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Abstract
This is a dissertation about two questions. The questions are whether
the senses of the expressions of a language can be mathematically modelled,
and in case they can, how can these senses be mathematically modelled.
This is also a dissertation about an answer: intensions, despite being a good
mathematization of senses, are not a sufficient means for grasping senses
totally. Intensions are not a new concept, they have a long history with
roots on a logic of Sense and Denotation which started with Frege, was
developed syntactically and axiomatically by Church, and semantically by
Montague. Thanks to them, senses and intensions are currently familiar
notions for logicians. And although senses continue being a more obscure
notion, intensions however are a well defined concept: they are functions
from possible worlds to objects.
The present work offers two formal languages with intensions: a First-
Order Intensional Hybrid Logic and an Intensional Hybrid Type Theory.
Both languages include expressions denoting intensions and also a hybrid
machinery for extensionalizing the intensions at given worlds of a model. But
they are not purely intensional languages, since they also include expressions
for denoting extensions. A powerful type notation is also included in order
to differentiate intensional and extensional expressions, intensional and ex-
tensional predication, and well formed formulas. The distinction between
intensional and extensional predication amounts to claiming the existence
of two kinds of concepts of predicates: one intended as a function between
concepts and the other as a function between objects and concepts.
The traditional issues in intensional logic—constant and varying domain
models and de dicto and de re readings—are also analyzed from a novel point
of view due to the fact that the previous languages do not only include in-
tensional expressions, but also hybrid operators and a disambiguating type
notation. The problem of non-denoting terms is studied assuming that in-
tensions are partial functions; and the problem of the identity of senses,
although solved for alethic contexts by means of the identity of intensions,
needs a more fine-grained solution for epistemic contexts. A more precise
answer can be found going beyond intensions to the hyperintensions realm.
Some philosophical notions, as existence and denotation, are also explored
from the point of view of our formal languages. Finally, Gödel’s proof for the
ii
existence of God and Caramuel’s argument against the existence of God are
analyzed in order to offer two suggestive exercises for intensional logic and
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4.3.5 Inconvenient Consequences of Gödel’s Proof . . . . . . 184
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What does “intensional” mean?
The first problem we need to face when addressing the topic of intensions is
to search for an adequate definition. The origin of intensions can be traced
back to the research about the meaning of linguistic expressions. But are
intensions and meaning the same thing? We know that meaning is a complex
concept, a very difficult one to grasp, as shown by the history of logic and
other linguistic sciences. “Instead of dealing with such a difficult concept, it
should be better to reduce it to a more understandable one,” was possibly
the thought of the researchers in the field. And, so, intensions appeared.
While meaning is an elusive notion, intensions can be mathematically studied
because they are functions: functions from worlds to entities. These entities
can be individuals, truth values, sets of individuals,... The understanding of
intensions as functions makes things so much easier, but the question about
the adequacy of the notion of intension as an explanation of the concept of
meaning still remains, in our view, open to discussion.
To say that intensions do not exhaust the content of meaning is not
the same as saying that intensions cannot provide us with a good way for
approaching the notion of meaning. A real understanding does not always
imply a complete one. Therefore, we will make use of intensions as the most
useful approach to the concept of meaning we have so far.
Furthermore, intensions raise also the question of what really is an in-
tensional logic. Many logics are considered to be intensional: from the basic
propositional modal logic to the more complex formal languages of epistemic
logic. There are theories which qualify a logic as intensional if the exten-
sionality principles do not apply,1 other views see intensionality related to
expressions such as necessity, possibility,... and some say that intensionality
derives from oblique contexts. To this diversity we can add that intensional-
ity is sometimes seen only as a feature of the semantics of the language, while
others vindicate intensionality as a characteristic linked to the language of a
1Here the extensionality principles I refer to are those that apply in set theory.
1
logic, where you should find intensional variables, constants and operators.
Hence, the answer to the question about what really characterizes a logic as
intensional is a difficult task too.
Surely all the aforementioned logics can be considered intensional in a
proper way, but what we really are looking for, is an intensional logic in its
deeper sense. A logic which can deal with intensions in its semantics and
also in its language. Consequently, a logic with only intensional semantic in-
terpretations of expressions of a merely extensional language does not fulfill
our objectives. We need a formal language where its expressions may denote
intensions and not only express them. It means that our formal language will
include different kinds of expressions: some denoting intensions and others
denoting extensions, and not a unique kind of expressions interpreted ex-
tensionally or intensionally depending only on the context. Furthermore, we
want to add to the more common extensional predication—where a predicate
is said of an object—a way for predicating of intensions, that is, of the func-
tions as a whole. In order to incorporate this, we will need to add some new
machinery to the languages based on classical logic and modal logic. The
new machinery, containing mainly a wider range of expressions of different
types and hybrid operators, are not easy to incorporate. There are some
profound modifications to be done in the syntax and semantics of the formal
languages. But it will be worth it.
In order to fully understand the new machinery and because we are in the
search of the core of intensionality, we have decided to make a progressive
development of our research about this concept.
The Chapters
The present dissertation is divided in three parts, each part corresponding
to a word of the title. The first part, characterized by the word intensions,
pretends to be a historical account about how intensions became increasingly
important in the logic of the last century. The second part, represented by
the word types, is more technical, and focus on the description of formal lan-
guages whose expressions, even in first-order modal logic, belong to a given
type. The third part, labelled with the word existence, is an application of
our results about intensions and types to philosophical matters, particularly,
to the ontological proofs for and against the existence of God. The different
chapters of this dissertation take the previous triple division and make it con-
crete by means of a detailed study of the historical background of intensions,
formal languages or philosophical problems.
Chapter 1, which should be identified with the first part (intensions),
offers an historical account of intensional logic. It is far from comprehensive,
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since our dissertation is not mainly an exposition on the History of inten-
sional logic. It covers only three authors of this History: Frege, Church and
Montague, whose choice is more than justified. Frege (1892) introduced the
idea into contemporary logic that it is possible to differentiate between what
a name denotes (Bedeutung) and what a name expresses (Sinn). Church
(1951) offered the first formal language and the first system of axioms for
dealing with a logic of Sense (Sinn) and Reference (Bedeutung). And Mon-
tague (1974b) came up with a semantics for an intensional logic in order to
link natural language to formal languages. Therefore, we have taken from
Frege the idea, from Church the formal language and from Montague the se-
mantics, the three elements which will be the core of the following chapters.
In chapter 2 we take as our start point two works, published more re-
cently, in intensional logic: (Fitting & Mendelsohn, 1998) and (Braüner,
2008). We begin with a presentation of the syntax and semantics of one of
the formal languages included in (Fitting & Mendelsohn, 1998) and of the
first-order intensional hybrid logic of Braüner (2008). But our presentation
has not been a mere copy, it has added a type notation to the expressions of
the language, something which will show its importance later. Two different
semantic approaches have been presented in this chapter: one with varying
domain models and other with constant domain models. Furthermore, we
have discussed the formal definitions of two predicates: denotation and exis-
tence, when varying domain models are considered. There are also analyses
about the problem of predicating of concepts and not only of objects, about
the issue of negative formulas which have non-denoting terms, and about the
behavior of predicate abstracts and hybrid operators as two different ways
of giving us a successful disambiguation procedure between the readings de
dicto and de re of formulas with modal operators.
After having made a critical analysis identifying the achievements and
also the difficulties of (Fitting & Mendelsohn, 1998) and (Braüner, 2008), we
have continued the search of a more satisfactory first-order intensional hybrid
logic. We have tested some hypothetical claims in order to identify what
types must have the concepts of an extensional expression. For example, if a
monary extensional predicate is of type 〈ιo〉, what is the type of a concept of
this predicate? 〈ιo〉1, 〈ι1o1〉, 〈ιo1〉 or 〈ι1o〉? We have arrived to the conclusion
(unlike Church) that the concepts of functional types, such as 〈ιo〉1, do not
have to be only functions on concepts, such as 〈ι1o1〉, but also functions
from extensional objects to concepts 〈ιo1〉. This thesis together with some
other results derived from our section 2.4: “Laboratory of Intensions”, have
provided us with new insights into intensional logic. Based on these insights
we have developed a First-Order Intensional Hybrid Logic, which allows us
to give a great deal of expressiveness to a formal language together with
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a successful account of extensional and intensional predication, and also to
offer a formalization of the predicates of denotation and existence, within a
constant domain model, with intensional terms and hybrid operators.
In chapter 3 we have gone beyond a First-Order Intensional Hybrid Logic
and we have presented our Intensional Hybrid Type Theory. A Type Theory
that, unlike Montague’s Intensional Logic, has not only expressions inter-
preted intensionally but also expressions, other than variables, interpreted
extensionally. We have claimed that, since our logic is not purely inten-
sional, we can use it as a unifier between pure extensional logics and pure in-
tensional ones. Moreover, this chapter centers also in the analysis of Russell’s
and Frege’s Theory of Descriptions, and includes the problematic around the
evaluation of formulas that derives from the inclusion of terms which do not
designate. The final section of this chapter is dedicated to the identity of
senses. This issue was crucial for Frege and Church and, in fact, the roots
of intensional logic can be found in the search of a theory which gives a
satisfactory account of the identity of two senses. We have shown that iden-
tity of intensions is not sufficient for doing this and, apart from the three
Alternatives of Church, we have done a brief exposition of the theories of
Pavel Tichý and of Yiannis Moschovakis as possible candidates for solving
the problem with success. Chapters 2 and 3 correspond with our second part
labelled with the word types.
Finally, in chapter 4, our third and last part: existence, we have taken
the ontological arguments of Gödel and Caramuel as practical exercises for
intensional logic. The first is an argument for proving the existence of God
while the second is an argument against it. Here we have used our previous
formal languages as a tool of analysis of notions such as existence, necessary
existence, essence, positive property and, even, nothingness. Even though our
study of the arguments has not been focused on the demonstration procedure,
the formal account of the notions involved in the axioms, definitions and
theorems of the arguments provides us with an insight into philosophical
problems. A Formal Ontology, as a field of research where philosophical
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Chapter 1
A Brief History of Intensional
Logic
The present chapter is a partial presentation of the history of intensional
logic.1 It is partial in a double sense: it is centered practically in the twentieth
century, and it only pays attention to three authors: Frege, Church and
Montague. We have chosen these authors because they are three milestones
for any contemporary study on intensionality. The idea of dealing with senses
from the point of view of a formal language can be found already in Frege.
The first language and axiomatic system for a logic of sense and denotation
is given by Church. And a possible world semantics for an intensional logic
is offered by Montague.
Our exposition follows the order of the publications of three main works
in the field of intensional logic: Frege (1892), Church (1951) and Montague
(1974b). Since Frege and Montague have been studied more extensively, we
have dedicated a more exhaustive analysis to Church, whose intensional logic
does not seem to have received the attention of many logicians or linguists,
apart from his doctoral students. That is the reason of the irregular length
of the different sections that the reader is going to find below.
1“Recognition that designating terms have a dual nature is far from recent. The Port-
Royal Logic used terminology that translates as ‘comprehension’ and ‘denotation’ for this.
John Stuart Mill used ‘connotation’ and ‘denotation.’ Frege famously used ‘Sinn’ and
‘Bedeutung,’ often left untranslated, but when translated, these usually become ‘sense’
and ‘reference.’ Carnap settled on ‘intension’ and ‘extension.’ However expressed, and
with variation from author to author, the essential dichotomy is that between what a
term means, and what it denotes.” (Fitting, 2015).
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1.1 Frege on Intensionality
1.1.1 Introduction
In Frege there is a philosophy of intensional entities but there is no intensional
logic. By absence of intensional logic we mean that there is (in the writings
of Frege) no formal logic which develops intensional logic in the same way
as extensional logic was developed in Begriffsschrift (1879). On the contrary
there can be found a philosophy of intensionality under the name of a theory
of sense and reference, which is explained in depth in the article Über Sinn
und Bedeutung (1892). Sinn is usually translated as sense into english and
is expressed by a name, while Bedeutung is usually translated as reference
(or denotation) into english and is indicated (or denoted, or referred) by a
name.
1.1.2 Having Sense and Reference
We can say that names have both senses (Sinne) and references (Bedeutun-
gen), but what they really are is by far a more difficult question. We can
affirm that the expression Pope Francis has a sense and has also a reference:
its sense is a kind of mode of presentation or cognitive content someone has
when is thinking about it; its reference is the actual person who rules the
Catholic Church. It can be the case that two names have the same reference
but different senses, so we can consider the same person to be presented as
Pope Francis or as Jorge Mario Bergoglio. In this case the referent is the
same but the sense of the expression “Pope Francis” is different from the
sense of “Jorge Mario Bergoglio”.
We can assume therefore that names, sentences and other expressions
have senses and references. When dealing with the expressions Pope Francis
and Jorge Mario Bergoglio we identify that the referent of them is a person,
but what are their senses? We have considered they are different from each
other, but what really are they?
1.1.3 Being Sense and Reference
For Frege there are two categories of expressions: “complete expressions” and
“incomplete expressions”. Complete expressions such as terms and sentences
have objects as their referent. The particularity of sentences is that, on the
one hand, they have as referent one of the truth values, and on the other
hand, as sense they have a proposition or Gedanke (i.e., a thought). However
incomplete expressions such as functional expressions or grammatical pred-
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icates have no objects as their referent, but functions. The question of the
sense of this kind of expressions is much more difficult to solve, and I will
henceforth try to go into detail about this in what follows.
It seems to us that it is easy to find a perfect match between Frege’s
analysis of language and Frege’s ontology. It is usually thought2 that Frege’s
ontology consists of objects, which are complete entities, and functions, which
are incomplete or unsaturated entities. The two categories of linguistic ex-
pressions, complete and incomplete, are connected with each entity respec-
tively. The sense and reference of complete expressions are objects, while
the sense and reference of incomplete expressions must be some kind of in-
complete entities. Incomplete expressions such as “the square root of ( )”
(a functional expression) and “( ) is a planet” (a grammatical predicate),
have as referent functions, but what do they have as sense? Also functions?
Some researchers have answered this question introducing “sense-functions”,
which would be the sense of functional expressions (Church, 1951). So “sense-
functions” would be functions in the realm of sense which are expressed by
incomplete expressions. Nevertheless, other philosophers, Dummett, for ex-
ample,3 do not agree with this interpretation and understand the sense of
incomplete expressions as a peculiar sort of object which possesses a certain
kind of incompleteness.
In addition to the interpretations of Church and Dummet, we have found
compelling the interpretation of Klement who endorses the claim that the
sense of function expressions are neither functions, nor objects, but a “par-
ticular type of unsaturated entity in the realm of Sinn” (Klement, 2002, p.
74). The problem with this interpretation is that it broadens Frege’s ontol-
ogy introducing besides objects and functions, a third type of entity. This
new kind of entity “can be understood as packets of descriptive information
that are somehow incomplete in the sense of having missing information”
(Klement, 2002, p. 76).
Therefore, to sum up, concerning linguistic expressions, we can choose be-
tween two possible referents: object and function; and three possible senses:
object or sense-function or a third entity which is the “sense of incomplete
2“Frege’s ontology is usually taken to divide exhaustively between objects and func-
tions; all complete entities are objects, and all incomplete or unsaturated entities are
functions. Certainly, there is textual evidence to support this reading. In Frege’s own
words, ‘an object is anything that is not a function’ (CP 147, cf. BL §2).” (Klement,
2002, p. 66).
3“Although other authors have pointed out problems with the view that the Sinne of
incomplete expressions are such sense-functions, Dummett is the only writer on Frege who
has seriously challenged it as the true interpretation of what Frege understood the Sinne
of incomplete expressions to be.” (Klement, 2002, p. 67).
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expression”. Introducing the latter, Klement does not reject the existence
of sense-functions, but in case they exist they would not be the sense of
incomplete expressions.
1.1.4 Senses Contextualized
A particular problem between sense and reference arises when we have to deal
with identity statements. In direct (we can also say extensional) contexts,
what really matters is reference, and the truth of identity statements involves
only the referents. But in indirect (we can also say intensional) or “oblique
contexts”, what really matters is sense.
In direct contexts if we say “The best friend of Sancho Panza is Alonso
Quijano” and supposing that “Alonso Quijano is Don Quijote de la Mancha”,
we can see how Leibniz’s law of substitutivity of identicals works because
there is no difficulty in accepting that “The best friend of Sancho Panza is
Don Quijote de la Mancha”. However, there is a real challenge to Leibniz’s
law when we are considering indirect contexts such as “I think that...”, “I
believe that...” and so on. In these contexts the sentences “Tony believes
that Don Quijote is the best friend of Sancho Panza” and “Tony believes
that Alonso Quijano is the best friend of Sancho Panza” might not be true
at the same time, so they are not logically equivalent and therefore Leibniz’s
law fails. What is the reason of this failure?
Frege solves the problem saying that there are two kinds of referents:
direct (or primary) and indirect (or secondary). Primary referents are the
usual referents and are designated by the expressions in direct contexts. Sec-
ondary referents are, however, the senses of the expressions, and they are
in fact the authentic reference of the expressions in “oblique contexts”. So
Leibniz’s law of substitutivity of identicals fails because the referents of the
expressions in indirect contexts are not identical, because they are dealing
with their senses, which are not identical either.
If interchangeability of expressions with different senses is allowed with-
out implying a change in the truth value of the whole, then we would be
dealing with identity of senses. And hence we can identify the conditions
two expressions may accomplish for having the same sense, that is, to be
interchangeable in indirect contexts.
1.1.5 What, then, are Senses?
After some deliberation, we find the realm of referents more approachable
than the realm of senses. In order to clarify this puzzle we are going to try
collecting the basic features of sense in Frege:
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1. The sense of a name or proposition is an object.
2. The sense of an incomplete expression is either a “sense-function”
(Church, 1951) or a “particular type of unsaturated entity” (Klement,
2002, p. 76).
3. Senses exist within a third realm apart from physical objects and psy-
chological entities (Frege, 1984, pp. 363-372).
4. The entities within this third realm are “objective but incapable of full
causal interaction with the physical world” (Klement, 2002, p. 63).
5. There are expressions that have a sense but do not possess a reference:
“the largest natural number” or “the least rapidly convergent series”
(Frege, 1984, p. 159).4
6. Every sense picks out a unique entity.
7. Identity of senses has to do with interchangeability in indirect contexts.5
8. There is an over-existence of senses:
(a) Every existing entity is picked out by some sense.
(b) Every entity defined by any set of conditions is presented by a
sense.
(c) Every sense is also picked out by another sense.
1.1.6 Conclusion
With regard to the division between intension and extension currently used
in logic, we think it is necessary to make more clear some ideas. After Carnap
(1947) and Kripke (1959, 1963), and in many current approaches to inten-
sional logic, intensions are understood as functions from worlds to some kind
of entities; extensions nevertheless would be other kind of entities different
4“Another defect of ordinary language Frege identifies is that it employs expressions
with Sinne that present or pick out no object as Bedeutungen (CP 159, 162-3). That
there should be such Sinne is not surprising given the reading of Sinne given here. A
Sinn consists of a set of criteria or conditions and picks out an object in virtue of it alone
satisfying those conditions. However, certainly, there are conditions or criteria that are
not satisfied by any unique object. Frege gives as example the expression ‘the least rapidly
converging series’ (CP 159).” (Klement, 2002, p. 62).
5“Frege’s primary criterion for the identity conditions of Sinne is that phrases express-
ing them should be interchangeable even in all singly oblique contexts.” (Klement, 2002,
p. 126).
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of intensions. Establishing a mere translation between sense and reference,
on the one hand, and intension and extension, on the other hand, can be
quite confusing. Therefore we consider that there is no a parallelism between
the current division intensional/extensional and the Frege’s distinction be-
tween sense/reference. For Frege sense and reference are not two distinct
categories of entities because senses can be also referents, as in the case of
indirect contexts. Therefore it could be wrapped up that the current ap-
proach to intensional terminology cannot be found in Frege. However, we
can arrive to the conclusion that what we currently call intensions originates
from Frege’s senses, and senses for him are some kind of entities that belong
to a third realm (different of the physical and psychological world) and that
are expressed, although not exhausted, by linguistic expressions.
Finally, although it is widely known and may sound repetitive, we do not
find any formal apparatus in the logical notation of Frege which can deal
with senses or oblique contexts. Consequently we have a theory of sense and
reference but not a logic of sense and reference.
1.2 Church on Intensionality
1.2.1 Introduction
Logic of Sense and Denotation is how Church6 called to what we are going to
name Church’s Intensional Logic, a lifelong project revisited again and again
for fifty years in some of his papers.
In the first pages7 of his Introduction to Mathematical Logic (1956, pp.
3–9) Church cites Frege’s distinction between sense and reference where he
sees an issue that should be studied in depth at another time. In an ab-
stract published in 1946 entitled A Formulation of the Logic of Sense and
Denotation a well-structured study project is shown (Church, 1946). The
development will come in an article, which shares the title with the abstract,
published in 1951, wherein we can find the basis of his work on intensionality
(Church, 1951).
But Church (1951) is not the end of an intensional logic, it is only the
beginning. And it is not a simple beginning. The new logistic system, which
wants to deal with the sense of the names and not only with their denotation,
is systematized in three different alternatives: Alternative (2), Alternative
(1) and Alternative (0). These can be differentiated by the conditions that
6For an introduction to Church, see (Manzano, 1997)
7This pages were written between September, 1947 and June, 1948, as Church himself
recognizes on his Preface (1956, p. v).
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make two names to have the same sense. The greater the number of the
alternative, the weaker the conditions and the easier the study. In (Church,
1951) only the first of the aforementioned alternatives is developed in depth,
the second one is only presented briefly, and the third one is not analyzed
in any way (Church, 1951, pp. 6–7). The articles written in the 1951-1993
period revisit the 1951 paper from different points of view: dealing with some
kind of antinomies, changing some axioms, developing Alternative (2), giving
some semantic interpretation in models and so on. These issues will be taken
into consideration by Church for the rest of his life: indeed, until 1993, when
he wrote his last paper about the logic of sense and denotation (Church,
1993). All this seems to suggest that Church’s work on the logic of sense
and denotation was never considered complete but a work in progress. But
before taking over from Church the unfinished tasks of the logic of sense and
denotation, it is necessary to look back to the grounds of his intensional logic.
There we find that the logic proposed in 1951 takes into account the system
of A Formulation of the Simple Theory of Types (Church, 1940). Since it is
supposed familiarity with this paper, we would like to remember the main
features of his simple theory of types.
1.2.2 Church’s Type Theory
If we are going to understand the logic of sense and denotation we need to
have at least a general knowledge of Church’s notation and its peculiarities
(Manzano, 1996, pp. 205–210). First of all, it must be said that his formula-
tion incorporates certain features of the calculus of λ-conversion, introduced
in Church (1932) and Church (1941), and takes the concept of function as
primitive, since properties and relations can be considered as functions from
entities to truth values. He follows also the tradition after Schönfinkel that
functions of more than one argument can be represented in terms of functions
of one argument whose values are themselves functions (Schönfinkel, 1967).
This procedure allows him to consider only functions of one argument at a
time.
Definition 1.2.1 (Type symbols). The class of type symbols is determined
by the following rules:8
1. ι is a type symbol;
2. o is a type symbol;
3. If β and α are type symbols,then (βα) is a type symbol.
8See (Church, 1940, p. 56).
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Comment 1.2.2. Type symbols are written as subscripts upon variables
and constants of the formal language indicating the type of the variable or
constant (propositional, individual or functional):
1. Individual type symbol: The greek letter iota, ι, is the type of
individuals.
2. Propositional type symbol: The greek letter omicron, o, is the type
of propositions.
3. Functional type symbol: If β and α are type symbols, then (βα) is
a type symbol of functions from elements of type symbol β to elements
of type symbol α.
Although Church’s reading of the functional type symbols is always from
right to left and the omission of parentheses presupposes that association is to
the left, we have not followed his customary approach.9 For reasons of clarity,
we have done some modifications in Church’s notation in order to render
the formulas easier to understand for most current readers. Type symbols,
therefore, must be read from left to right and functional type symbols such
as (βα) should be interpreted as functions from type β to type α. In order
to reduce the number of brackets, when we find a typed formula with more
than two type symbols we assume that association is to the right. Therefore,
from this point on, types written (αβ) in Church’s notation, will be written
(βα) and interpreted as functions from type β in type α. A type (oα)β in
Church’s notation will be written as β(αo) and abbreviated as βαo. If we





9It is common to read functions from left to right, and it can be, in a certain way,
counterintuitive to read the functional types from right to left, but we can find useful
Church’s reading direction because in such a way the first type symbol in the subscript
indicates the type were the function ends, and so we can know more quickly the final range
of the function. If we have a sequence of type symbols which starts with o then we know
that we have a propositional function, i.e., a function whose values are propositions (truth
values, in fact).
10Although Church’s simple type theory is an attempt to replace set theory as a basis
for mathematics, it is possible to translate Church’s functional terminology into a set
theoretical framework we are more familiar with. In this sense, the properties we usually
interpret as sets in our semantics are in Church’s terms characteristic functions, and to
say that an individual has a property, what we usually translate as the membership of
an element in a set, can also be said as the characteristic function having value truth for
this element. So the type symbol ιo represents a unary relation, ιιo a binary relation, and
so on. If α is any type symbol, αo is intended as a set of elements of type α; if α and
β are both type symbols, βαo represents a binary relation between elements of type β
and elements of type α. On the contrary, a function from individuals to individuals can
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that is,
gβαo : Dβ → Dαo
x 7→ fαo :Dα → Do
y 7→ T, F
Example 1.2.3. For example, ιo will be the abbreviation of (ιo), ooo of
o(oo), (ιι)ιι of ((ιι)(ιι)),... and for a longer expression, if α, β, γ, δ are
type symbols, then αβγδ abbreviates (α(β(γδ))), which means the type of
functions from elements of type α to elements of type (β(γδ)), which are in
turn functions from elements of type β to elements of type (γδ), which are
in turn functions from elements of type γ to elements of type δ.
Definition 1.2.4 (Types). The hierarchy of types, intended as a family of
domains, is built inductively from the basic types to the functional types:
1. Basic types:
• Dι, is the type of individuals.
• Do = {T, F}, is the type of the truth values.
2. Funcional types:
• D(βα) = D
Dβ
α , is the type of all functions from Dβ to Dα.
Example 1.2.5. We know that he following type symbol ιιo denotes the
functional type from ι to ιo, which is in turn the functional type from ι to o.
But how can it be interpreted? It can be seen as the type of propositional
functions of two individual variables. For example, “x is the father of y”.
The functional type symbol ιo, which expresses a function from individuals
to truth values, represents suitably a set or a property, so that one element
belongs to a set or an individual has a given property if the function repre-
senting the set or property maps that element to truth. For example, “y is
green”.
Syntax
The primitive symbols of the language can be divided into the following two
categories:
be represented by the type symbol ιι, etc. We can thus deal with sets, properties and
relations, which are here considered as certain kind of functions.
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1. Improper symbols:
• the abstraction operator: λ;
• the parenthesis: (, ), 〈, 〉;
• the dot: .
2. Proper symbols:
• Logical constants: Noo (negation), Aooo (disjunction), Π(αo)o (it is
used to express the idea of universal quantification) and ı(αo)α (it
is a selection operator, note that we have left the greek letter iota,
ι, as the type symbol for individuals and therefore this is the vowel
i without the dot and in italics), for each type symbol α;
• Variables: an infinite list of type α, for each type symbol α:








α, . . .
Definition 1.2.6 (Formula). A formula is any finite sequence of primitive
symbols, some of these sequences are well-formed and we call them well-
formed formulas (wff ). They are also said to have a certain type according
with the following rules:11
1. A formula consisting of a single proper symbol (a logical constant or a
variable) with a type symbol α is a well-formed formula of type α.
2. If xβ is a variable of type β and Aα is a wff of type α, then 〈λxβ.Aα〉
is a wff of type βα.
3. If Aβα and Bβ are wff of types βα and β respectively, then (AβαBβ) is
a wff of type α.
Comment 1.2.7. Following rule 1. of formation of formulas we can consider
that Noo is a wff of type oo and aα is a wff of type α. According with rule 2.,
we can build wffs by abstraction, because λ is called an abstraction operator.
This kind of formulas denotes the function whose value on any argument xβ is
Aα, therefore its interpretation is in D
Dβ
α . Finally, rule 3. allows juxtaposition
to create wffs. A formula like (AβαBβ) can be interpreted as the value of the
function of type (βα) denoted by Aβα for the argument of type β.
Definition 1.2.8 (Free and bound variable). Like both quantifiers in first
order logic: ∀ and ∃, λ is also a variable binder. An occurrence of a variable
xβ in a wff is bound if it is an occurrence in a well-formed part of the formula
having the form 〈λxβ.Aα〉, and is free if it is not an occurrence in a well-
formed part of the formula having the form 〈λxβ.Aα〉.
11Cf. (Church, 1940, p. 57).
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Definition 1.2.9 (Abbreviations). Various conventions of abbreviations can
also be used:12
1. (¬Ao) ::= NooAo
2. (Ao ∨Bo) ::= AoooAoBo
3. (Ao ∧Bo) ::= (¬((¬Ao) ∨ (¬Bo)))
4. (Ao → Bo) ::= ((¬Ao) ∨Bo)
5. (Ao ↔ Bo) ::= ((Ao → Bo) ∧ (Bo → Ao))
6. (∀xαAo) ::= Π(αo)o〈λxα.Ao〉
7. (∃xαAo) ::= (¬∀xα¬Ao)
8. ( xαAo) ::= ı(αo)α〈λxα.Ao〉
9. Qααo ::= 〈λxα.〈λyα.∀fαo(fαoxα → fαoyα)〉〉
10. (Aα = Bα) ::= QααoAαBα
Comment 1.2.10. These abbreviations (with the usual propositional con-
nectives) have an appearance more familiar to us than the polish notation
of the unabbreviated expressions. We can also give a brief account of each
abbreviation as follows:
1. The negation function takes a truth value and returns also a truth
value, that is the reason why has type oo.
2. Disjunction takes two truth values and returns also a truth value.
3. Conjunction corresponds to a binary function from truth values to truth
values, so it has type ooo.
4. Conditional is also a binary function from truth values to truth values,
with type ooo.
5. The same applies to the biconditional.
12Cf. (Church, 1940, p. 58).
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6. The universal quantifier is defined by means of the constant Π(αo)o and
is a propositional function of propositional functions.13 If the propo-
sitional function 〈λxα.Ao〉 maps all elements of type α to truth, then
the propositional function Π(αo)o maps also the former propositional
function to truth.
7. The existential quantifier is defined as usual by means of the universal
quantifier.
8. The upside-down iota,  , is Russell’s definite description operator, which
is defined by means of a logical constant, the selection operator ı. It
acts as a function of propositional functions.14
9. Qααo is a propositional function and expresses the idea behind Leibniz’s
identity of two elements having the same properties.
10. This abbreviation takes into account the Leibnizian identity of indis-
cernibles for dealing with equality. According with this definition two
elements x and y are the same if and only if y has every property that
x has.
Church gives also the definition of the natural numbers, which have the
functional type (αα)(αα), abbreviated α′ (although there can also be natural
numbers of type α′′, i.e., (α′α′)(α′α′)), of the successor function Sα′α′ , of the
predecessor function P , of the propositional function which expresses “to be
a natural number” N , and some more definitions. We will not dwell on elu-
cidating these abbreviations because they are more interesting for studying
the foundations of mathematics than for dealing with intensional logic.
Rules of Inference
Church (1940, p. 60) presents six rules which can be divided into two groups:
the first three rules are called rules of λ-conversion, and the last three ones are
similar to the classical rules of substitution, modus ponens and generalization.
13In set theoretical terminology, it denotes a property of sets, namely, the property of
being universal. The set defined by 〈λxα.Ao〉, which is a formula of type αo, has the
property Π(αo)o if and only if the set of type αo contains all elements of type α.
14In set theoretical terminology, the selection operator selects an element of type α of
the set described by the type symbol αo.
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• Rules of λ-conversion:
1. Alphabetic change of bound variable. To replace any part Mα of a
formula by the result of substituting yβ for xβ throughout Mα, i.e.,
Mα[yβ/xβ], provided that xβ is not a free variable of Mα and yβ does
not occur in Mα.
2. λ-contraction. To replace any part 〈λxβ.Mα〉(Nβ) of a formula by
the result of substituting Nβ for xβ throughout Mα, i.e., Mα[Nβ/xβ]
provided that the bound variables of Mα are distinct both from xβ and
from the free variables of Nβ.
3. λ-expansion. Where Aα is the result of substituting Nβ for xβ through-
out Mα, to replace any part Aα of a formula by 〈λxβ.Mα〉(Nβ), pro-
vided that the bound variables of Mα are distinct both from xβ and
from the free variables of Nβ. I.e., to infer 〈λxβ.Mα〉(Nβ) from Aα
if Aα can be inferred from 〈λxβ.Mα〉(Nβ) by a single application of
λ-contraction.
• Rules of substitution, modus ponens and generalization:
4. Substitution. From Fαoxα to infer FαoAα, provided that xα is not a
free variable of Fαo.
5. Modus ponens. From Ao → Bo, and Ao, to infer Bo.
6. Generalization. From Fαoxα to infer Π(αo)oFαo, provided that xα is not
a free variable of Fαo.
1.2.3 Church’s Intensional Logic
The simple theory of types is extended with new symbols (subscripts, a new
“intensional” primitive constant) in order to improve the expressive power of
the previous language. This new language is located within the framework
of Frege’s research on intensionality.
Church knows about the theory of sense and denotation that Frege pro-
poses. He even thinks that Frege would have agreed with a formal treatment
of these issues within an intensional logic. But Frege did not build any formal
system dealing with senses and referents, however he serves as an impulse
for building it. That is where Alonzo Church’s tentative starts. Church’s
logic is inspired by Frege but it does not reflect Frege’s theory on sense and
denotation. Church is aware of having preserved the important features of
the theory of Frege, but he is also conscious of having deviated from Frege’s
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views, at least in the introduction of the simple theory of types and perhaps
in the abandonment of the notion of a function as something unsaturated.15
However, for Church an expression or a name, which is intended as a
closed well formed formula, expresses its sense and refers or denotes its de-
notation. The sense of a name presents or picks univocally out its denotation.
What the names denote are entities and the entities which can be senses of
a name are concepts. And a concept picks out or is a concept of an entity in
a unique manner.
In Church’s writings, sense and denotation translate the words Sinn and
Bedeutung of Frege. However, although the fregean Begriff is translated as
concept in english, for Church concepts and Begriffe have an entirely different
meaning. Concepts are intensional entities, anything which can be considered
as the sense of a word, as long as Begriffe are intended as predicates or
properties.16 On senses and concepts can also be individuated the following
features:
• Senses are not univocally connected with a particular language. The
same sense can be expressed by names in different languages.
• The existence of concepts is independent of the existence of names.
We can suppose the existence of concepts although there are no actual
names in any particular language which express these concepts.
• We can assume the existence of more concepts than names, in fact, we
can suppose a non-enumerable infinity of concepts.
In order to clarify how Church uses his own terminology and how is linked
or differentiated of the vocabulary of Frege, the diagram in Figure 1.1 can
be found useful.
Definition 1.2.11 (Intensional type symbols). We add subscripts to the type
symbols in definition 1.2.1 in order to obtain the intensional type symbols.
We have then:
1. An infinite list of symbols ι0, ι1, ι2,... where ι0 is written as ι and is
the same type symbol ι of the simple theory of types. ι0 is the type of
individuals; and ιi+1 is the type of the senses of expressions of type ιi.
15“In favor of a notion according to which the name of a function may be treated in the
same manner as any other name.” (Church, 1951, p. 4).
16“In order to describe what the members of each type are to be, it will be convenient
to introduce the term concept in a sense which is entirely different from that of Frege’s
Begriff [...] Namely anything which is capable of being the sense of a name of x is called





















Figure 1.1: Linguistic and ontological terminology in Church’s intensional
logic.
2. An infinite list of symbols o0, o1, o2,... where o0 is written as o and is
the same type symbol o of the simple theory of types. o0 is the type of
truth values, o1 is the type of senses of the truth values or the type of
propositions, oi+1, is the type of the senses of expressions of type oi.
3. If α and β are any type symbols, then (βα) is a type symbol for func-
tions. If F(βα) and Aβ are of type (βα) and β respectively, then F(βα)Aβ
is of type α.
Definition 1.2.12 (Intensional types). We add to definition 1.2.4 on page 14
the following clause:
4. If Dα is a type, then Dα1 is a type.
Comment 1.2.13. As in the simple theory of types, greek letters: α, β, γ
are used as metavariables for type symbols. Subscript n is used upon such
greek letters (αn) to indicate the result of increasing all subscripts in the type
symbol by n, where n is any of the natural numbers 0, 1, 2, ... For example,
if α is (ιo)(ι1o1)o, then α1 is (ι1o1)(ι2o2)o1, and α2 is (ι2o2)(ι3o3)o2. The rule
for parentheses is the same as before, with the convention that association is
to the right.
Definition 1.2.14. For each type symbol α there is a corresponding domain
which we call the type α.
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• Type o is the type of the truth values: truth and falsehood. Type
o1 is the type of concepts of truth-values, also called propositions or
Gedanken, following Frege. Type o2 is the type of concepts of propo-
sitions or propositional concepts. Generally, type oi+1 is the type of
concepts of the members of the type oi.
• Type ι is the type of individuals. It can be finite, infinite or empty.
Type ι1 is the type of concepts of individuals or individual concepts.
Generally, type ιi+1 is the type of concepts of the members of the type
ιi.
• If α and β are two types, we have the type (βα) of functions, where
the argument is a member of type β and the value of the function is a
member of type α.
Comment 1.2.15. The family of domains that build the hierarchy of types
in Church’s intensional logic is simplified by reducing the domains of the
conceptual types. As purely extensional types we have: the type of the truth
values Do = {T, F}; the type of individuals: Dι; and the functional type Dαβ,
which consists of all the functions from type α to β. To these types we add
the conceptual types: for the types of truth values and individuals we have
an intensional hierarchy composed by Don and Dιn for n = {1, 2, ...}. For
the functional type we would expect a type such as D(αβ)n , to which belong
the concepts of functions, but there is no such a kind of type in Church’s
intensional logic. Instead of creating a new separate type for the concept
of functions Church suggests that functions from concepts to concepts can
play the part of concepts of functions defined in Dαβ. Therefore the concepts
of functions are not to be found in a possible separate type D(αβ)n , but
in the type Dαnβn , i.e., the type which contains functions from concepts
to concepts. The concepts of functions are then considered as functions of
concepts, and that is the functional simplification in the type hierarchy which
Church adheres to until his last published paper concerning this issue in 1993,
where he explains that “a concept of a function of type αβ is itself a function
and is of type α1β1. This assumption is perhaps not unavoidable, but it
greatly simplifies the theory and we shall follow it” (Church, 1993, p. 142).
Definition 1.2.16 (Preferred type). Some selected types are considered pre-
ferred types, these are types which are necessarily non empty, even if the type
of individuals is empty. The preferred types avoid the appearance of deno-




• if β is a preferred type symbol, then αβ is a preferred type symbol.
Syntax
The improper symbols are the same as before and the proper symbols are:
• Logical constants: Cononon (conditional), Π(αnon)on (the universal pred-
icate), ι(βnon)βn (the selection operator), ∆αn+1αnon (it expresses the
relationship between the sense of a name and its denotation); for all
type symbols α, all preferred type symbols β, and all natural numbers
n.
• Variables: an infinite list of type α, for each type symbol α: aα, bα, . . . ,
a′α, b
′




α, . . .
The definitions of a formula and of free and bound variable are the same
of definition 1.2.6 and of definition 1.2.8.
Definition 1.2.17 (Abbreviations). The following abbreviations can be stated
using the logical constants:17
1. Aon → Bon := ConononAonBon
2. ∀xαnAon := Π(αnon)on〈λxαn .Aon〉
3. T := ∀ao(ao → ao)
4. Ton := ∀aon(aon → aon)
5. F := ∀aoao
6. Fon := ∀aonaon
7. ¬Aon := Aon → Fon
8. ∃xαnAon := ¬∀xαn¬Aon
9. ιxβnAon := ι(βnon)βn〈λxβn .Aon〉
10. Qααon := 〈λaα.〈λbα.∀fαon(fαonbα → fαonaα)〉〉
17Note that these abbreviations are not the same of definition 1.2.9 because in the simple
theory of types the primitive constants were not the same either.
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11. Aα = Bα := QααoBαAα
12. Aα =n Bα := QααonBαAα
13. Aα 6= Bα := ¬(Aα = Bα)
14. Aα 6=n Bα := ¬(Aα =n Bα)
15. 2onom := QononomTon , where m ≤ n
The constants: Cooo, Π(αo)o, T , F , ¬, =, 6= and ∃, amount to the con-
ditional, the universal predicate, truth, falsehood, negation, equality, non-
equality and the existential quantifier, respectively. The primitive constant:
ι(βo)β allows to create names through a description operator. Following
Frege’s idea, in order to reject the entrance to denotationless names into
a formalized language, Church restricts β to be a preferred type, which is
necessarily non-empty, wherein there has been selected a particular member
of the type called the designated member of that type. This device assures
that formulas such as ι(βo)βAβo do never lack a denotation. Despite this lim-
itation, Church believed in the possibility of constructing a language where
there could exist denotationless names:
It would also be possible, by recognizing functions having less
than an entire type as the range of the argument, to fix the
sense of ιβ(oβ) [our ι(βo)β] in such a way that names of the form
(ιβ(oβ)Aoβ) [our ι(βo)βAβo] would occur that have a sense but no
denotation. Frege held that such names do exist in the natural
languages, but avoided them in constructing a formalized lan-
guage. The writer believes that the construction of a formalized
language containing denotationless names should also be possible.
And it might well be worth while to carry out the construction
of such a language in spite of probable complications—if only as
a museum piece, to show that the avoidance of denotationless
names in a formalized language is a matter of option rather than
theoretical necessity. [...] There are sound reasons for the opinion
generally held that the meaningfulness of an expression of a for-
malized language must not be allowed to depend on any question
of extralinguistic fact. But these reasons refer to meaningfulness
in the sense of having a sense, rather than in the sense of having
a denotation. Therefore, tentatively, we shall allow that in some
language [...] there may be names which have a sense but no
denotation. Hence we also admit concepts that are not concepts
of anything. (Church, 1951, p. 14–15, footnote 16).
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The abbreviation ιxβ is therefore used as a description operator. This is
purposely differentiated from the description operator of Russell  , as used in
Principia Mathematica, which is contextually defined and it is not, strictly
speaking, a real description operator but a “mere typographical convenience”:
Strictly speaking, there is no description operator and there
are no descriptions in the formalized language of Principia Mathe-
matica. For the authors of Principia state explicitly that they re-
gard definitions generally as “mere typographical conveniences”—
thus not a part of their formalized language, but only a means
for its easier interpretation. In the case of an expression—say, a
description—introduced by contextual definition, this means that
when the longer expression in which it occurs is rewritten in full
there is found to be no well-formed part which can be identified
with the description. Hence the Fregean analysis of meaning must
not be applied to Russell’s descriptions. And, in particular, such
a description must not be said to denote, except as a manner
of speaking, introduced by a contextual definition applied to the
meta-language.
It is even possible that not only the “denotation” but also the
“sense” of a Russellian description might be introduced by con-
textual definition into the metatheory. But until this has actu-
ally been done for a particular formalized meta-language, these
expressions—especially the “sense”—must be used with a great
deal of caution, if at all. (Moreover, it seems unlikely that by such
a device the need can be done away with for a direct treatment
of intensional notions.) (Church, 1951, p. 15, footnote 17).
Instead of the symbol 2 for expressing necessity, Church has the constant
Nonom , which should not be confused with the primitive constant for negation:
Noo, of the simple theory of types. Subscripts in 2 can be omitted if m is 0
and if all the omitted information can be restored univocally.
Definition 1.2.18 (Concept of). The primitive constant ∆α1αo denotes a
binary function whose value is truth in case the first argument is a con-
cept of the second argument and is falsehood in the contrary case. So, in
∆α1αoAα1Aα, the expression Aα1 denotes the sense of the expression Aα. A
concept of x is anything which is capable of being the sense of a name of x.
Comment 1.2.19. In Church’s original notation, the primitive constant
∆ denotes a binary function which takes as second argument the possible
concept of the first argument. We consider this does not make it any easier
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for the reader to understand the formulas: if you are reading a formula
starting with ∆ and you are interpreting this symbol as the “concept of”
relation, we think it is more simple to begin with the argument which is
considered to be the concept and to continue with the argument which is
considered to have as concept the first argument. Hence, we have changed
the order of the type symbols in ∆ from ∆αα1o to ∆α1αo. In this way we
can say that the expression Aα1 denotes the sense of the expression Aα,
with the formula ∆α1αoAα1Aα. With this change we have gained a more
understandable interpretation of the formula, which can be read as “Aα1 is
a concept of Aα”.
Definition 1.2.20 (Characterizing function). The function φ′β1α1 character-
izes the function φβα if the following condition is satisfied, that the value of
the function φ for an argument ξ is η if and only if the value of the function
φ′ for any concept of ξ as argument is always a concept of η.18
Having defined what it is to be a characterizing function, Church makes
two assumptions:
1. He identifies each concept σ of a function φ with the characterizing
function φ′ of φ that is determined by σ.
2. He also assumes that every characterizing function φ′ of φ is to be
regarded as a concept of φ.
Church is conscious that these assumptions have been made without support
on the writings of Frege but however he finds them very useful.
The rules of inference are the same that in the simple theory of types,
with the exception that the substitution rule is not included. These are: the
λ-conversion rules (alphabetic change of bound variable, λ-contraction and
λ-expansion), universal generalization and modus ponens.
1.2.4 Heuristic Principles behind Church’s Alternatives
Church offers three Alternatives for his logic of sense and denotation. The
three alternatives of intensional logic are in close relation with the different
conditions you need to consider for speaking of identity of senses. Identity
has always been a crucial issue in the debate not only of extensional logic but
also in intensional logic. In the very beginning of the “primitive” intensional
logic of Frege (1892), the discussion begins with some identity difficulties
raised when dealing with different names that are considered to be equal.
18This is the exact definition of Church (1951, pp. 15–16).
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When we are dealing with the denotation of linguistic expressions, an equality
statement poses no problem although we have different names for denoting
the same object, because at the core of the equality statement what we have
is the identity relation between an object and itself (which is the very same
object under two different names, and in extensional logic what we are really
doing is operating exclusively with denotations of linguistic expressions and
not with senses).
When changing to an intensional logic, the problem of the identity of
senses is one of the most important to be addressed. This issue can also
be analyzed regarding the synonymity relation between two names. Two
names are said to be synonymous when they express the same sense, so with
identity of senses we refer to the conditions under which two names express
the same sense. These conditions can be weak or can be strong. Church
realizes the range of options and formulates three alternatives which can be
ordered following the strength of the identity conditions of the senses. In an
increasingly order the alternatives are: Alternative (2), Alternative (1) and
Alternative (0). The lower the number, the stronger the identity conditions
for considering two senses to be equal.
Alternative (2) is presented and just slightly developed in (Church, 1951)
and revised in (Church, 1973a) and (Church, 1974) and it has also been
studied by (Kaplan, 1964) and (C. Parsons, 1982). Alternative (1) is pre-
sented in (Church, 1951) where some axioms are indicated at the end of that
article and is developed in (Church, 1993). Alternative (0) is presented in
(Church, 1951), is little worked in (Church, 1974) and is mainly developed
by (Anderson, 1977) in his dissertation thesis.
Alternative (2)
This alternative refers to a criteria of identity of senses related with proving
logical equivalence between two names. In Church’s words, Alternative (2)
“makes the senses of A and B the same whenever A = B is logically valid.”
(1951, p. 5). This alternative, which regards the identity of senses in rela-
tion only with the truth-value of A and B, can be useful in some kinds of
intensional logic like modal logic but is of little help in epistemic logic and
those logics which take into account propositional attitudes. The problem
with this alternative in an epistemic context is that if you believe something
that is a logical truth you must believe in all others logical truths, something




In this alternative “two names are assumed to have different senses in all cases
where it is not already a consequence that the senses are the same.” (Church,
1946, p. 31). For Church this is the alternative that is more plausible for
working within a fregean framework. And in Church terminology, A and
B would have the same sense if they can be obtained under the application
of any of the lambda conversion rules. Therefore the rules of λ-contraction
and λ-expansion along with the rule of α-conversion, or alphabetic change
of bound variable, preserve the identity of senses.
Alternative (0)
This alternative imposes the strictest conditions concerning the identity of
senses and, in this case, two names are said to express the same sense when-
ever one can be obtained from the other by application of the rule of α-
conversion, which allows the possibility of doing an innocuous change of a
bound variable. This alternative, presented as an amended form of Alter-
native (1) but without a name in the addendum to the abstract (Church,
1946),19 was called “Alternative (0)” from (Church, 1951) onwards and was
considered to correspond to Carnap’s notion of intensional structure, “with
the one difference that it retains the notion of sense as something to be
dealt with in the object language, whereas Carnap’s intensional structure is
a metatheoretic notion and is dealt with in his meta-language.” (Church,
1951, p. 5). Alternative (0) is a more complicated system in which you need
to use an infinite list of primitive symbols λi. Of this hierarchy of operators,
λ0 is abbreviated by λ and is interpreted as an abstraction operator. The
rules of λ-contraction and λ-expansion are restricted to λ0, in such a way that
there is no lambda conversion that can preserve the sense of two expressions
under the application of these rules.
Synonymous Isomorphism
Alternatives (1) and (0) are more closely related to the linguistic expressions
that express identical senses than Alternative (2), which is more focused on
the equivalence relation between expressions. In that sense, Church uses a
variant of Carnap’s notion of intensional isomorphism (Carnap, 1947) which
he calls synonymous isomorphism (Church, 1954) for dealing with the iden-
tity of senses through synonym replacements in linguistic expressions. As we
19The abstract is dated in March, 1946 and the addendum in April 29, 1946.
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have seen before, synonymous isomorphism refers in Alternative (1) to re-
placements closed to applications of the λ-conversion rules, and in Alternative
(0) to replacement of a bound variable. In order to increase the understand-
ing of the notion of synonymous isomorphism, we would like to consider its
application to natural language by means of an example. Following Klement:
“In natural language, two propositions A and B are synonymously isomor-
phic if and only if there is some finite number of synonym replacements that
could be made to the expressions in A such that B results.” (2002, p. 102).
A synonym replacement is the substitution of one expression with another
expression that have the same sense in the same contexts. So, for example,
the propositions:
1. Some myopic men wear glasses
2. Some short-sighted men wear glasses
would be synonymously isomorphic because you can obtain 2. from 1.
through one synonym replacement: “short-sighted” for “myopic”, which are
different expressions having the same sense in the same contexts. We could
also replace “glasses” for “spectacles” and we would obtain from 2.:
3. Some short-sighted men wear spectacles
In this case, 3. would be synonymously isomorphic with 2. but also with 1.,
although there has been needed two synonym replacements to arrive from
1. to 3. These examples can be very helpful for understanding that two
synonymously isomorphic sentences share a common (grammatical) form and
there is only replacement between synonym expressions.
Synonymous isomorphism as a criterion for identity of senses can be help-
ful but it is not a complete one. Although it can explain the identity of sense
of two whole propositions, it presupposes some previous synonymies that
cannot be explained with this notion. Synonymy between “myopic” and
“short-sighted” is simply taken as presupposed and cannot be explained why
they are synonymous.20
1.2.5 Axiomatization for Church’s Alternatives
Church proposes a number of axioms that can be divided into various cate-
gories depending on the features of the system we want to construct. Instead
of single axioms, he includes axiom schemata, because there exists a version
20This short of criticism to the theory of synonymy can be found in Quine (1951, pp.
24–27; 32–36).
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of each schema for the different types α and β and type-indices n. Although
we usually refer to the axioms in singular, because we find it more manage-
able, each of them should be understood as a set of axioms or as an axiom
scheme.
First of all, some extensional axioms are introduced. These axioms are not
specific to intensional logic and they serve for a standard extensional higher-
order functional calculus employing the simple theory of types. Axioms 1-7
allow the functioning of a propositional calculus and the laws of quantifiers.
Axioms 8-9 are axioms of extensionality. And axiom 10, a consequence of a
possible added axiom of choice, is about descriptions.
Intensional Axioms
These axiom schemata were thought to be applied to every system of inten-





Axioms 11-14 have the same structure: ∆Aα1Aα. The main objective of
Church is to assure that the first ascendant (1993, p. 142)—obtained from
the original formula by increasing every subscript in it by 1—of a formula
denotes its sense, so he needs these axioms to obtain theorems in which the
first ascendant of a formula denotes its sense. Axiom 11 expresses the rela-
tion between the constant “Cononon” and its first ascendant : “Con+1on+1on+1”,
saying that the second constant is the sense of the first constant. Axioms 12,
13 and 14 express something similar to what has been explained about axiom
11, saying that the first ascendants of the constants Π((αnon)on), ι((βnon)βn) and
∆αnαn+1on are respectively their senses, or that these constants are presented
(as denotation) by their first ascendants (which are their senses).
15. ∀fβα∀fβ1α1∀xβ∀xβ1 [∆(β1α1)(βα)ofβ1α1fβα → (∆β1βoxβ1xβ
→ ∆α1αo(fβ1α1xβ1)(fβαxβ))]
16. ∀fβα∀fβ1α1 [∀xβ∀xβ1(∆β1βoxβ1xβ → ∆α1αo(fβ1α1xβ1)(fβαxβ))
→ ∆(β1α1)(βα)ofβ1α1fβα]
17. ∀xα∀yα∀xα1 [∆α1αoxα1xα → (∆α1αoxα1yα → (xα = yα))]
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Axioms 15, 16 and 17 are at the core of Church’s intensional logic, and it
is essential to understand their meanings because they not only describe the
main features of the heuristic principles behind Church’s intensional axioms
but also because they have an important role in the difficulties that Church’s
intensional logic has had to face.
These axioms are important because they formalize the previous defined
notion of characteristic function (definition 1.2.20 on page 25) that is so
crucial in Church’s intensional logic:
fβ1α1 characterizes fβα ::=
∀xβ1∀xβ(∆β1βoxβ1xβ → ∆α1αo(fβ1α1xβ1)(fβαxβ))
(1.1)
In order to simplify the reading we have abbreviated the symbols of the
types representing the first ascendant of a name with the same expression
with an asterisk. The expressions f and f ∗ become the abbreviations of fβα
and fβ1α1 respectively; x and x
∗ of xβ and xβ1 . With this new abbreviated
notation, we can formalize the notion of characterization by saying that a
function f ∗ characterizes a function f if and only if:
∀x∗∀x[∆x∗x→ ∆f ∗x∗fx] (1.2)
Axiom 15 says that if f ∗ is a concept of f then, if x∗ is a concept of x, then
f ∗x∗ is a concept of fx. So in terms of characterization we can say that if
f ∗ is a concept of f then f ∗ characterizes f . Axiom 16 says that if x∗ is
a concept of x then, if f ∗x∗ is a concept of fx, then f ∗ is a concept of f .
Therefore, if f ∗ characterizes f , then f ∗ is a concept of f .
Axiom 17 says that if two entities have the same concept, then these two
entities are equal. Therefore a concept is a concept of at most one thing, and
each concept thus individuates univocally a thing.
Intensional Axioms for Alternative 2
The specific axioms for Alternative (2) repeat axioms schemata 1-17 with
the addition of the necessity operator 2 and with some changes in the type
symbols. Axioms 18-27 copy the schemata from axioms 1-10. Axioms 28-31
are similar to 11-14. Axioms 32, 33, *33 and 34 mirrors axioms 15, 16 and 17.
Finally, the last axioms 35-38 have to do with the behavior of the operator
2.
We offer only some examples of these axioms in order to see their struc-
ture:
18. 2∀fα1β1o1(∀xα1∀yβ1fα1β1o1xα1yβ1 → ∀yβ1∀xα1fα1β1o1xα1yβ1)
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28. 2[∆(on+2on+2on+2)(on+1on+1on+1)o1Con+2on+2on+2Con+1on+1on+1 ]
33. 2∀fβ1α1∀fβ2α2 [∀xβ1∀xβ2(∆β2β1o1xβ2xβ1 → ∆α2α1o1(fβ2α2xβ2)(fβ1α1xβ1))→
∆(β2α2)(β1α1)o1fβ2α2fβ1α1 ]
35. ∀fα1o1∀xα∀xα1∀xα2 [∆α1αoxα1xα → (∆α2α1o1xα2xα1 → (2(∆α2α1o1xα2xα1)→
(2(Π(α1o1)o1fα1o1)→ 2(fα1o1xα1))))]
Intensional Axioms for Alternative 1
The axiomatization for Alternative (1) starts with some axioms (39-45) in-
dicating that any two senses expressed by expressions which have a different
composition, i.e., having a different primitive constant as main operator, are
not identical. Therefore, the sense expressed by a conditional expression is
not identical with the sense of an expression whose main operator is a uni-
versal quantifier, or a descriptor. The structure of the syntactic expression
is essential in Alternative (1), moving away from Alternative (2) where the
main point was rooted in the truth value of the expressions and not in its
composition. We give axiom 39 as an example:
39. ∀pon+1∀qon+1∀fαn+1on+1(Con+1on+1on+1pon+1qon+1 6= Π(αn+1on+1)on+1fαn+1on+1)
Apart from the previous axioms Church introduces some axioms for deal-
ing with the identity of senses in expressions which have the same composi-
tion. Axioms 45 and 46 indicate that the senses of two conditional expres-
sions are the same whenever the senses expressed by their antecedents and
consequents are identical.
45. ∀pon+1∀qon+1∀ron+1∀son+1(Con+1on+1on+1pon+1qon+1 = Con+1on+1on+1ron+1son+1 →
(pon+1 = ron+1))
46. ∀pon+1∀qon+1∀ron+1∀son+1(Con+1on+1on+1pon+1qon+1 = Con+1on+1on+1ron+1son+1 →
(qon+1 = son+1))
Axioms 47-50 are similar to the previous ones but refer to the primitive
constants: Π, ι and ∆. The last three axioms: 51-53, establish that the senses





As we have seen, Church offers axioms for dealing with the identity of
senses of expressions which specifically relates to the primitive constants, but
it would have been desirable that Church had offered some axioms for dealing
with the identity of senses in a general way, as he actually did in (1974, pp.
149–152) when he gave an axiomatization for Alternative (0).
Intensional Axioms for Alternative 0
Regarding the axioms for Alternative (0), it must be said that they cannot
be found in (Church, 1951) but in (Church, 1974). As a new element we find
that it is introduced a superscript m in the primitive constant ∆, which is
part of Church’s Tarskian solution for solving some semantical antinomies.
This solution is based on the creation of a hierarchy of ∆, always appearing
with a superscript m, that mirrors the Tarskian hierarchy of languages and
metalanguages. From all the axioms, it is worth considering axiom 64, an
axiom which, along with axioms 10-17, allows the derivation of many other
axioms, for example, those for Alternative (1) (Klement, 2002, p. 111).




(∆mβ1βoyβ1yβ → (fβ1α1xβ1 = fβ1α1yβ1 → (xβ1 = yβ1)))))
The meaning of axiom 64 can be easily described if we focus on the last
conditional of the axiom:
fβ1α1xβ1 = fβ1α1yβ1 → xβ1 = yβ1
If the senses of the expressions fx and fy are the same then the senses of
the arguments x and y are also identical. This seems a good principle for
dealing with synonymy, because it captures the idea that if the values of
fx and fy are synonymous, then x and y must also be synonymous. Apart
from synonymy, the axiom says that a concept of a function is an injective
function (or one-to-one function) on concepts. For Anderson (1980, p. 222),
axiom 64 implies that not every entity in certain types can be “concepted”.
He appreciates the role of this axiom and wants to preserve it in order to
construct a consistent logic of sense and denotation.21
21The reason for postulating axiom 64 is just to have as consequence the principle
(F) saying that “if (FA) is synonymous with (FB), then A is synonymous with B.” And
Anderson concludes “that Principle (F) is central to the Fregean program. Further, since
Alternative (0) is the only systematic criterion of which we are aware, we should be
reluctant to abandon it without compelling reason.” (Anderson, 1980, p. 224).
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1.2.6 Problems with Church’s Intensional Logic
Problems with Paradoxes
As we have seen, Alternatives (1) and (0) deal with senses that are so closely
related with the linguistic expressions which express them that they have a
high probability to be attacked by some analogue of the traditional semantical
antinomies.22 Church is aware of this additional complications that can be
derived from these alternatives and in a footnote he also indicates that:
The writer is indebted to Leon Henkin for raising the question
of the cardinal number of the concepts (senses) of a given type,
in connection with the answer to which an antinomy may easily
appear, at least unless appropriate caution has been exercised
in regard to the assumptions which are made (in the form of
axioms and rules). Because of this and other possibilities of self-
contradiction, no logistic treatment of sense and denotation can
be accepted as more than provisional until its consistency has
been thoroughly studied. (1951, p. 6, footnote 6).
This intuition about the possibility of derived problems came true only
seven years after Church’s article in Myhill (1958), where it was shown that
Alternative (1) was formally inconsistent, something that Church himself
recognized.23 As usual, the origin of the antinomy derives from Cantor’s
theorem concerning the greater cardinality of the number of classes of entities
(of a certain type) than the cardinality of the number of entities (of the same
type). The analysis of this antinomy will not be done here and we refer the
reader to the studies of Anderson (1977, chapter 3), (1980, pp. 221–223)
and (1987, pp. 107–108) for a deeper approach. Anderson relates Myhill’s
antinomy to Russell’s paradox and calls this problem “the Russell-Myhill
antinomy”.
Another problem that attacked Church’s original intensional logic stems
from a version of the Epimenides paradox which could be formulated in the
system, as David Kaplan reported (Anderson, 1987, p. 113, note 6). We
also remit to the papers of Anderson referred in the previous paragraph for
further study and for technical details about this paradox.
22Church realizes about the danger of this proximity: “Indeed, the stronger are the
conditions required in order that two names shall express the same sense, or that concepts
shall be identical, the more closely will the abstract theory of concepts resemble the more
concrete theory of the names themselves–with the relations symbolized by ∆oα1α serving
as analogues of the relations of denoting in the semantical theory. Hence, the stronger
these conditions are, the greater is the danger of antinomies analogous to Richard’s or
Grelling’s or the Epimenides.” (1974, p.149).
23“In fact A Formulation is unsound or faulty in many ways.” (Church, 1973a, p. 24).
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Traditionally there have been two solutions to these semantical anti-
nomies and paradoxes. The first one is to adopt a ramified theory of types,
where you distinguish not only between types but also between orders. The
second solution comes from Tarski, who draws a distinction between object
language and metalanguage; a distinction which has been widely accepted
since then and that is now common knowledge. Church, in his subsequent
revisions of his original logic of sense and denotation, will make use of both
attempts of solution. In his revision of the seventies, Church modified his sys-
tem by adding a superscript m to the semantic operator ∆, where m can be
l, l+1, l+2, etc. This hierarchy mirrors the tarskian distinction between lan-
guage and metalanguage. Unfortunately, although Church introduced these
changes for avoiding the semantical paradoxes, Anderson (1977, pp. 22–29)
and (1980, pp. 221–223) showed that these paradoxes could appear again in
the modified system. This led Church to consider the other attempt, and in
his revised formulation of the logic of sense and denotation of the nineties,
he adopts a ramified type theory (no longer a simple one) for avoiding the
semantical paradoxes. In between these attempts for eliminating the seman-
tical paradoxes we find the proposal of Anderson, not adopted by Church,
of removing axiom 16 in favor of a new axiom schema. This modification
would match with the Tarskian hierarchy and it would not be needed to
drop out the simple type theory in favor of a fully ramified one. It is possible
that Church considers axiom 16 so central to his system that he prefers to
abandon his simple type theory than ending up without axiom 16.
Problems with Intensionality
As Church says in (1973a, p. 25) A. F. Bausch discovered a flaw in the axioms
for Alternative (2) of (Church, 1951) consisting not in an inconsistency but in
a reduction to extensionality. It means that it can be proved in Alternative
(2), making use of axiom 16, that there is only one true proposition.24
24Parsons gives a formal sketch of the proof in (2001, pp. 515–516), here he also gives
the following informal account:“The proof exploits the fact that in alternative 2 necessarily
equivalent concepts are identical. That is, two concepts that are necessarily concepts of the
same thing are identical. The proof proceeds by defining two concepts that can be proved
to be concepts of the same function, because they can be proved to characterize the same
function f ; axiom set 16 thus makes them (provably) concepts of f. Thus, in alternative 2
they are identical. However, they are defined in such a way they are not identical, because
they differ for certain arguments that are not concepts of anything (recall that axiom set
16 ignores what functions do to non-concepts). At least they differ if such arguments
exist. And such arguments can be shown to exist whenever there is more than one true
proposition. The only escape from the inconsistency then is to conclude that there is not
more than one true proposition.” (p. 515).
34
In effect, the discussion on pages 15-16 of A Formulation,
leading up to the assumption that ϕ′ is a concept of a function ϕ
if and only if it is a characterizing function of ϕ, is incompatible
with the principle of Alternative (2), that the senses of names
A and B are the same if and only if the equation A = B is
logically valid. Because this (italicized) assumption is embodied
in the axioms as Axioms 15αβ and 16αβ, the result is that the
axioms lead, not quite to an inconsistency, but to a reduction to
extensionality, in the sense that it is a theorem in each type α
that two concepts of the same thing are always identical. (Church,
1973a, p. 25).
Problems with Emptiness
Frege rejected from a formalized language names with sense but without
denotation. Remember, however, that Church believed that
the construction of a formalized language containing denota-
tionless names should also be possible. [...] Therefore, tentatively,
we shall allow that in some language [...] there may be names
which have a sense but no denotation. Hence we also admit con-
cepts that are not concepts of anything; and although no name
in this present language has such a concept as its sense, we may
wish in the construction of the language to allow for existence of
such concepts. (1951, pp. 14–15, footnote 16).
Church explains that there is room for dealing with empty terms and their
senses in a formalized language. For doing this, following T. Parsons (2001),
we need to make some changes, especially in axiom 16 which should be
“incompatible with the existence of empty terms in any language, at least if
their senses are included in the ontology” (p. 517).25 For T. Parsons (2001)
the very problem comes from the fact that “axiom set 16 makes functions be
senses without looking at what they do to arguments that are not senses”
(p. 517). Therefore, Parsons’ proposal, based on (Church, 1973a, 1974, 1993)
and (Anderson, 1984), is that “a functional sense should be something like a
partial function, defined on senses and not defined at all for non-senses” (p.
518).
The semantics for this logic with empty names and empty senses should
contain some entity, which is not already in the domain, added to the domain
25“And for Alternatives (1) and (2), there is moreover the possibility that Axioms 16αβ
may have to be modified in connection with considerations concerning vacuous concepts.”
(Church, 1951, p. 4, footnote 4).
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of a given type. So we should have an extended domain for any given type
resulting from adding to the original domain a new entity, called a zip. If we
consider that a term has intuitively no denotation at all, in this semantics
we can stipulate that this term refers to the zip of the respective type. We
add zips, symbolized as ⊗, to every domain of non-functional types: so ⊗α
is the zip for the type α. We also assume that zips cannot be concepts of
anything. In this regard, an empty concept of type α1 would be a concept
of ⊗α, and, as a result, a proposition (of type o1) which is neither true nor
false, would be a concept of ⊗o0 .
The formal account of this theory is solved by changing Church’s notion of
characterization of a function, as given in definition 1.2.20 and equation (1.1),
by a new one of supercharacterization which, taking into account the intro-
duction of zips, is defined as:
Definition 1.2.21 (Supercharacterization). The function fβ1α1 supercharac-
terizes the function fβα if and only if
∀xβ1∀xβ(∆β1βoxβ1xβ → ∆α1αo(fβ1α1xβ1)(fβαxβ))∧
∀xβ1(¬∃xβ∆β1βoxβ1xβ → fβ1α1xβ1 = ⊗α1)
By replacing this definition by definition 1.2.20 in axioms 15 and 16 Par-
sons gives us a tool for grasping empty senses in our formalized language.
Furthermore, Parsons shows an interpretation of Church’s intensional logic
which allows us to deal with de dicto readings as well as de re readings. In
natural language there is ambiguity concerning the interpretation of pred-
icates that can receive a de dicto or a de re reading. In this regard, the
concept of relation can also have both kinds of readings. Although Church
has considered only the de dicto reading, there is nothing to prevent Church’s
intensional logic from doing a de re reading. For Church the concept of re-
lation relates functions of functional types β1α1 with functions of functional
types βα, but should there be possible a concept of relation between func-
tions of type βα1 and functions of type βα? This is just the solution Parsons
offers for the problem. Therefore a function of type βα can have as concept
either a function of type β1α1 or a function of type βα1. The first possibility
fits a de dicto reading and the second one a de re reading, which Parsons calls
“Fregean” and “Russellian” instances of the concept of relation respectively
(T. Parsons, 2001, p. 526).
Note that on this account a concept can be a concept of more
than one thing. But this does not really violate the idea that
concept of is functional, because the types are different; a concept
can never be a concept of two different things in the same sense
of ‘concept of’. (T. Parsons, 2001, p. 528).
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Therefore Church’s intensional logic is opened to many new possibilities due
to its richness. As we have seen, it not only allows the introduction of empty
terms but also the duality of de re and de dicto readings. Both improvements
if not directly developed by Church at least seriously suggested.26
1.2.7 Conclusion
We can define Church’s intensional logic as an attempt to find stronger con-
ditions for dealing with the identity of senses. The question that serves as
a major impetus is What is the criterion of identity for senses? or Under
what circumstances do two formulas express the same sense? It is easy to
pinpoint the question but, in order to clarify the solution, we are going to
consider some answers that mirror Church’s attempt of solving this problem.
Instead of talking about too abstract senses in the hierarchy of intensional
types (what is really a concept of a concept of a concept of a proposition?),
in the following points we will consider the more concrete question of what
is the criterion of identity for propositions.
1. Two sentences express the same proposition when they are synony-
mous. But this is only a change of the name of the problem: what is
synonymy? This proposal is thus too vague.
2. Two sentences express the same proposition when they are both true
or both false, that is, when the two sentences are equivalent. This is
simple but reduces intensional logic to extensional logic.
3. Two sentences express the same proposition when they are necessary
equivalent. This is Alternative (2) and can be useful in modal contexts
but not in contexts related to belief, assertion,...
4. Two sentences express the same proposition when there is an inten-
sional isomorphism between then. This is a concept that Church takes
from Carnap as the basis of Alternative (0) in (Church, 1951), but later,
in (1954), rejected as too weak. The problem lies in the very notion
of intensional isomorphism, which ends up confusing synonymy with
logical equivalence.
26The first of them has been pointed out in section 1.2.6, and the second one is indicated
in (Anderson, 1998, p. 155, footnote 63): “Church nowhere in print expresses sympathy
with the idea that there might be such a thing of a ‘de re’ reading of a belief sentence
or other sentence apparently involving obliquities. However, in lectures on open problems
in intensional logic at U.C.L.A. in 1977 [recorded by Nathan Salmon] he says the idea is
‘tenable’ but leads to some surprises.”
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5. Two sentences express the same proposition when there is an synony-
mous isomorphism between then. In Church (1954) intensional isomor-
phism is replaced by synonymous isomorphism as the basis of Alter-
native (0) and Alternative (1). Church modified Carnap’s criterion by
requiring not that the expressions being replaced be necessarily equiv-
alent but that the corresponding simple parts of the expressions be
synonymous. But have we returned to the vagueness of point 1? What
is synonymy? To solve the problem Church “supposes that it will be
given as part of the semantical basis of the language which primitive
expressions are stipulated to be synonymous with each other and with
complex expressions present in the language.” (Anderson, 1998, p.
158).
Summing up, from all the previous exposed possible answers, only two
were taken seriously by Church in his three different alternatives for an inten-
sional logic. One of them is the criterion based on logical equivalence which
is natural when dealing with modal logic and is developed as Alternative
(2). The other criterion refers to synonymous isomorphism which is suitable
for the logics of belief and knowledge and is developed in a weaker form as
Alternative (1) and in a stronger form as Alternative (0).
The analysis we have done in the present chapter has taken into consid-
eration the main writings of Church into what he called “logic of sense and
denotation” or what we have called “Church’s intensional logic”. The de-
velopment of this logic cannot be considered fully Fregean—there are many
aspects that are strange to a fully Fregean logic (Klement, 2002, pp. 117–
124), but is largely inspired by Frege from the very beginning. After almost
fifty years of reflection about the logic of sense and denotation, Church fin-
ished mixing his criterion of synonymous isomorphism with a ramified theory
of types to fulfill a viable intensional logic system. But is it the only possi-
ble intensional system for a logic of senses? Although we are not going to
enter in detail into the following issue, it must be said that Church (1973b)
considered the viability of a second intensional system based on a Russellian
intensional logic within a ramified type theory with the addition of a connec-
tive expressing propositional identity, called “four-line equality” (Anderson,
1998, pp. 167-168). This is only mentioned to appreciate how much time and
effort Church dedicated to the almost never-ending project of consolidating
a logic of sense and denotation.
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1.3 Montague on Intensionality
1.3.1 Introduction
The work of Richard Montague is focused on giving a model theoretic se-
mantics for natural language. If builds a bridge between two fields that were
told apart given its incompatibility: the accuracy of formal languages and
the ambiguity of natural language. Montague’s enterprise was inspired by
the following idea:
There is in my opinion no important theoretical difference be-
tween natural languages and the artificial languages of logicians;
indeed, I consider it possible to comprehend the syntax and se-
mantics of both kinds of languages within a single natural and
mathematically precise theory. On this point I differ from a num-
ber of philosophers, but agree, I believe, with Chomsky and his
associates. (Montague, 1974c, p. 222).
Or more categorically: “I reject the contention hat an important theo-
retical difference exists between formal and natural languages.” (Montague,
1974a, p. 188). An idea not very extended at a time where model theoretical
semantics were diametrically opposed to natural language:
It is here that Montague made his biggest contribution. To
most logicians (like the first author) trained in model-theoretic
semantics, natural language was an anathema, impossibly vague
and incoherent. To us, the revolutionary idea in Montague’s PTQ
paper (and earlier papers) is the claim that natural language is
not impossibly incoherent, as his teacher Tarski had led us to
believe, but that large portions of its semantics can be treated
by combining known tools from logic, tools like functions of fi-
nite type, the λ-calculus, generalized quantifiers, tense and modal
logic, and all the rest. (Barwise & Cooper, 1981, p. 204).
Together with the model theoretical approach to natural language for con-
structing “an adequate and comprehensive semantical theory” (Montague,
1974c, p. 222), Montague put the basis of this theory in the Principle of
Compositionality which reads: “the meaning of a compound expression is a
function of the meanings of its parts and of the way they are syntactically
combined.” (Partee, 1984, p. 281).
This principle is the link between the syntax and the semantics of natural
language and it implies that any syntactic element of a sentence must have a
meaning, and that any syntactic rule needs a semantic rule as a counterpart
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in order to indicate how the meaning of the compound expression is obtained
(Janssen, 2016).
Montague’s semantics was developed on the basis of the Carnapian dis-
tinction between extension and intension, and made use of the possible world
semantics of Kripke. In (Montague, 1974b), instead of introducing directly
the semantics for fragments of natural language, Montague decided to present
the syntax and semantics of the artificial language which is currently known
as Montague’s Intensional Logic. And then to give a way for translating the
natural language into the artificial language:
We could [...] introduce the semantics of our fragment di-
rectly; but it is probably more perspicuous to proceed indirectly,
by (1) setting up a certain simple artificial language, that of
tensed intensional logic, (2) giving the semantics of that language,
and (3) interpreting English indirectly by showing in a rigorous
way how to translate it into the artificial language. (Montague,
1974b, p. 256).
In this case the natural language expressions are interpreted indirectly into
the semantics, since they have been translated first to the artificial lan-
guage.27.
Montague’s Intensional Logic is characterized for being a typed inten-
sional language, where functional types play a central role given that except
for the expressions of the basic types, the vast majority have a functional
type and, therefore, denote functions. The logic has also expressions with
lambda. The λ operator allows the constructions of functions from other
given expressions and is considered such an important tool “that Barbara
Partee said: ‘lambdas really changed my life’; in fact lambdas changed the
lives of all semanticists.” (Janssen, 2016). Montague’s Intensional Logic has
modal operators and its models include a set of possible worlds and, finally,
it has also tense operators and models which include a structure of time.
Now we present Montague’s Intensional Logic as exposed in his influential
article The Proper Treatment of Quantification in Ordinary English (1974b),
which is usually abbreviated as PTQ in the literature. We have based our
presentation in (Dowty, Wall, & Peters, 1981, pp. 154–162) which has a





respectively. Our symbols for variables are x, y, . . .
instead of u, v, . . . The tense operators F and P read as “it will be the
case that” and “it has been the case than”, respectively, are the respective
27Montague also offered a way of giving a model theoretic semantics for natural language
directly, without a previous translation to a logical language in (1974a)
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substitutes of Montague’s W and H. Furthermore, we use w for a possible
world and t for a moment of time instead of Montague’s i and j respectively
(Dowty et al., 1981, p. 177, n. 3).
1.3.2 Syntax
Definition 1.3.1 (Type). Let t, e and s be any fixed objects. Then the set
of types (TYPES) is defined recursively as follows:
1. t is a type.
2. e is a type.
3. If a and b are any types, then 〈a, b〉 is a type.
4. If a is any type, then 〈s, a〉 is a type.
Note that s is not itself a type, but it is used to form functional types.
Definition 1.3.2 (Basic Expressions). It is employed a denumerably infinite
set of variables and non-logical constants:
1. For each natural number n and for each type a, a denumerably infinite
set of non-logical constants cn,a, dn,a, . . . The set of all constants of type
a is called CONa.
2. For each natural number n and for each type a, a denumerably infinite
set of variables xn,a, yn,a, . . . The set of all variables of type a is called
VARa.
Definition 1.3.3 (Meaningful Expressions). The set of meaningful expres-
sions of type a, MEa, is defined recursively as follows:
1. Every variable of type a is in MEa.
2. Every constant of type a is in MEa.
3. If α ∈ MEa and x is a variable of type b, then λxα ∈ ME〈b,a〉.
4. If α ∈ ME〈a,b〉 and β ∈ MEa, then α(β) ∈ MEb.
5. If α and β are both in MEa, then α = β ∈ MEt.
6. If φ ∈ MEt, then ¬φ ∈ MEt.
7. If φ, ψ ∈ MEt, then [φ ∨ ψ] ∈ MEt.
41
8. If φ, ψ ∈ MEt, then [φ ∧ ψ] ∈ MEt.
9. If φ, ψ ∈ MEt, then [φ→ ψ] ∈ MEt.
10. If φ, ψ ∈ MEt, then [φ↔ ψ] ∈ MEt.
11. If φ ∈ MEt, and x is a variable of any type, then ∀xφ ∈ MEt.
12. If φ ∈ MEt, and x is a variable of any type, then ∃xφ ∈ MEt.
13. If φ ∈ MEt, then 2φ ∈ MEt.
14. If φ ∈ MEt, then Fφ ∈ MEt.
15. If φ ∈ MEt, then Pφ ∈ MEt.
16. If α ∈ MEa, then ˆα ∈ ME〈s,a〉.
17. If α ∈ ME〈s,a〉, then ˇα ∈ MEa.
Between all the meaningful expressions, the last ones are perhaps the less
familiar to the reader:
The expression [̂ α] is regarded as denoting (or having as its
extension) the intension of the expression α. The expression [̌ α]
is meaningful only if α is an expression that denotes an intension
or sense; in such a case [̌ α] denotes the corresponding extension.
(Montague, 1974b, p. 257).
1.3.3 Semantics
Definition 1.3.4 (Possible Denotations). The set of possible denotations of
type a is defined as follows:
1. De = A
2. Dt = {0, 1}
3. D〈a,b〉 = D
Da
b
4. D〈s,a〉 = D
(W×T )
a
where a and b are any types, and 0 and 1 are the truth values falsehood
and truth respectively.
Definition 1.3.5 (Senses of type a). The set of senses of type a, Sa, is
defined as D〈s,a〉.
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Definition 1.3.6 (Intensional Model). A model for Montague’s Intensional
Logic is the quintuple
M = 〈A,W, T,<, F〉
such that A, W and T are any non-empty sets, < is a linear ordering on the
set T , and F is an interpretation function whose domain is defined on the set
of all non-logical constants of the language and whose value is in the set of
senses of type a, Sa = D〈s,a〉.
where A is considered to be the set of individuals, W is the set of possible
worlds and T the set of moments of time. With respect to A, the set of
individuals, Montague explains:
Or possible individuals. If there are individuals that are only
possible but not actual, A is to contain them; but this is an issue
on which it would be unethical for me as a logician (or linguist
or grammarian or semanticist, for that matter) to take a stand.
(1974b, p. 257, footnote 8).
Note also that the interpretation function F, which assigns to each non-
logical constant of type a a member of the set of senses of type a, Sa, has
only intensional values, since they are always elements of D〈s,a〉.
Definition 1.3.7 (Assignment). An assignment function g is a function
whose domain is defined on the set of all variables and which gives as value
for each variable of type a a member of Da.
Note that g assigns an extension to each variable. By contrast, F assigns
an intension to each constant.
Definition 1.3.8 (Interpretation of Meaningful Expressions). Let M be a
model for Montague’s Intensional Logic, w a possible world such that w ∈ W ,
t a moment of time such that t ∈ T and g an assignment function, then
given an expression α, we define recursively the extension of α with respect
to model M, possible world w, moment of time t and assignment function
g, denoted by JαKM,w,t,g, as follows:
1. If α is a constant, then JαKM,w,t,g = (F(α))(〈w, t〉).
2. If α is a variable, then JαKM,w,t,g = g(α).
3. If α ∈ MEa and x is a variable of type b, then JλxαKM,w,t,g = h where





4. If α ∈ ME〈a,b〉 and β ∈ MEa, then Jα(β)KM,w,t,g = JαKM,w,t,g(JβKM,w,t,g).
5. If α and β are both in MEa, then Jα = βKM,w,t,g = 1 iff JαKM,w,t,g =
JβKM,w,t,g.
6. If φ ∈ MEt, then J¬φKM,w,t,g = 1 iff JφKM,w,t,g = 0, and J¬φKM,w,t,g = 0
otherwise.
7. If φ, ψ ∈ MEt, then J[φ∨ψ]KM,w,t,g = 1 iff JφKM,w,t,g = 1 or JψKM,w,t,g =
1.
8. If φ, ψ ∈ MEt, then J[φ∧ψ]KM,w,t,g = 1 iff JφKM,w,t,g = 1 and JψKM,w,t,g =
1.
9. If φ, ψ ∈ MEt, then J[φ→ ψ]KM,w,t,g = 1 iff JφKM,w,t,g = 0 or JψKM,w,t,g =
1.
10. If φ, ψ ∈ MEt, then J[φ↔ ψ]KM,w,t,g = 1 iff JφKM,w,t,g = JψKM,w,t,g.
11. If φ ∈ MEt, and x is a variable of any type, then J∀xφKM,w,t,g = 1
iff JφKM,w,t,g′ = 1 for all assignment functions g′ exactly like g except
possibly for the value assigned to x.
12. If φ ∈ MEt, and x is a variable of any type, then J∃xφKM,w,t,g = 1 iff
JφKM,w,t,g′ = 1 for some assignment function g′ exactly like g except
possibly for the value assigned to x.
13. If φ ∈ MEt, then J2φKM,w,t,g = 1 iff JφKM,w
′,t′,g = 1 for all w′ in W and
all t′ in T .
14. If φ ∈ MEt, then JFφKM,w,t,g = 1 iff JφKM,w,t
′,g = 1 for some t′ in T
such that t < t′.
15. If φ ∈ MEt, then JPφKM,w,t,g = 1 iff JφKM,w,t
′,g = 1 for some t′ in T
such that t′ < t.
16. If α ∈ MEa, then Ĵ αKM,w,t,g = h, where h : (W × T ) → Da such that
for all 〈w′, t′〉 in W × T , h(〈w′, t′〉) = JαKM,w′,t′,g.
17. If α ∈ ME〈s,a〉, then J̌ αKM,w,t,g = JαKM,w,t,g(〈w, t〉).
Definition 1.3.9 (Truth of a formula with respect to M and to 〈w, t〉). A
formula φ, such that φ ∈ MEt is true with respect to M and to 〈w, t〉 if and
only if JφKM,w,t,g = 1 for all assignment functions g.
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Definition 1.3.10 (Intension of α with respect toM and to g). If α is any
expression, then the intension of α with respect to M and to g, denoted
JαKM,g , is that function h with domain W × T such that for all 〈w, t〉 in
W × T , h(〈w, t〉) is JαKM,w,t,g.
1.3.4 Some Meaningful Expressions
Let us now introduce the types of some common expressions in Intensional
Logic. We present Montague’s notation in comparison with Church’s nota-







t o T, F
e ι individuals
〈a, b〉 αβ functional types
〈s, a〉 α1 intensional types
〈s, e〉 ι1 individual concepts
〈e, t〉 ιo one-place predicates of individuals




〈s, t〉 o1 propositions
〈e, 〈e, t〉〉 ιιo relations between individuals/
two-place predicates
〈〈s, e〉, t〉 ι1o sets of individual concepts
〈〈s, t〉t〉 o1o sets of propositions
〈s, 〈〈s, 〈e, t〉〉, t〉 ((ιo)1o)1 properties of properties of individuals
〈s, 〈e, 〈e, t〉〉〉 (ιιo)1 relations-in-intension between individuals/
concepts of two places predicates
1.3.5 Conclusion
Montague’s Intensional Logic has shown influential in logic and in the studies
concerning natural language. As we have seen, Montague, unlike Church, has
contributed to intensional logic with a semantics for the formal language.
A language which, for Montague and also for Church, includes expressions
denoting intensions.
With respect to the notions of sense and intension, it must be said that
for Montague they are different notions. While all intensions are senses, not
all senses have to be intensions. There can be senses that are not intensions
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of any expression of the language. “The set of senses of type a is simply the
set of ‘possible intensions’ out of which the intensions of expressions of type
a are to be chosen. Thus all intensions of expressions will be senses, but not
necessarily all senses will be intensions of some expression or other.”(Dowty
et al., 1981, p. 157).
The work of Montague was continued by Daniel Gallin. In (Gallin, 1975)
an axiom system for Montague’s Intensional Logic is presented and it is es-
tablished a relation between Montague’s Intensional Logic and a Two-Sorted
Type Theory where variables over indices (such as 〈w, t〉) are included. For
Gallin, “the cap operator ˆ acts as a functional abstractor over indices, al-
though s itself is not a type and no variables ranging over indices are present
in IL.” (Gallin, 1975, p. 13). Gallin proves also completeness for his ax-
iomatic formulation with general models based on Henkin (1950). In Two-
Sorted Type Theory (Gallin, 1975, pp. 58-63), ˆα is explicitly defined in






This chapter begins with an approach to first-order intensional logic whose
intensional expressions are always interpreted extensionally at a given world
of a certain model and goes further introducing intensional expressions which
are interpreted as what they really are: intensions. It is important to note
that, as we move in a modal framework, the interpretation of formulas is
relativized to worlds and so, the classical notions of truth and validity ap-
plied to formulas, must be redefined as it can be seen in definitions 2.2.14,
2.2.16, 2.2.17 and 2.2.19. Hence, in all the logics presented in this chapter
we differentiate—and the following concepts must be grasped with care—
between:
1. Validity in a class of frames: when a formula is valid in every frame of
the class.
2. Validity in a frame: when a formula is true in every model based on a
given frame.
3. Validity: when a formula is true in every model.
4. Truth in a model: when a formula is true at every world of a model.
5. Truth at a world of a model.
When we talk about expressions which are interpreted extensionally or about
extensionalized intensions, we are always referring to expressions which are
interpreted, not in general, but at a given world of a model.
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2.1.1 Background
We have not started from scratch, and the content of this chapter is indebted
to Melvin Fitting, Richard Mendelsohn and Torben Braüner for their work
on the field.1 But the debt to those authors is not only implicit but explicit,
mainly in the first sections. Here, we offer two approaches substantially based
on the first-order modal logic of Fitting and Mendelsohn (1998) and on the
first-order intensional hybrid logic of Braüner (2008). But what follows is
not only a copy: it is a translation to a new symbolic language where a
type notation has been introduced in order to differentiate extensional from
intensional expressions. Despite we know that in first-order logic we dispense
with type notation, we have decided to introduce it because type notation
itself (written as subscripts in the expressions of the language) plays an
important role in our research about intensional logic. As we are using types
elsewhere in the logics presented through this dissertation, it is relevant to
introduce them from the lowest level, that being so, we can have acquaintance
with the symbols for a better understanding on how all the logics relate
and change. The use of the same notation throughout all our study, at the
beginning appears as an unnecessary complication, but at the end will result
in a finer understanding on how intensions can be studied in different formal
systems.
2.1.2 The Different Sections
In section 2.2, we present a first-order intensional logic, which is essentially
the logic of Fitting and Mendelsohn (1998). This book provides a great in-
sight into intensional logic: it is plenty of discussions about actualist and
possibilist quantifiers, varying and constant domain semantics, de re and
de dicto modal readings, scope disambiguation in negative statements (wide
and narrow scope), definite descriptions, equality and identity, existence and
designation, semantics with partial interpretation functions or nil entities
when there are non-denoting terms. It has been one of the main influential
resources in the present study. However, one of the drawbacks of the book
is that, when you try to find what is the first-order logic they propose, you
have to revisit practically all the pages of the book. It lacks of a compre-
hensive presentation of a preferable logic, which synthesizes all the previous
discussions, in only a few pages at once. This is what we have ventured to do
in section 2.2. The choice we have done takes actualist quantification within
a varying domain semantics, uses predicate abstracts—in order to remove
modal ambiguities de dicto and de re and scope ambiguities—and considers
1Cf. (Fitting & Mendelsohn, 1998), (Fitting, 2004) and (Braüner, 2011).
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definite descriptions as intensional constants. It also deals with the equality
relation only between extensional variables, differentiates between existence
and designation, and prefers a partial interpretation function for evaluating
formulas where non-designating terms appear. Some of the choices done here
are not justified neither in this section, nor in this chapter. Others will be
discussed in the following chapters. In this section we study with more depth
the difference between denotation and existence, which is crucial for under-
standing how formulas are evaluated. Denotation is linked with the way
the assignment function g and the partial interpretation function F proceed,
and existence has a close relationship with the actualist interpretation of the
quantifiers, which range over the domain of each possible world.
The purpose of section 2.3 is to offer an hybridized version of a first-order
intensional logic, which is not the logic just presented in section 2.2 but a sim-
ilar one. The exposition of this logic follows closely Braüner (2008), and little
modifications have been made. Braüner (2008), more influenced by Fitting
(2004) than for Fitting and Mendelsohn (1998), introduces intensional vari-
ables, which can be quantified over and act as arguments to predicates, but
dispenses with intensional constants; he also adds the proper hybrid-logical
machinery: nominals (the metavariables a, b, c, . . . range over nominals); two
binders, ∀, which can also bind nominals, and ↓; and a satisfaction operator
@a, for each nominal a. We have taken Braüner’s logic language and we have
added our type notation as subscripts of the expressions. λ and predicate
abstracts which had an essential role in section 2.2 do not appear at the
beginning of this section, the ↓ binder is introduced instead, and it will play
an important role as a disambiguating device. At the end of the section, we
have compared the usage of ↓ and λ in contexts where scope ambiguity poses
a problem, just as in negative sentences including non-denoting terms, and
in contexts which have to deal with the ambiguity of modal readings de dicto
and de re. We have compared ↓ and λ in order to see if both are necessary
for having an intensional hybrid language with good expressiveness features,
or if we can do away with one of them. If the comparison resulted in the ac-
quisition of equivalent expressiveness power, to opt for one or another would
be only a matter of preference.
In section 2.4, on the basis of the two accounts of sections 2.2 and 2.3,
we have tried to explore new possible ways to improve a first-order inten-
sional logic by means of an innovative interpretation of the type notation
and through the use of hybrid machinery. The main point of this section is
that we want to show that the hybrid machinery has not to be introduced ad
hoc over a preexisting intensional logic (only for creating an unpublished log-
ical system), but we try to explain how the intensional logic itself is claiming
for some kind of mechanism which allows us to differentiate between predicat-
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ing of an intension (intended as a function) and predicating of a “devalued”
intension, i.e., of an intension which has been used to individuate a concrete
entity at a certain world. A predication that should also be respectful with
the types of the expressions and should not ignore the coherence of type
notation.
Section 2.4 also explores the richness of using predicates which can be
interpreted other than functions from worlds to sets—and whose types, as
we will see, have the form 〈σ〈ιo〉〉 or 〈ιo〉, both are different notations for the
same type—as Fitting and Mendelsohn (1998), and Braüner (2008) do, and
considers a new, but at the same time old, way of interpreting predicates,
namely, that predicates can also be rigid. We are claiming for a logic hav-
ing intensions but also extensions in its own right. Extensions do not have
to reduce only to be the interpretation of any kind of object terms (exten-
sional terms and extensionalized terms) at a given world, they can also be
the interpretation of predicates. An intensional logic can have extensional
and intensional variables, extensional and intensional constants and function
symbols; but in the same way, an intensional logic can also have intensional
and extensional predicates as well. In order to avoid the confusion between
an extensional (or rigid) predicate and an intensional one, what it would be
needed is a procedure which enables us to distinguish between them. The
device we promote is a concrete one: a powerful type notation, the same we
have been applying since the beginning of this chapter. Through our type
notation, we can indicate when we are coping with an intensional predicate
or an extensional one. With an extensional predicate we understand a predi-
cate whose interpretation at every world of a model is unchanged, thus it is a
rigid predicate, as those we can find between the predicates of mathematics.
What we are proposing, in essence, is that we do not need a logic for mathe-
matical statements (the classical first-order logic) and other logic for modal
contexts, in principle it is possible to deal with sentences of mathematics and
of modal contexts with the same logic without confusing predicates or other
expressions. This is the reason behind our research in section 2.4. But what
the reader is going to find in this section are not conclusive theses but only
some attempts to arrive to a thesis.
Section 2.4 must be contemplated as a sort of laboratory where some ex-
periments with our type notation have being made. We analyze the possible
types we can count on, we study their plausibility and test the interpreta-
tion of our types in natural language, also in contexts where we have modal
ambiguities de dicto and de re. We also see how the differentiation between
extensional and intensional types is so closely related with modal operators,
just because of the very nature of extensional and intensional expressions.
An extensional statement, like a mathematical one, has in its background a
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necessity claim of being true at every world in a model, while an intensional
statement has, in its background, the possibility of change at each world
of a model. As a result, modal operators could be removed in extensional
contexts, where mathematical (extensional) expressions are used, and left
unchanged in intensional contexts. But given that modal operators qualify
our intensional expressions: is it not possible to ask for coherence with regard
to the type of the expressions? As we are differentiating between extensional
and intensional expressions, we propose that modal operators do not have to
qualify extensional expressions but only intensional ones, i.e., modal opera-
tors (of type 〈o1o〉) should not go with names of truth values (of type o) but
only with names of propositions (of type o1).
Finally, section 2.5 pretends to take the best of all the previous sec-
tions: the intensional machinery of Fitting and Mendelsohn, the hybridiza-
tion mechanisms of Braüner’s hybrid logic and the results of our own explo-
ration in the field of intensional hybrid logic with a powerful type notation.
In section 2.5, we develop a syntax and a semantics for a first-order inten-
sional hybrid logic with some of the desired features we have pointed out,
but without others, such as having extensional predicates, something we have
left for our type theory in the next chapter. We have introduced, however,
intensional predication, that is, the possibility of ascribing properties to in-
tensions and not only to intensions extensionalized at a given world. We
defend also the coherence of our type notation, specially the types of pred-
icates, in comparison with the classical interpretation. And we also discuss
some issues concerning how hybrid formulas can deal with denotation and
existence claims. As intensional predication and existential claims are one of
the main points of our work, we finish with them the section and the chapter.
As a conclusive remark and before beginning with the other sections,
it has to be noted that we have considered object terms, rigid terms and
extensional expressions, to be all of extensional type, while non-rigid terms
and intensional expressions are of intensional type. To be extensional and
to be rigid are then, from our point view, practically synonymous. The only
difference is that when we are talking about extensional, we are only referring
to the type of the expression, and when we mention rigid, we rather refer to
the procedure for arriving to the extensional type, and therefore an expression
can be rigid if it is extensional by itself or if it has been extensionalized,
through the use of a satisfaction operator, for example.
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2.2 A First Approach to First-Order Inten-
sional Logic
This approach is essentially based on Fitting and Mendelsohn’s book on
First-Order Modal Logic (1998). We have done some modifications, though:
they do not use any type notation and we have introduced one. Remember
that, although it is not customary to introduce types in first-order logic, we
have chosen to use types to acquaint ourselves with them, as it will make the
comparison between logics more unchallenging. In this section, the notation
is mainly used to indicate explicitly what are the types of the expressions,
but they are rarely used as subscripts. As we do not have constants of dif-
ferent types, neither variables, nor functors or predicates, we have left them
“unsubscripted”, as is usual in first-order logic. Functors and predicates are
always intensional and they only can vary its n-ariness. In essence, and
despite certain changes in the symbols used, the logic of Fitting and Mendel-
sohn (1998) and the logic presented in this section, can be considered the
same.
Concerning our type notation, we have done a mixed use of Montague
and Church’s notation, although we tend to favor, surely because of the
greater familiarity, Church’s notation. Note that we presuppose a distinction
between types and signature. A signature is
a set of individual constants, predicate symbols and function
symbols; each of the predicate symbols and function symbols has
an arity (for example it is binary if its arity is 2). Each signature
K gives rise to a first-order language, by building up formulas
from the symbols in the signature together with logical symbols
(including =) and punctuation. (Hodges & Scanlon, 2013).
Types can be basic types (as ι and o), or complex functional types: the
type of functions of one type to another. Our signature corresponds with
our type notation. The elements of a signature have also a type, indicated
by a type symbol as a subscript, which can be the type of individuals or a
functional type. The type of a predicate of a signature is determined, for
example, by the number (arity) and type of its arguments. Any expression
of the language is of a type which is indicated by a type symbol. And, in
our case, types can be extensional or intensional, so our notation has also
extensional and intensional type symbols.
In his type theory, Montague uses the symbols t, e and s, for truth values,
entities and senses respectively. We will also make use of a triple division
of the basic symbols, but ours are a little bit different. Following Church’s
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notation: the symbol t will be replaced by the greek letter omicron, o; the
symbol e, by the greek letter iota, ι; and s, which does not appear in Church,
by σ; in order to have greek letters altogether. The letter σ by itself is not a
type and it is used for giving us the type 〈σα〉, which is the type of expressions
naming the intension (or the sense) of an expression of type α. If we wanted
to follow strictly Church’s notation, the type of the sense of an expression
of type α should be given by α1 and, in fact, in many cases, we use α1 as a
simplification of the notation 〈σα〉, for any type α.
In this logic we consider that constants are intensional, not only those
that stand for definite descriptions, such as “the present king of Spain”, but
also for proper names, such as “Aureliano Buend́ıa”, whose designation may
vary; function symbols are also intensional —they can, for its part, to have
intensional terms as arguments; and, finally, predicates are intensional too —
they are interpreted as properties of entities that vary from world to world.
On the other hand, variables are interpreted extensionally and we do not
have intensional variables. The semantics supposes varying domains for the
interpretation of quantifiers, and we have a partial interpretation function
for the interpretation of constants of the language.
2.2.1 Types
The types we consider are functional types following the tradition of Church
and Montague, which differentiates from Fitting’s relational notation exposed
in his book Types, Tableaus and Gödel’s God (2002).2
Definition 2.2.1 (Types). The set TYPES of types of first-order intensional
logic is defined as follows:
• ι, o are basic types;
• 〈σι〉 is a type;
• 〈σ〈(t1 . . . tn)ι〉〉 and 〈σ〈(t1 . . . tn)o〉〉 are types, where each type t1 . . . tn
can be either of type ι or of type 〈σι〉.
In order to clarify the readability of types with σ, we are going to ab-
breviate, following Church’s notation, the functional types with σ using a
subscript 1: 〈σα〉 can then be expressed as α1, where α can be ι, 〈(t1 . . . tn)ι〉
or 〈(t1 . . . tn)o〉, where each type t1 . . . tn can be either of type ι or of type
〈σι〉. For example, functional type 〈σι〉 can be written as ι1 and 〈σ(ιo)〉 as
〈ιo〉1.
2For a clarifying exposition about functional and relational types see (Manzano, 1996,
pp. 186–214).
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Example 2.2.2. As said before, one of the basic types is the type ι, which
is the type of individuals. Type 〈ιo〉 is the type of functions from individ-
uals to truth values. This type is, therefore, the type of ordinary monadic
predicates, which can be interpreted as characteristic functions from the set
of individuals.
If we add intensional machinery to our previous types, we would have
new types where σ plays a new role. The intensional type 〈σι〉, would be the
type of functions from worlds to individuals, and the type 〈σ(ιo)〉, would be
the type of functions from worlds to properties or to characteristic functions
from individuals. Expressions typed with any of these subscripts will be
considered intensional and, therefore, world dependent.
2.2.2 Syntax
In order to have and differentiate new intensional expressions from the ex-
tensional (classical) ones, we are going to indicate as a subscript the type of
the expression:
1. Individual Variables: x, y, z, . . . They all are considered to be ex-
tensional, xι.
2. Constant symbols: c, d, . . . They are interpreted non-rigidly, being
of type 〈σι〉, and can stand for definite descriptions or proper names.
3. Function symbols: f, h, . . . They can be n-ary and the type t1 . . . tn
of each one of their arguments can be the type ι or the type 〈σι〉.
Function symbols are considered to be intensional, their type being
〈σ〈(t1 . . . tn)ι〉〉.
4. Predicate symbols: P,Q, . . . They can also be n-ary and we are
going to allow only variables to follow the predicate symbol in order
to avoid ambiguities with intensional terms and modal operators (i.e.,
problems concerning mainly de re and de dicto readings). Predicate
symbols are considered to be intensional. Their type is
〈σ〈(
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
ι . . . ι)o〉〉
Definition 2.2.3 (Term). The terms of the language are specified by the
following rules:
1. Every variable is a term of type ι.




t1 , . . . , τ
n
tn) is a term of intensional type, where f is an n-
place function symbol, and τ 1, . . . , τn are terms, and ti ∈ {ι, ι1} for
each ti and 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Definition 2.2.4 (Predicates). The predicates of the language can be:
1. Predicate letters of arity n: P,Q,R, . . . Their type is: 〈σ〈(
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
ι . . . ι)o〉〉.
2. Predicate abstracts of arity n: 〈λx1ι . . . xnι .φ〉, where x1ι . . . xnι are vari-
ables and φ is a formula. Note that in the definition of predicate ab-
stracts we presuppose the definition of formulas of below. The purpose
of predicate abstracts is that we can obtain predicates from formulas:
given a certain formula, a predicate can be abstracted from it. Their
type is: 〈σ〈(
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
ι . . . ι)o〉〉.
Definition 2.2.5 (Formula). Any sequence of symbols of the language is a
formula. A well formed formula (wff) is a sequence of symbols of the language
which follows the following rules:




ι , . . . , x
n
ι ) is an atomic formula. Note that the predicate
letter is only followed for variables and not, as usual, for any kind of
terms.
2. xι = yι is an atomic formula.
3. If φ is a formula, then ¬φ is a formula.
4. If φ and ψ are formulas, then φ ∧ ψ is a formula.
5. If φ and ψ are formulas, then φ ∨ ψ is a formula.
6. If φ and ψ are formulas, then φ→ ψ is a formula.
7. If φ and ψ are formulas, then φ↔ ψ is a formula.
8. If φ is a formula, then 2φ is a formula.
9. If φ is a formula, then 3φ is a formula.
10. If φ is a formula and x a variable, then ∀xφ is a formula.
11. If φ is a formula and x a variable, then ∃xφ is a formula.
12. If 〈λx1ι . . . xnι .φ〉 is a predicate abstract and τ is a term, then
〈λx1ι . . . xnι .φ〉(τ 1 . . . τn) is a formula.
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Definition 2.2.6 (Free variable occurrence). The set of free variable occur-
rence of a given formula φ, FREE(φ), is determined by the following rules:
1. Every occurrence of a variable in an atomic formula is a free occurrence.
2. The free variable occurrences of ¬φ are those of φ.
3. The free variable occurrences of φ∧ψ, φ∨ψ, φ→ ψ, φ↔ ψ, are those
of φ together with those of ψ.
4. The free variable occurrences of 2φ and 3φ are those of φ.
5. The free variable occurrences of ∀xφ and ∃xφ are those of φ, except for
occurrences of x.
6. The free variable occurrences of a predicate abstract 〈λx1ι . . . xnι .φ〉 are
those of φ except for occurrences of x1ι . . . x
n
ι . The free variable oc-
currences of 〈λx1ι . . . xnι .φ〉(τ 1 . . . τn) are those of the predicate abstract
together with all variable occurrences in τ 1 . . . τn.
Definition 2.2.7 (Sentence). A sentence or a closed formula is a formula
with no free variable occurrences.
2.2.3 Semantics
In the semantics we assume varying domain models, where quantifier domains
can vary from world to world. We distinguish between the domain of the
model Dι and a domain function δ mapping members of W to non-empty
sets. Dι is the set
⋃
w∈W δ(w). We refer to δ(w) as the domain of the world
w, and think of it as the set of things that exist at that world. We will use
then actualist quantification because quantifiers range over the domain of
each particular world, where the actually existents of each world are. Think
of Dι as the set of things we can talk about at each world w in a significant
way.
Given that models are based on frames we begin defining a frame:
Definition 2.2.8 (Frame). A frame F = 〈W,R〉, consists of a non-empty
set, W , whose members are generally called possible worlds, and a binary
relation, R, on W , generally called the accessibility relation.
w1 and w2 are elements of W denoting possible worlds. If w1 and w2 are
in the relation R, we would write w1Rw2 or 〈w1, w2〉 ∈ R, and read this as
w2 is accessible from w1.
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Definition 2.2.9 (Varying Domain Model).
M = 〈W,R,Dι, 〈δ(w)〉w∈W ,F〉
where
1. W 6= ∅;
2. R is a binary relation on W ;
3. Dι 6= ∅
4. 〈δ(w)〉w∈W is a family of domain functions such that for each world w,
δ(w) ⊆ Dι. δ(w) is called the domain of quantification at the world w.
5. F is a partial interpretation function which assigns:
(a) To each n-place predicate symbol P and to each possible world
w ∈ W a characteristic function of n-tuples on Dι:
F(P )(w) ∈ {T, F}(Dι)n
(b) To each constant c of the language (which are always of type
〈σι〉), and to some (possibly no) member w ∈ W , a member of
the domain Dι. For a given constant c, the function F can be
defined at a world w or not, therefore we have two possibilities:
i. If F(c)(w) is defined, then F(c)(w) ∈ Dι.
ii. It can be the case that F(c)(w) is not defined, in this situation
we have no value for the function.
(c) To each n-place function symbol f of the language, and to each
w ∈ W , some n-ary function such that F(f)(w) is a partial func-
tion from Dt1 × · · · ×Dtn into Dι, where ti ∈ {ι, 〈σι〉} for each ti
and 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Remark. Note that F always give value to predicate symbols. However,
F does not always give value to constants. F(f)(w), moreover, is a partial
function.
Definition 2.2.10 (Assignment). An assignment g is a function that to each




Definition 2.2.11 (Variant). An x-variant assignment g′ of g is an assign-
ment having the same values that the original assignment g except, possibly,
for x. That is, g(y) = g′(y) for all y, such that y 6= x, and g′(x) ∈ Dι.
Definition 2.2.12 (Variant at w). g′ is an x-variant assignment at w of g
when g′ is an x-variant of g and
g′(x) ∈ δ(w)
Definition 2.2.13 (Interpretation of terms in a world w of a modelM using
assignment g). The interpretation of every term, τ , of the language is given
considering an assignment g, an interpretation function F, and a given world
w, such that:
1. If x is a free variable, x designates at w and
JxKM,g,w = g(x)
2. If c is a constant symbol of type 〈σι〉, then:
(a) if F(c)(w) is defined, then c designates at w and JcKM,g,w = F(c)(w);
(b) if F(c)(w) is not defined, then c does not designate at w.
3. If f is an n-place function symbol, and each term τ 1, . . . , τn designates
at w, and 〈Jτ 1KM,g,w, . . . , JτnKM,g,w〉 is in the domain of the function
F(f)(w), then f(τ 1, . . . , τn) designates at w, and
Jf(τ 1, . . . , τn)KM,g,w = (F(f)(w))(Jτ 1KM,g,w, . . . , JτnKM,g,w)
Although difficult to read, the meaning of the previous expression is
not difficult to understand. (F(f)(w))(Jτ 1KM,g,w, . . . , JτnKM,g,w) says
that we apply the designation of the function symbol f at w to the
designation of every term τ 1, . . . , τn at w. So, first we extensionalize
(identify the designation on Dι) every term being as arguments of the
function symbol, and then apply to them the function which is the
designation of the function symbol at w.
Remark. Variables always designate. Constants are said to designate at
a world when the value F(c)(w) is defined, but F(c)(w) needs not to be a
member of the local domain δ(w). Since F(f)(w) is a partial function, for
a complex term as f(τ 1, . . . , τn), designation at w guarantees that all terms
τ 1, . . . , τn designate plus the partial function F(f)(w) being defined for these
arguments.
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Definition 2.2.14 (Truth of a formula in a world w of a model M under
assignment g). LetM = 〈W,R,Dι, 〈δ(w)〉w∈W ,F〉 be a varying domain first-
order modal model. Now we can define the truth of a formula at a world w
in model M using assignment g:
1. JP (x1, . . . , xn)KM,g,w = T iff (F(P )(w))(g(x1), . . . , g(xn)) = T
2. Jx = yKM,g,w = T iff g(x) = g(y)
3. J¬φKM,g,w = T iff JφKM,g,w = F
4. Jφ ∧ ψKM,g,w = T iff JφKM,g,w = T and JψKM,g,w = T
5. Jφ ∨ ψKM,g,w = T iff JφKM,g,w = T or JψKM,g,w = T
6. Jφ→ ψKM,g,w = T iff JφKM,g,w = F or JψKM,g,w = T
7. Jφ↔ ψKM,g,w = T iff JφKM,g,w = JψKM,g,w
8. J2φKM,g,w = T iff JφKM,g,w′ = T for all w′ ∈ W such that wRw′
9. J3φKM,g,w = T iff JφKM,g,w′ = T for some w′ ∈ W and wRw′
10. J∀xφKM,g,w = T iff JφKM,g′,w = T , for all x-variant g′ of g at w
11. J∃xφKM,g,w = T iff JφKM,g′,w = T , for some x-variant g′ of g at w
12. And finally we present the evaluation of formulas with predicate ab-
stracts: J〈λx1 . . . xn.φ〉(τ 1 . . . τn)KM,g,w. For this evaluation, we con-
sider two cases depending on wether or not all the terms designate at
w:
(a) If each τ 1 . . . τn designates at w:
J〈λx1 . . . xn.φ〉(τ 1 . . . τn)KM,g,w = T iff JφKM,g′,w = T
where g′ is the x1 . . . xn-variant of g, such that g′(x1) = Jτ 1KM,g,w,
..., g′(xn) = JτnKM,g,w.
(b) If any of the τ 1 . . . τn does not designate at w:
J〈λx1 . . . xn.φ〉(τ 1 . . . τn)KM,g,w = F
Comment 2.2.15. The previous definition of evaluation of formulas makes
false predicate abstract formulas with non-denoting terms without introduc-
ing a third truth value into the logic. It amounts to having two truth values
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(true and false) and rejecting as false the formulas which tend to apply a
predicate (positive or negative) to a non-designating term. Designation is
therefore crucial in our model because it determines the boundary where the
meaningfulness of expressions is assessed. Note that we are here dealing with
two problematic predicates: existence and designation. This distinction is on
the basis of the possibility of speaking with terms denoting an entity in the
domain of a model, but which does not exist at the world of evaluation. For
instance, although my father is dead and he does not exist currently, I can
speak about him because my father has a denotation at the current world
despite not having actual existence.
Definition 2.2.16 (Truth in a model). A formula φ is considered to be true
in a model M if it is true at every world of the model under assignment g.
Definition 2.2.17 (Validity). A formula φ is valid if it is true in every model
M.
Before introducing the definitions of validity in a frame and validity in a
class of frames, let us classify frames depending on the properties that the
accessibility relation holds:
Definition 2.2.18. Let 〈W,R〉 be a frame. We say it is:
• reflexive: if w1Rw1, for every w1 ∈ W ;
• symmetric: if w1Rw2 implies w2Rw1, for all w1, w2 ∈ W ;
• transitive: if w1Rw2 and w2Rw3 imply w1Rw3, for all w1, w2, w3 ∈ W ;
• serial : if, for each w1 ∈ W , there is some w2 ∈ W such that w1Rw2.
Depending on the properties a class of frames has, different modal logics
can be characterized as follows:




• B: reflexive and symmetric;
• K4: transitive;
• S4: reflexive and transitive;
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• S5: reflexive, symmetric and transitive.
Definition 2.2.19 (Valid in a frame and L-valid). A formula φ is valid in
a frame if it is valid in every model based on that frame. And, if L is a
collection of frames, φ is L-valid if φ is valid in every frame in L.
What characterizes the different modal logics are thus the L-valid formu-
las, for particular classes L of frames. The logic S5 is then characterized by
the class of frames being reflexive, symmetric and transitive. When noth-
ing is said on the contrary, we prefer moving within S5, which seems more
appropriate for dealing with metaphysical necessity.
2.2.4 Existence and Designation
One of the most important ideas we have found in Fitting and Mendelsohn
(1998) is the introduction of a formal definition for the predicates “existence”
and “denotation”. These predicates have sometimes been considered either
as non proper predicates or as metalinguistic predicates. In classical logic
variables are assumed to designate existent objects, therefore if variables al-
ways designate and always designate existent objects, it would be redundant
to indicate something which is always presupposed. In our varying domain
first-order model these predicates are neither redundant nor equivalent.
The logical language introduced in this section provides us some mecha-
nisms for defining the predicates of “existence” and “designation”. Predicate
abstracts will help us to do this. We must remember, however, that our
predicates of “existence” and “designation” always refer to a given world of
a model. Below are the definitions of both predicates:
1. Existence:
E(τ) ::= 〈λx.∃y(y = x)〉(τ)
2. Designation:
D(τ) ::= 〈λx.x = x〉(τ)
Comment 2.2.20. The conditions for these previous formulas to be true at
w are the following:
1. For the formula E(τ) to be true at a world w of a model M under
assignment g, τ needs to designate at w and this designation should
belong to δ(w). We will prove it in Proposition 2.2.22.
2. For the formula D(τ) to be true at w of a modelM under assignment
g, the only requirement is that τ designates at w. We will prove it in
Proposition 2.2.23.
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The consideration on the one side, of existence as a predicate, and on
the other side, the difference of scope in negation statements (as indicated
in Russell and Whitehead (1925)), allows us to distinguish between saying of
an individual that it has the negative property of non-existence and negating
that an individual has the property of existence:
1. Non-existence (negative property):
E(τ) ::= 〈λx.¬∃y(y = x)〉(τ)
2. Non existence (negation of existence):
¬E(τ) ::= ¬〈λx.∃y(y = x)〉(τ)
Comment 2.2.21. The requirements for the previous formulas to be true
at w are:
1. Formula E(τ) is true at world w of a model M under assignment g,
when τ designates at w but this designation is not in δ(w). We prove
this in Proposition 2.2.24.
2. Formula ¬E(τ) is true at world w of a model M under assignment g,
when
(a) either τ does not designate at w;
(b) or τ designates at w but JτKM,g,w /∈ δ(w).
We will prove this in Proposition 2.2.25.
Remark. Note that in the definitions of the predicates of “existence” and
“designation”, the equality relation symbol appears in the predicate abstract.
Although not stated explicitly previously, we would like to underline that the
interpretation of the equality symbol at each possible world is the identity
relation. Therefore all models are normal.
Proposition 2.2.22. Let M = 〈W,R,Dι, 〈δ(w)〉w∈W ,F〉 be a normal, vary-
ing domain, first-order modal model, let g an assignment, and w a world in
W . For any term τ : JE(τ)KM,g,w = T if and only if τ designates at w and
JτKM,g,w ∈ δ(w).
Proof. JE(τ)KM,g,w = T ,
iff J〈λx.∃y(y = x)〉(τ)KM,g,w = T
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iff τ designates at w and J∃y(y = x)KM,g′,w = T, where g′ is an x -variant of g
such that g′(x) = JτKM,g,w
iff τ designates at w and Jy = xKM,g
′′,w = T for some y-variant g′′ of g′ at w
(g′ is an x -variant of g such that g′(x) = JτKM,g,w)
iff τ designates at w and JyKM,g
′′,w = JxKM,g
′′,w,
(g′′ being an y-variant of g′ at w,
and g′ an x-variant of g with g′(x) = JτKM,g,w),
iff τ designates at w and g′′(y) = g′′(x),
g′′(y) ∈ δ(w) while g′′(x) = g′(x) = JτKM,g,w;
(g′′ being a y-variant of g′ at w
and g′ an x-variant of g, such that g′(x) = JτKM,g,w)
iff τ designates at w and JτKM,g,w ∈ δ(w).
Proposition 2.2.23. Let M = 〈W,R,Dι, 〈δ(w)〉w∈W ,F〉 be a normal, vary-
ing domain, first-order modal model, let g an assignment, and w a world in
W . Then for any term τ : JD(τ)KM,g,w = T if and only if τ designates at w
in M with respect to g.
Proof. JD(τ)KM,g,w = T
iff J〈λx.x = x〉(τ)KM,g,w = T
iff τ designates at w and Jx = xKM,g
′,w = T
(g′ is an x-variant of g such that g′(x) = JτKM,g,w),
iff τ designates at w and JxKM,g
′,w = JxKM,g
′,w,
(g′ is an x-variant of g such that g′(x) = JτKM,g,w),
iff τ designates at w.
Proposition 2.2.24. Let M = 〈W,R,Dι, 〈δ(w)〉w∈W ,F〉 be a normal, vary-
ing domain, first-order modal model, let g an assignment, and w a world in
W . Then for any term τ : JE(τ)KM,g,w = T if and only if τ designates at w
and JτKM,g,w /∈ δ(w).
Proof. JE(τ)KM,g,w = T ,
iff J〈λx.¬∃y(y = x)〉(τ)KM,g,w = T
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iff τ designates at w and J¬∃y(y = x)KM,g′,w = T, where g′ is an x -variant of g
such that g′(x) = JτKM,g,w
iff τ designates at w and Jy = xKM,g
′′,w = F for all y-variants g′′ of g′ at w
(g′ is an x -variant of g such that g′(x) = JτKM,g,w)
iff τ designates at w and JyKM,g
′′,w 6= JxKM,g′′,w,
(g′′ being any y-variant of g′ at w,
and g′ an x-variant of g with g′(x) = JτKM,g,w),
iff τ designates at w and g′′(y) 6= g′′(x),
g′′(y) ∈ δ(w) while g′′(x) = g′(x) = JτKM,g,w;
(g′′ being any y-variant of g′ at w
and g′ an x-variant of g, such that g′(x) = JτKM,g,w)
iff τ designates at w and JτKM,g,w /∈ δ(w).
Proposition 2.2.25. Let M = 〈W,R,Dι, 〈δ(w)〉w∈W ,F〉 be a normal, vary-
ing domain, first-order modal model, let g an assignment, and w a world in
W . Then for any term τ : J¬E(τ)KM,g,w = T if and only if:
1. τ does not designate at w; or
2. τ designates at w and JτKM,g,w /∈ δ(w).
Proof. J¬E(τ)KM,g,w = T
iff J¬〈λx.∃y(y = x)〉(τ)KM,g,w = T
iff J〈λx.∃y(y = x)〉(τ)KM,g,w = F
iff 1. τ does not designate at w, or
2. τ designates at w but J〈λx.∃y(y = x)〉(τ)KM,g,w = F
iff τ designates at w but J∃y(y = x)KM,g′,w = F
where g′ is an x -variant of g such that g′(x) = JτKM,g,w
iff τ designates at w and Jy = xKM,g
′′,w = F for all y-variants g′′ of g′ at w
(g′ is an x -variant of g such that g′(x) = JτKM,g,w)
iff τ designates at w and JyKM,g
′′,w 6= JxKM,g′′,w,
(g′′ being any y-variant of g′ at w,
and g′ an x-variant of g with g′(x) = JτKM,g,w),
iff τ designates at w and g′′(y) 6= g′′(x),
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g′′(y) ∈ δ(w) while g′′(x) = g′(x) = JτKM,g,w;
(g′′ being any y-variant of g′ at w
and g′ an x-variant of g, such that g′(x) = JτKM,g,w)
iff τ designates at w and JτKM,g,w /∈ δ(w);
iff 1. τ does not designate at w, or
2. τ designates at w and JτKM,g,w /∈ δ(w).
The terms that designate can refer to existent objects in the world of
evaluation or to non existent objects in the same world, therefore we can say
of this kind of terms that either they have the property of existence or the
non-existence property:
D(τ)↔ E(τ) ∨ E(τ)
Of non-designating terms we can say that they do not exist:
¬E(τ) ::= ¬〈λx.∃y(y = x)〉(τ)
but not that they have the property of non-existence.
Proposition 2.2.26. For each term τ , the following is true at each world of
a varying domain model:
D(τ)↔ E(τ) ∨ E(τ)
Proof. LetM be any normal, varying domain first-order modal model, g any
assignment and w ∈ W . To prove that JD(τ)↔ E(τ) ∨ E(τ)KM,g,w = T , we
will distinguish two cases:
1. τ designates at w;
2. τ does not designate at w.
Case 1. τ designates at w. By proposition 2.2.23, JD(τ)KM,g,w = T . Ei-
ther JτKM,g,w ∈ δ(w) or JτKM,g,w /∈ δ(w). In the first case, JE(τ)KM,g,w = T
by proposition 2.2.22. Therefore, JE(τ) ∨ E(τ)KM,g,w = T , and so JD(τ) ↔
E(τ) ∨ E(τ)KM,g,w = T . In the second case, JE(τ)KM,g,w = T by proposi-
tion 2.2.24. Therefore, JE(τ) ∨ E(τ)KM,g,w = T , and so JD(τ) ↔ E(τ) ∨
E(τ)KM,g,w = T .
Case 2. τ does not designate at w. Thus, JD(τ)KM,g,w = F , by proposi-
tion 2.2.22. Since τ does not designate at w, any formula 〈λx.φ〉(τ) is false,
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and in particular 〈λx.∃y(y = x)〉(τ), which is E(τ); and also 〈λx.¬∃y(y =
x)〉(τ), which is E(τ). Thus, JE(τ)KM,g,w = F = JE(τ)KM,g,w = F . There-
fore, JD(τ)↔ E(τ) ∨ E(τ)KM,g,w = T .
Example 2.2.27. Suppose we have a varying domain model with two worlds
w1 and w1, where Dι = {c,d, e}, δ(w1) = {c, e} and δ(w2) = {d}. We
take the worlds to be interpreted in a temporal way and the universe to
be the universe of composers, where Max Richter is c, Arvo Pärt is e and
Vivaldi is d. Our present century being w1 and the eighteenth century w2.
The accessibility relation R = {〈w1, w2〉, 〈w2, w1〉}. Our language has three
intensional constants: c, d and e which are interpreted in w1 as c (Max
Richter), d (Vivaldi) and e (Arvo Pärt) respectively. We also know that the
interpretation of d at w2 is defined (as d) but that the interpretation of e at
w2 is not defined. So we have: F(c)(w1) = c, F(e)(w1) = e, F(d)(w1) = d,
F(c)(w2) = c, F(d)(w2) = d and F(e)(w2) is not defined.
Taking our present century as the world of evaluation, we can say that Max





Let us see that all three are true at w1. LetM be the structure described in
our example and g any assignment on Dι.
1. E(c) is true at the present century w1 iff 〈λx.∃y(y = x)〉(c) is true at
w1. As c designates at w1, then
J〈λx.∃y(y = x)〉(c)KM,g,w1 = T iff J∃y(y = x)KM,g′,w1 = T
where g′ is the x-variant of g, such that g′(x) = JcKM,g,w1 = c.
J∃y(y = x)KM,g′,w1 = T iff Jy = xKM,g′′,w1 = T
for some y-variant g′′ of g′ at w1. Take as g
′′ the y-variant of g′ at w1
such that g′′(y) = c.
The formula is true at w1 since c ∈ δ(w1) and
JyKM,g
′′,w1 = g′′(y) = c = JcKM,g,w1 = JxKM,g
′′,w1
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2. D(d) is true at w1 iff 〈λx.x = x〉(d) is true at w1. As d is defined at
w1, we have that
J〈λx.x = x〉(d)KM,g,w1 = T iff Jx = xKM,g′,w1 = T
where g′ is the x-variant of g, such that g′(x) = JdKM,g,w1 = d. There-
fore, the formula D(d) is true as we have that d = d true and we do
not need d to be in world w1.
3. E(d) is true at w1 iff 〈λx.¬∃y(y = x)〉(d) is true at w1. As d is defined
at w1, we have that
J〈λx.¬∃y(y = x)〉(d)KM,g,w1 = T iff J¬∃y(y = x)KM,g′,w1 = T
where g′ is the x-variant of g, such that g′(x) = JdKM,g,w1 = F(d)(w1) =
d.
J¬∃y(y = x)KM,g′,w1 = T iff Jy = xKM,g′′,w1 = F
for all y-variant g′′ of g′ at w1. Let g
′′ be any y-variant of g′ at w1. As
g′′(y) ∈ δ(w1), we can have that g′′(y) = c or that g′′(y) = e and it is
false that c = d or that e = d. And then the formula E(d) is true at
w1.
On the other hand, if we evaluate the previous formulas from the eigh-
teenth century, we have that Max Richter (c) does not exist at w2, that
Vivaldi (d) designates at w2 and that to say of Vivaldi that he has the neg-
ative property of non-existence at w2 is false:
1. E(c) is false at w2.
2. D(d) is true at w2.
3. E(d) is false at w2.
1. E(c) is true at w2 iff 〈λx.∃y(y = x)〉(c) is true at w2. As F(c)(w2) is
defined, c designates at w2, then
J〈λx.∃y(y = x)〉(c)KM,g,w2 = T iff J∃y(y = x)KM,g′,w2 = T
where g′ is the x-variant of g, such that g′(x) = JcKM,g,w2 = c.
J∃y(y = x)KM,g′,w2 = T iff Jy = xKM,g′′,w2 = T
for some y-variant g′′ of g′ at w2. The only possibility we have at w2 is
that g′′(y) = d. And then
g′′(y) = d 6= c = g′′(x) = g′(x)
Consequently the formula E(c) can not be true at w2, and hence it is
false at w2.
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2. D(d) is true at w2 iff 〈λx.x = x〉(d) is true at w2. As d is defined at
w2, we have that
J〈λx.x = x〉(d)KM,g,w2 = T iff Jx = xKM,g′,w2 = T
where g′ is the x-variant of g, such that g′(x) = JdKM,g,w2 = d. There-
fore we have that d = d, which is also true. Ergo, the formula D(d) is
true at w2.
3. E(d) is true at w2 iff 〈λx.¬∃y(y = x)〉(d) is true at w2. As d is defined
at w2, we have that
J〈λx.¬∃y(y = x)〉(d)KM,g,w2 = T iff J¬∃y(y = x)KM,g′,w2 = T
where g′ is the x-variant of g, such that g′(x) = JdKM,g,w2 = F(d)(w2) =
d.
J¬∃y(y = x)KM,g′,w2 = T iff Jy = xKM,g′′,w2 = F
for all y-variant g′′ of g′ at w2. Let g
′′ be any y-variant of g′ at w2.
As g′′(y) ∈ δ(w2), we only have that g′′(y) = d. But it is true that
g′′(y) = d = d = g′(x), then Jy = xKM,g′′,w2 = T . And therefore the
formula E(d) is false at w2.




We begin evaluating ¬E(d) at our present century century w1 and continue
with the evaluation of ¬E(e) and E(e) at the eighteenth century w2.
4. ¬E(d) is true at w1 iff J¬〈λx.∃y(y = x)〉(d)KM,g,w1 = T iff J〈λx.∃y(y =
x)〉(d)KM,g,w1 = F . This formula can be false when d does not designate
at w1, which is not the case, or if J∃y(y = x)KM,g
′,w1 = F , where g′ is
the x-variant of g such that
g′(x) = JdKM,g,w1 = F(d)(w1) = d
We have then that Jy = xKM,g′′,w1 = F , where g′′ is any y-variant of g′
at w1.
As g′′(y) ∈ δ(w1), we have two possibilities:
(a) either g′′(y) = c;
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(b) or g′′(y) = e.
In any case g′′(y) = g′(x) is false. Therefore the formula ¬E(d) is true
at w1.
5. ¬E(e) is true at w2 iff J¬〈λx.∃y(y = x)〉(e)KM,g,w2 = T iff J〈λx.∃y(y =
x)〉(e)KM,g,w2 = F . Since F(e)(w2) is not defined, then J〈λx.∃y(y =
x)〉(e)KM,g,w2 is false, and consequently ¬E(e) is true at w2.
6. E(e) is true at w2 iff J〈λx.¬∃y(y = x)〉(e)KM,g,w2 = T . But since
F(e)(w2) is not defined then, following definition 2.2.14, J〈λx.¬∃y(y =
x)〉(e)KM,g,w2 = F .
As a result, the formula E(e) is false at w2.
Note that for such a denoting term d at w1, where JdKM,g,w1 /∈ δ(w1),
¬E(d) and E(d) have the same truth value. Both formulas are true at w1
and therefore it is equivalent to say of the interpretation of d that it has
not the property of existence at w1 or that it has the negative property of
non-existence at w1.
On the other hand, for the non-denoting term e at w2, ¬E(e) and E(e) have
different truth values. ¬E(e) is true at w2 and E(e) is false at w2. The
reason is that of a non-denoting term we cannot predicate anything, even
the non-existence.
In table 2.1 we present a summary of how the formulas about denotation
and existence are evaluated in our model of composers. Note the difference in
the truth values of ¬E(e) and E(e) at world w2, where e does not designate:
Accordingly, we can affirm that for a denoting term τ at each world w of
a varying domain model M, the following equivalence is true:
E(τ)↔ ¬E(τ)
while for a non-denoting term τ ∗ at each world w of a varying domain model
M, the previous equivalence is not true. What is true, however, at each
world w in a varying domain model M of a non-denoting term τ ∗ is:
E(τ ∗)→ ¬E(τ ∗)
In conclusion, with respect to the previous analysis, if we have a term
τ , we can face one of the following alternatives concerning designation and
existence:3
3There are alternatives which take into account other options: that τ designates at
every world or that τ does not designate at every world, but we are now more interested
in designation and existence of terms and truth of formulas in a world of a model and not















Table 2.1: Evaluation in the model of composers
1. τ designates at a world w1 and also exists in w1;
2. τ designates at a world w1 but does not exist in w1;
3. τ does not designate at a world w1 but does exist in other possible
world w2;
4. τ does not designate at a world w1 and does not exist in any world.
Let us offer some examples in order to understand this classification. Here
the interpretation of possible world is given in a temporal way:
1. “Philip VI of Spain” designates at the present time, say w1, and also
exists in w1.
2. “The discoverer of America” designates at the present time w1, but
does not exist in w1, although he existed in the past.
3. “The present pope of Avignon” does not designate at w1 because the
papacy of Avignon is not defined at the current time, but there was a
time when there were popes in Avignon, and hence there have existed
some “present pope of Avignon” in different times of the past.
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4. “The wife of Isaac Newton” does not designate at w1 and, at least in
the different states of affairs of the current Universe, there is no time
in our History where Newton’s wife can be found. Ergo, the wife of
Newton does not exist in any world (sure, in the development of our
History).
Finally, we conclude saying that designation of a term at a given world can
be seen as a necessary condition for a meaningful talking about it. However
it is not necessary an existence requirement at the same world, and therefore
you can refer to people, places, etc. which do not exist any more at this
world. Nonetheless, if a term does not designate at a certain world, all what
we can predicate of it (positively or negatively) is false at the same world.
This non-denoting term is only like a flatus vocis.
2.3 A First Approach to First-Order Inten-
sional Hybrid Logic
If we take a first-order intensional logic and add nominals and satisfaction
operators we introduce an hybridization mechanism that results in a first-
order intensional hybrid logic. We are following here the work of Torben
Braüner (2008).4 In order to see how hybridization works, we are going
to dispense with constants and complex functional expressions. We think
that in this way we can understand better the use of nominals, satisfaction
operators and ↓.
2.3.1 Syntax
First of all, to the syntax of first-order intensional logic of Fitting (2004) we
add nominals and rigidified terms. We also indicate as a subscript the type
of the expression. Types are defined in the same way as in definition 2.2.1
on page 53. Our language has ordinary extensional first-order variables for
objects and intensional variables for intensions, predicate symbols and nom-
inals.
1. Variables: x, y, z, . . . They can be extensional, as xι, or intensional,
as xι1 .
4The same author recognizes that his hybrid system is based on the first-order inten-
sional logic of Fitting as presented in (2004). “In this article we give an intensional version
of first-order hybrid logic (which also can be viewed as a hybridized version of Fitting’s
First-Order Intensional Logic).” (Braüner, 2008, p. 631).
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2. Predicate symbols: P,Q, . . . They can be n-ary and they are con-
sidered to be intensional. Their type is 〈(t1 . . . tn)o〉1, where each of
t1 . . . tn can be either ι or ι1.
3. Nominals: a, b, . . . They are a sort of propositional symbols which are
true only at one world.
Definition 2.3.1 (Term). The terms τ 1, . . . , τn of the language are specified
by the following rules:
1. Every variable (extensional or intensional) is a term either of type ι or
of type ι1.
2. Every rigidified intensional variable @axι1 is a term of type ι. Where xι1
is an intensional variable, a is a nominal and @ is called a satisfaction
operator.
We present a distinction between letters τ 1, . . . , τn which range over any
sort of terms, of type ι or ι1, and ρ
1, . . . , ρn, which range over terms of type
ι. Terms, in general, are variables of any kind. Object terms, or extensional
terms, however, are extensional variables or rigidified intensional variables.
Terms can be of type ι or ι1, while object terms are only of type ι.
Definition 2.3.2 (Object Term). An object term ρ1, . . . , ρn, also called ex-
tensional terms, is either an extensional variable, such as xι, or a rigidified
(intensional) variable, like @axι1 . Object terms are of type ι.
Any sequence of symbols of the language is a formula. According to clause
1 of definition 2.2.5 on page 55, we did not have permission for building an
atomic formula by means of a predicate letter followed by any kind of terms,
only extensional variables were allowed. Here, however, atomic formulas can
have extensional terms and also intensional terms. The novelty of this ap-
proach is that intensional terms do not need to be extensionalized. They can
stand for the intensions they denote and, therefore, we can have intensional
predication, one of the innovations we have found of the utmost importance.
Definition 2.3.3 (Formula). A well formed formula (wff) is a sequence of
symbols of the language following the rules:
1. P〈(t1...tn)o〉1(τ
1
t1 , . . . , τ
n
tn) is an atomic formula, where τ
1
t1 , . . . , τ
n
tn are terms,
extensional or intensional. t1 . . . tn can be either ι or ι1.
2. ρ1ι = ρ
2
ι is a formula.
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3. τ 1ι1
== τ 2ι1 is a formula.
4. If φ is a formula, then ¬φ is a formula.
5. If φ and ψ are formulas, then φ ∧ ψ is a formula.
6. If φ and ψ are formulas, then φ→ ψ is a formula.
7. If φ is a formula, then 2φ is a formula.
8. If φ is a formula and xι an extensional variable, then ∀xιφ is a formula.
9. If φ is a formula and xι1 an intensional variable, then ∀xι1φ is a formula.
10. If a is a nominal, then a is a formula.
11. If φ is a formula and a is a nominal, then @aφ is a formula.
12. If φ is a formula and a is a nominal, then ∀aφ is a formula.
13. If φ is a formula and a is a nominal, then ↓ aφ is a formula.
Remark. For Braüner (2008) the types of predicates are 〈t1 . . . tn〉, even
though the interpretation of P varies from world to world.
φ∨ψ abbreviates ¬(¬φ∧¬ψ) and 3φ is an abbreviation for ¬2¬φ. ∃xιφ
abbreviates ¬∀xι¬φ and, analogously, ∃xι1φ and ∃aφ are abbreviations for
¬∀xι1¬φ and ¬∀a¬φ respectively.
The notion of free occurrences of variables is defined as usual, analogously
to definition 2.2.6 on page 56.
Definition 2.3.4 (Free occurrences of nominals). The notion of free occur-
rences of nominals is defined as follows:
1. If a is a nominal, then it has one free occurrence of a nominal, namely,
itself.
2. If @aφ is a formula, then the free nominal occurrences in it are those
in φ together with the occurrence of a. Satisfaction operators, thus, do
not bind nominals.
3. If ∀aφ is a formula, then the free nominal occurrences in it are those
in φ except for a.




In section 2.2, on page 56, we had a semantics with a varying domain model.
In Fitting (2004) and Braüner (2008) models with constant domains are
considered instead. Our model has two domains: a domain of object quan-
tification and a domain of intension quantification. And both are taken to
be constant, that is, the domain of quantification is the same from world
to world. Quantification is called possibilist, because quantifiers range over
every possible existent, including those which actually exist at the world of
evaluation. And the domain of intension quantification is not required to be
the set of all functions5 from W to Dι, but only to be a non-empty subset of
partial functions from W to Dι, that is:
Dι1 ⊆ {f | f : H → Dι and H ⊆ W}
Definition 2.3.5 (Constant Domain Model).
M = 〈W,R,Dι, Dι1 ,F〉
where
1. W 6= ∅;
2. R is a binary relation on W ;
3. Dι 6= ∅;
4. Dι1 is a non-empty set of partial functions from W to Dι;
5. F is an interpretation function which assigns to each n-place predicate
symbol P and to each possible world w ∈ W a characteristic function
of n-tuples of Dι or Dι1 :
F(P n)(w) ∈ {T, F}(Dt1×···×Dtn )
where t1 . . . tn are the types of the arguments of the n-ary predicate
and can be ι or ι1.
5For Fitting, to require of the domain of intension quantification to be the set of all
functions from W to Dι, is something that is not desirable. He argues two reasons:
“First, not everything reasonably should be considered an intension. There is not much
plausibility to an intension that is a wrench in this world, a baby robin in another, and
the number 7 in a third. Intensions should have some coherence to them, and though I
do not know how to characterize that, clearly not everything mathematically possible will
meet a reasonable coherence condition. The second reason for not taking the entire set of
functions from G [our W ] to DO [our Dι] as DI [our Dι1 ] is more practical: if we do, a
complete proof procedure is almost certainly beyond reach.” (2004, pp. 182–183).
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Definition 2.3.6 (Assignment). An assignment g is a function that to each
extensional variable xι assigns an element of Dι, to each intensional variable




Note that g(xι1) has as value a partial function from W to Dι.
Definition 2.3.7 (Variant). An xι-variant assignment g
′ of g is an assign-
ment having the same values as the original assignment g except possibly for
xι.
g′(xι) ∈ Dι
An xι1-variant assignment g
′ of g is an assignment having the same values as
the original assignment g except possibly for xι1 .
g′(xι1) ∈ Dι1
An a-variant assignment g′ of g is an assignment having the same values as
the original assignment g except possibly for a:
g′(a) ∈ W
Definition 2.3.8 (Denotation of terms in a world w of a model M using
assignment g). Given a model M = 〈W,R,Dι, Dι1 ,F〉, the interpretation of
every term τ of the language, is given considering an assignment g and a
world w:
1. If xι is an extensional variable:
JxιKM,g,w = g(xι)
2. If xι1 is an intensional variable:
Jxι1K
M,g,w = g(xι1)
3. If @axι1 is a rigidified intensional variable, then:
(a) if g(xι1)(g(a)) is defined, that is, if g(a) is in the domain of the
partial function g(xι1), then J@axι1KM,g,w = g(xι1)(g(a));
(b) if g(xι1)(g(a)) is not defined, then @axι1 does not designate.
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Definition 2.3.9 (Truth of a formula in a world w of a model M using
assignment g). Let M = 〈W,R,Dι, Dι1 ,F〉 be a constant domain first-order
model. Now we can define the truth of a formula in modelM, where F is an
interpretation function, g an assignment, w a world, and φ a formula.
1. The evaluation of JP (τ 1, . . . , τn)KM,g,w requires the analysis of two cases
depending on whether or not all object terms designate:
(a) If every τ 1, . . . , τn designates at w:
JP (τ 1, . . . , τn)KM,g,w = T iff (F(P )(w))(Jτ 1KM,g,w, . . . , JτnKM,g,w) = T
(b) If any of the terms τ 1, . . . , τn does not designate at w:
JP (τ 1, . . . , τn)KM,g,w = F
2. The evaluation of Jρ1 = ρ2KM,g,w requires also two cases:
(a) If ρ1 and ρ2 designate, then:
Jρ1 = ρ2KM,g,w = T iff Jρ1KM,g,w = Jρ2KM,g,w
(b) If ρ1 or ρ2 does not designate, then:
Jρ1 = ρ2KM,g,w = F
3. Jτ 1ι1 == τ
2
ι1
KM,g,w = T iff Jτ 1ι1K
M,g,w = Jτ 2ι1K
M,g,w
4. J¬φKM,g,w = T iff JφKM,g,w = F
5. Jφ ∧ ψKM,g,w = T iff JφKM,g,w = T and JψKM,g,w = T
6. Jφ→ ψKM,g,w = T iff JφKM,g,w = F or JψKM,g,w = T
7. J2φKM,g,w = T iff JφKM,g,w′ = T for all w′ ∈ W such that wRw′
8. J∀xιφKM,g,w = T iff JφKM,g
′,w = T , for all xι-variant g
′ of g
9. J∀xι1φKM,g,w = T iff JφKM,g
′,w = T , for all xι1-variant g
′ of g
10. JaKM,g,w = T iff g(a) = w
11. J@aφKM,g,w = T iff JφKM,g,g(a) = T
12. J∀aφKM,g,w = T iff JφKM,g′,w = T , for any a-variant g′ of g
76
13. J↓ aφKM,g,w = T iff JφKM,g′,w = T , where g′ is an a-variant of g and
g′(a) = w.
Truth in a model and validity are defined as in definitions 2.2.16 and
2.2.19 on pages 60 and 61 respectively.
Remark. Note that although ↓ and @ are similar because they go with
nominals, they are not the same operator. The satisfaction operator @ is
used to individuate a certain world where an expression is interpreted, this
world is determined by the nominal and can be the present world of evaluation
or not. The ↓ operator, however, fixes the world where the formula has to be
interpreted at the present world of evaluation, and the value the assignment
function gives to the nominal bound by ↓, is the world where the expression
is being evaluated.
Example 2.3.10. Suppose we have a model with two worlds: w1, represent-
ing the Christian worldview, and w2, representing the Jihadist worldview.
Nominal a names w1 and nominal b, w2. The individuals of the domain of
the model are Salman Abedi (c), the suicide bomber who killed more than
20 people during a concert in Manchester in 2017, and Saint Sebastian (d),
an early Christian saint. Suppose also that the intensional term xι1 stands
for the description “the man who acted according to his faith”, and the in-
tensional predicate P , of type 〈ιo〉1, for “is a martyr”. We want to evaluate
the formulas P (@axι1) and P (@bxι1) in the model at each one of the two
worlds under assignment g. We also suppose that @axι1 and @bxι1 are de-
noting terms, given that the description “the man who acted according to
his faith” denotes Saint Sebastian at w1 and Salman Abedi at w2. At w1,
P (@axι1) is read as “Saint Sebastian is a martyr”, which is true, since the
denotation of @axι1 at w1 is given by g(xι1)(g(a)) = g(xι1)(w1) = d. On
the other hand, P (@bxι1) is evaluated at w1 as false because it has the read-
ing that “Salman Abedi is a martyr”, since the denotation of @bxι1 at w1 is
g(xι1)(g(b)) = g(xι1)(w2) = c, i.e., Salman Abedi. At w2, by contrast, and
following a similar procedure, we can conclude that P (@axι1) is false, while
P (@bxι1) is true.
Consider now the formulas ↓aP (@axι1) and ↓ b P (@bxι1). If we evaluate
↓b P (@bxι1) at w1, what the formula is saying is that the property of being a
martyr at w1 is attributed to the individual denoted by @bxι1 at w1, once that
b has been fixed to w1. But @bxι1 has now to be interpreted in a different way
because ↓b has fixed the nominal b at the world of evaluation, and therefore
g′(b) = w1. The denotation of @bxι1 is, thus, the result of interpreting xι1
at the world w1, which gives d as value, and d is martyr at w1, therefore
the formula ↓ b P (@bxι1) is true at w1. The evaluation of ↓ aP (@axι1) at
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w2 is similar to the previous one. Since the ↓ operator fixes a to w2 and so
g′(a) = w2, the rigidified term is interpreted as claiming that g(xι1)(g
′(a)) has
c as its value and, therefore, the interpretation of the formula ↓ aP (@axι1)
at w2 says that c is a martyr, which is true at w2, given that Salman Abedi
is a martyr within a Jihadist worldview.
Remark. Note also that we have an equality symbol (=) for object terms and
an equality symbol (==) for intensional terms. = denotes a relation between
objects and it is interpreted as the genuine identity relation which holds
between an object and itself. By contrast, == denotes a relation between
functions. == has an stronger interpretation than = because it states the
identity between two concepts and, therefore, it has the characteristics of a
synonymy relation.
2.3.3 Intensional Predication
In section 2.2, although intensions were mainly introduced as the interpre-
tation of constants, and predicates were interpreted as varying from world
to world, there was no way of attributing a property to a proper intension,
since atomic formulas where formed only with extensional variables, and the
only way to introduce intensional terms was through formulas with predicate
abstracts, but in this case all intensional terms were always extensionalized.
Intensions are a helpful mechanism for individuating concrete individuals at
determinate worlds. But intensions are also functions which can be consid-
ered by themselves, and they do not need to be extensionalized at a world in
order to make them workable. We are then faced with two options when we
evaluate an intensional expression at a given world: we can interpret the ex-
pression at our world as determining an individual at the world of evaluation,
or we can evaluate the expression at our world as determining an intension
at the world of evaluation. In the first case we have extensional predication
and in the second one we have intensional predication.
Suppose we say that “the winner of the Golden Ball [Ballon d’Or ] has the
most important sport distinction in the world”, where the expression “the
winner of the Golden Ball” is formalized as the intensional term xι1 and “has
the most important sport distinction in the world” as P , whose type is 〈ι1o〉1
—remember that predicates are always interpreted at a world, and that is the
reason of the appearance of the last 1 as subscript of the expression between
the parentheses. What we pretend to express with the formula P (xι1) is that
we attribute the property of having the most important sport distinction in
the world to the intension denoted by “the winner of the Golden Ball”, which
is an element of the intension domain Dι1 and not of the object domain Dι.
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If we think in different people as possible worlds, the sentence can be true
at some worlds: for people which are soccer enthusiasts, and also be false
at other worlds, for people which do not profess any sympathy for soccer.
The key issue is that the truth value of the formula is not determined by
the person individuated by the intensional expression at a particular world,
and is independent of whoever is that person at a given world. On the other
hand, we can take the same intensional expression xι1 but as a mere device
for picking up a concrete individual at a certain world, as in “the winner
of the Golden Ball is handsome”, for example. In this case, the intensional
expression “the winner of the Golden Ball” determines a concrete individual
at the world of evaluation, and the denotation of the predicate “is handsome”
(Q) at the same world of evaluation can be applied or not to it, depending
on the standards of beauty ruling at the world of evaluation. But, how do
we formalize this sentence? As Q(xι1)? If this were the case, we would never
know when an intensional term has to be interpreted as an intension and
when it has to be extensionalized. We need some kind of device which allows
us to distinguish between the double use of intensional terms, which results
in a double interpretation of them.
One of the possible devices, which we are not following here,6 given item
1 of definition 2.3.3 on page 72, could be to use a type notation in predicates.
If a predicate is of type 〈ιo〉1, the expression in the argument place, even an
intensional term, should be always interpreted extensionally, since the ι of
the type of the predicate commands it. If the predicate is of type 〈ι1o〉1, then
the predication would be intensional, and the property should be applied to
the very same intension. But we do not see the coherence of saying that a
predicate of type 〈ιo〉1 is followed by a term of type ι1. As a result, we have
shown preference in using some device to devalue the type of the term from
ι1 to ι.
This device, the one that we follow in definition 2.3.8 on page 75, cen-
ters on our satisfaction operator @a. When it is used to rigidify intensional
terms of type ι1, we get an expression, @axι1 , which has type ι. The reason
is that the satisfaction operator gives the world where the term has to be
interpreted—something that is not necessary for intensions (the functions
themselves do not change from world to world)—, doing this, the intension
has received as argument the world of evaluation and, therefore, we have as
value the object denoted by the term at a world. In this case, if we want to
6This device, however, is supposed, in a certain way, in the interpretation of formulas
with predicate abstracts which we are going to see in the following pages. The predicate
abstract would be of type 〈ιo〉1 while the term in the argument place would be of type ι1.
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have intensional predication we leave the formula unchanged:
P〈ι1o〉1(xι1) (2.1)
On the contrary, if we desire extensional predication, the formula is writ-
ten as:
↓ aQ〈ιo〉1(@axι1) (2.2)
Formally, the formula P〈ι1o〉1(xι1) is true at a world w if and only if the
intension designated by xι1—that is, g(xι1)—belongs to the extension of the
predicate P at w:
JP〈ι1o〉1(xι1)K
M,g,w = T iff (F(P )(w))(g(xι1)) = T
The formula ↓ aQ〈ιo〉1(@axι1) is true at a world w if and only if the designation
of xι1 at w belongs to the extension of the predicate Q at w. What the ↓
operator is doing here, is to fix the nominal a to the point of evaluation:
g(a) = w.
J↓ aQ〈ιo〉1(@axι1)KM,g,w = T iff JQ(@axι1)KM,g
′,w = T,





Note that we are assuming that the terms are denoting terms, and so the
function g′(xι1) is defined at g
′(a) = w. If @axι1 were a non-denoting term
at w, then the formula ↓ aQ(@axι1) would be false.
In Fitting and Mendelsohn (1998) intensional predication did not receive
any attention, but in Fitting (2004) it is considered as a proper and inter-
esting way of predication. But the first-order intensional logic of Fitting
(2004) is modal but not hybrid, and consequently hybrid operators are not
available. There are, however, predicate abstracts, which are shown to be
extremely useful in removing certain ambiguities in formal languages. Let us
then introduce into the present language formulas with predicate abstracts.
This can be done by expanding some of our previous definitions. First of all,
we need to indicate that, apart from predicate symbols P,Q, . . . , predicate
abstracts are also predicates of the language. If xι is an extensional vari-
able and φ a formula, then 〈λxι.φ〉 is a predicate abstract. Then we expand
definition 2.3.3 on page 72 by adding a new item:
14. If 〈λxι.φ〉 is a predicate abstract and xι1 an intensional term, then
〈λxι.φ〉(xι1) is a formula.
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The free variable occurrences of this formula are those of φ except for xι,
plus the occurrence of xι1 .
We abbreviate 〈λxι.〈λyι.φ〉(yι1)〉(xι1) as 〈λxι, yι.φ〉(xι1 , yι1). Note also how
the predicate abstract acts as a bridge between intensional variables and ex-
tensional ones. It acts as if by way of passing through the predicate abstract,
intensions were stripped of its abstract category and devalued to a concrete
object. Predicate abstracts act, then, as a procedure of “incarnation of in-
tensions”, and so intensions can touch the real objects of the world: Verbum
caro factum est.
And finally, we add to definition 2.3.9 on page 76, the evaluation of for-
mulas with lambda:
14. Let 〈λxι.φ〉(xι1) be a formula with a predicate abstract and an inten-
sional variable; we consider two cases depending on wether or not the
intensional variable designates at the world of evaluation (remember
that g(xι1) is a partial function):
(a) If xι1 designates at w:
J〈λxι.φ〉(xι1)KM,g,w = T iff JφKM,g
′,w = T
where g′ is the xι-variant of g, such that g
′(xι) = g(xι1)(w).
(b) If xι1 does not designate at w:
J〈λxι.φ〉(xι1)KM,g,w = F
The idea behind the interpretation of 〈λxι.φ〉(xι1) at a given world w, is that
if xι1 designates at w, then the object designated by xι1 at w has the property
specified by φ at w; and if xι1 does not designate at w, then it cannot be
predicated anything about it at w, and therefore, to say that xι1 has the
property specified by φ at w is false.
Let us revisit our previous examples to analyze how helpful can be pred-
icate abstracts. The example of intensional predication is formalized in the
same way as before: “the winner of the Golden Ball has the most important
sport distinction in the world” is left as P (xι1). But, the example of exten-
sional predication: “the winner of the Golden Ball is handsome” is translated
as:
〈λxι.Q(xι)〉(xι1) (2.3)
We can evaluate the previous formula following a pattern like this: first, we
must take the intensional expression “the winner of the Golden Ball”, and
check if it designates at w; if it does, we take the object determined by the
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intension at w, and check if the property Q interpreted at w has the previous
object as an element. If it is, the formula is true at w. If it is not, the formula
is false at w. And if “the winner of the Golden Ball” does not designate at
w, then the formula is false at w.
Example 2.3.11. Think about a model where the elements of the domain
of individuals are soccer players. In this soccer-model we have three worlds:
w1, w2 and w3. w1 represents a person in 2016 who is a soccer fanatic
loving Ronaldo’s physique but not Messi’s physique; w2 represents a person
in 2009 who does not feel any sympathy for soccer and which thinks that both
Ronaldo and Messi are good-looking men; and w3 represents a person in 1950
who enjoys playing soccer and thinks that Alfredo Di Stéfano is attractive.
At w1: P (xι1), which translates “the winner of the Golden Ball has the
most important sport distinction in the world”, is true—remember that w1 is
a fanatic. Its truth value does not depend on who is the winner of the Golden
Ball at a particular year, but it is the concept of the award itself which is the
most important sport distinction in the world. At w2, the formula P (xι1) is
evaluated to false given that, for w2, to be awarded with a soccer prize can be
important but not the most important sport distinction. At w3, although the
Golden Ball prize had not been awarded yet in 1950, it is possible, however,
to refer to the concept denoted by xι1 and, if enjoying playing soccer, as w3
does, to evaluate the formula P (xι1) as true. The formula P (xι1) is, thus,
true at w3.
We continue now with the evaluation of the formula 〈λxι.Q(xι)〉(xι1),
translating “the winner of the Golden Ball is handsome”.
At w1, the description “the winner of the Golden Ball” designates Cris-
tiano Ronaldo and therefore:
J〈λxι.Q(xι)〉(xι1)KM,g,w1 = T iff JQ(xι)KM,g
′,w1 = T
where g′ is the xι-variant of g, such that g





iff (F(Q)(w1))(g(xι1)(w1)) = T
Then the formula is true supposing that Cristiano Ronaldo, g(xι1)(w1), fits
the criteria of beauty of w1, F(Q)(w1), which does, and so 〈λxι.Q(xι)〉(xι1)
is true at w1.
At w2, xι1 designates Lionel Messi, and so we have that:
J〈λxι.Q(xι)〉(xι1)KM,g,w2 = T iff JQ(xι)KM,g
′,w2 = T
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where g′ is the xι-variant of g, such that g
′(xι) = g(xι1)(w2). The denotation
of xι1 at w2 is g(xι1)(w2), which determines Lionel Messi as the winner of
the Golden Ball in 2009. If the beauty standards at w2, that is, F(Q)(w1),
can be applied to Lionel Messi, then the formula 〈λxι.Q(xι)〉(xι1) would be
true at w2. If Lionel Messi does not fulfill the idea of a handsome man at
w2, then sentence 〈λxι.Q(xι)〉(xι1) would be false. As Messi fits the criteria
of beauty at w2, then 〈λxι.Q(xι)〉(xι1) is true at w2.
At w3, we find that the intensional term xι1 does not have any denotation,
given that the Golden Ball prize was not awarded yet. (Remember that
g(xι1) is a partial function not defined in w3.) And, therefore, as we can not
predicate anything true of non-denoting terms we conclude that:
J〈λxι.Q(xι)〉(xι1)KM,g,w3 = F
It is false thus at w3 that “the winner of the Golden Ball is handsome”, since
“‘the winner of the Golden Ball” does not denote any individual in 1950.
By contrast, “the winner of the Golden Ball has the most important sport
distinction in the world” is true at w3, even if there is no winner of the Golden
Ball in 1950, since you can denote an intension even at a world where it has
no individual object as value.
2.3.4 Scope distinction
As we have seen before, when we have formulas where a predicate is said
of a non-denoting term, the formulas are false and “that’s it!”. But when
formulas with negation are taken into account, it results in some complica-
tions. In this section we revisit—remember section 2.2.4 on page 61— the
inconsistencies with the interpretation of negative statements which have
non-denoting terms. The novelty is that here we are going to compare pred-
icate abstracts and hybrid machinery, to see how they work independently.
Consider, for example, the proposition expressed by: “the Spanish winner of
the current Eurovision contest is famous worldwide”, evaluated at the present
world w = g(a), year 2017. Suppose that yι1 stands for “the Spanish winner
of the current Eurovision contest” and R for “being famous worldwide”. The
previous sentence could be formalized in two ways:
1. ↓aR(@ayι1), or
2. 〈λyι.R(yι)〉(yι1)
↓aR(@ayι1) is evaluated according to rules 13 and 1 of definition 2.3.9 on
page 76. As we know that @ayι1 is a non-designating term at w, it follows
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that
J↓ aR(@ayι1)KM,g,w = F (2.4)
And, according to case (b) of rule 14 of definition 2.3.9 on page 81:
J〈λyι.R(yι)〉(yι1)KM,g,w = F (2.5)
In line with evaluations (2.4) and (2.5), it seems there is no problem
with the truth values that are assigned to formulas with non-designating
terms. But what does it happen when we consider a proposition which is
the negation of the previous one, that is, “the Spanish winner of the current
Eurovision contest is not famous worldwide”? We can formalize it in different
ways depending on the reading we do: either (A) “it is not the case that the
Spanish winner of the current Eurovision contest is famous worldwide”, or
(B) “the Spanish winner of the current Eurovision contest is not-famous
worldwide”. In the first case we are negating the attribution of a property
to the object determined by an intension at a given world. In the second
case we are saying of the object determined by an intension at a given world
that it has a negative property, that is, the property of being not-famous
worldwide. We know from section 2.2.4 on page 61, that these nuances are
captured by means of the use of predicate abstracts. And, in fact, the truth
value of (A) and (B) are different when non-denoting terms are considered.
Let us remember it.
(Aλ) ¬〈λyι.R(yι)〉(yι1) is true at our present world w, while
(Bλ) 〈λyι.¬R(yι)〉(yι1) is false at our present world w.
We ask now if the same distinction concerning the scope of the negation sym-
bol can also be captured by the hybrid operators. We try it by interchanging
the negation symbol and ↓. The result is as follows:
(A↓) ¬↓aR(@ayι1) is true at w. The evaluation of this formula at w = g(a)
gives us that, as g(yι1)(w) is not defined, then @ayι1 does not desig-
nate at w = g(a), and therefore R(@ayι1) is false at w. Consequently
¬↓aR(@ayι1) is true at the present world 2017.
(B↓) ↓a¬R(@ayι1) is true at w. We interpret the predicate the predicate at w
and the rigidified intensional variable @ayι1 at the same world g(a) = w.
The term @ayι1 does not designate at w as we know that g(yι1)(w) is
not defined. Accordingly, R(@ayι1) is false at w, and ¬R(@ayι1) is true
at the present world 2017.
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Both cases (A↓) and (B↓) have the same truth value so it seems that
¬↓aR(@ayι1) and ↓a¬R(@ayι1) are equivalent formulas. They are also equiv-
alent with ¬〈λyι.R(yι)〉(yι1). But, as we have seen, the nuances expressed
through 〈λyι.¬R(yι)〉(yι1) have not been captured by hybrid operators, and
hence there is no way of expressing the attribution of a negative property to
an object with only the use of ↓ and @. When we have denoting terms there
is no problem at all: (Aλ), (Bλ), (A↓) and (B↓), have always the same truth
value. But if non-denoting terms come into play, (Bλ) takes a different truth
value with respect to the other alternatives.
One way of solving this problem is to dispense with predicate abstracts,
and to give a unique formalization to (A) and (B), making unnecessary
any difference in scope. In this case, (A) and (B) would express the same
proposition which would be formalized as, for example, ¬↓aR(@ayι1).
We can, however, combine predicate abstracts and hybrid operators in the
same language without having the problem of inconsistencies in the interpre-
tation of the language, provided we restrict the formalization of sentences
where a negative property is applied to an object to formulas with predicate
abstracts. In this case when we formalize negative statements what, first of
all, we need to clarify is if they have the form of a “It is not the case that x
is P” sentence or if they have the form of a sentence like “x has the negative
property of non-being P”.
2.3.5 De dicto and De re
We are concerned with the distinction between de dicto and de re, because
there are certain ambiguities which result from the combination of inten-
sional terms with modal operators. Imagine we say that “it is necessary
that the winner of the current Eurovision contest is Portuguese”. Suppose S
stands for “is Portuguese” and zι1 for “the winner of the current Eurovision
contest”. And so, we get the formula 2S(zι1) from the previous statement.
The sentence can be read as saying that the winner of the current Eurovision
contest at each possible world—where possible worlds are interpreted as time
instances—is Portuguese at the same worlds; or it can be understood as that
the winner of the current Eurovision contest at the present world of evalua-
tion is Portuguese at every possible world. Is only one of both interpretations
correct? We think it is plausible to have both interpretations. In the first
case we have a de dicto reading, which is the straightforward interpretation
in a sentence like “it is necessary that the winner of the current Eurovision
contest is Portuguese”; in the second case, however, we have a de re reading,
which is more easily understood if we paraphrase the sentence as “the winner
of the current Eurovision contest is necessarily Portuguese”. Intuitively, in
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the first case we have a false sentence at the present world of 2017, because
it has never been necessary in the history of Eurovision contests to be Por-
tuguese for winning the competition; while, in the second case, we can have
a true sentence in 2017 because it can be said at every possible world of
Salvador Sobral that he is Portuguese.
Traditionally, a de dicto reading is a modal interpretation of the predi-
cation of terms, where the designation of the term has to be found at every
possible world where the formula is evaluated; the designation of the terms,
thus, can change from one world to another. The predication is done of
the dictum, i.e., of the expression, in our case of “the winner of the current
Eurovision contest”, whose denotation is different depending on the world.
However, a de re reading takes, first of all, the denotation of the term at
the world of evaluation, individuating an entity and, then, predicating about
this concrete object, or rem, at possibly different worlds. In our case we had
to interpret “the winner of the current Eurovision contest” at our world of
evaluation (the present time) and then to check if this concrete individual
can receive the property of “being Portuguese” at different worlds. In a de
dicto reading we have to check if it is true that “the winner of the current
Eurovision contest is Portuguese” at certain worlds; while in a de re read-
ing, we check the truthfulness at certain worlds if the “being Portuguese”
predicate can be applied of “the winner of the current Eurovision contest”
as individuated at the world of evaluation (Salvador Sobral in 2017).
We know (from Fitting and Mendelsohn (1998)) that predicate abstracts
allow us to differentiate between de dicto and de re readings. If we take the
previous example, the de dicto reading would be formalized as:
(λ-dictum) 2〈λzι.S(zι)〉(zι1).
And the de re reading as:
(λ-rem) 〈λzι.2S(zι)〉(zι1).
Let us see how these formulas are evaluated:
(λ-dictum) Formula 2〈λzι.S(zι)〉(zι1) is true at world w of a modelM using
assignment g if and only if 〈λzι.S(zι)〉(zι1) is true at any world w′ of
a model M accessible from w and, if this is the case, if the object
denoted by zι1 at each w
′ belongs to the interpretation of S at the
same w′. Therefore, we first go to each of the worlds where the formula
has to be evaluated and, there, we pick up the extensions of both, the
intensional term and the predicate and, finally, check if the predicate
applies to the term.
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(λ-rem) For the formula 〈λzι.2S(zι)〉(zι1) to be true at w, we begin individ-
uating the object denoted by zι1 at w, and once we have determined
the thing (rem), we check if at any w′ accessible from w the property
S at w′ can be attributed to the object individuated at the beginning
of the evaluation.
In the particular case of our example about the necessity that “the winner of
the current Eurovision contest is Portuguese”, the formula 2〈λzι.S(zι)〉(zι1)
is false at our world of 2017, while 〈λzι.2S(zι)〉(zι1) is true at our present
world of 2017.
We ask now, if hybrid operators are also adequate as a new way for solv-
ing the problem of the ambiguity between de dicto and de re readings, in line
with the performance of predicate abstracts, without losing any kind of ex-
pressiveness. In this case, the use of rigidified terms and the ↓ operator adds
up to remove the ambiguities. In the first place, we present the hybridized
version of a the de dicto reading:
(↓-dictum) 2↓aS(@azι1).
And, in the second place, a version of the de re reading:
(↓-rem) ↓a2S(@azι1).
Now, we explain, informally, how the evaluation works:
(↓-dictum) The formula 2↓aS(@azι1) is true at w if and only if the formula
↓aS(@azι1) is true at any w′ accessible from w. To evaluate ↓aS(@azι1)
at each w′, we first concentrate in the ↓ operator. This operator fixes
the nominal which bounds to the world where the formula is being
evaluated, suppose w′, then ↓ a says that the nominal a has to be
interpreted not as the world it names in “normal” circumstances, but
as w′. Consequently, the individual determined by @azι1 is the value of
the intension denoted by zι1 when it takes as argument w
′. And, finally,
as a result, the object individuated by the extensionalized intension at
each w′ has to belong to the extension of the predicate at each w′ for
making the formula true.
(↓-rem) The formula ↓a2S(@azι1) is true at w, when the object determined
by zι1 at w belongs to each of the interpretations of S at any w
′ acces-
sible from w
In the particular case of our example about the Eurovision contest, the for-
mula 2↓aS(@azι1) is false at our present world, but ↓a2S(@azι1) is true at
our world of 2017.
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Example 2.3.12. Let us now consider a traditional example like this: “the
number of planets is necessarily greater than 7”, and see how predicate ab-
straction with λ, on the one side, and the ↓ operator with nominals, on the
other side, work in order to distinguish a de dicto reading from a de re one.
Via predicate abstracts, the proposition “the number of planets is neces-





As we have seen again, predicate abstracts and (intensional) terms together
are very useful for removing ambiguities. In Fitting and Mendelsohn (1998)
this procedure is explained thoroughly and it is also considered by Fitting
(2004). But we do not necessarily need this machinery to distinguish formally
between such readings.
We can also use rigidified terms and the ↓ operator, as in Braüner (2008).






2↓aP (@axι1) could be translated by “it is necessary that the number of
planet is greater than 7” and ↓ a2P (@axι1) by “the number designated by
the term ‘the number of planets’ is necessarily greater than 7”. In the first
case we go to every world, then determine the designation of the term “the
number of planets” there and then evaluate the application of the interpreted
predicate “is greater than 7” to the designated object. That shows that the
sentence “it is necessary that the number of planet is greater than 7” is
false, because there can be worlds where the term “the number of planets”
designate a number lower than 7 or nothing at all. In the second case, we
try to find the object designated by xι1 at the world of evaluation and, then,
we carry the same value to all the worlds and, in all of them, we check if the
interpreted predicate “is greater than 7” can be applied successfully to the
designated object. Under this reading the proposition would be true because
8 or 9 (it depends on the last published paper on astrophysics) is necessarily
greater than 7.
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We proceed now to give a more formal account of the evaluation of the
previous formulas at a world w of a given model under an assignment g. Let
us suppose that we have a planetary model where the domain contains the
planets of the Solar System. We have also two worlds: w1, the telescopic-
world, which is supposed to be our current world where we have telescopes
for studying the celestial bodies; and w2, the naked-eye-world, which is the
ancient Babylonian world where celestial bodies were identified only by means
of the sense of sight. At w1, the planets are considered to be 8. At w2,
the planets are 5, provided that the Sun and the Moon are not taken into
account. Moreover, the accessibility relation between the two worlds is an
equivalence relation; and the description “the number of planets” designates
at each world.
The evaluation of 2〈λxι.P (xι)〉(xι1) at w1 is as follows:
J2〈λxι.P (xι)〉(xι1)KM,g,w1 = T if J〈λxι.P (xι)〉(xι1)KM,g,w
′
= T
for all w′ ∈ W such that w1Rw′. In this case w′ can be w1 or w2. At
w1, J〈λxι.P (xι)〉(xι1)KM,g,w1 = T , provided JP (xι)KM,g
′,w1 = T , where g′
is the xι-variant of g, such that g
′(xι) = g(xι1)(w1), and that is number
8. As the interpretation of the predicate P at w1 is the set of numbers
greater than 7, and 8 > 7, then 〈λxι.P (xι)〉(xι1) is true at w1. At w2,
J〈λxι.P (xι)〉(xι1)KM,g,w2 = T , provided JP (xι)KM,g
′,w2 = T , where g′ is the
xι-variant of g, such that g
′(xι) = g(xι1)(w2), which is the number 5. As
the interpretation of the predicate P at w2 is the same set we have at w1
formed by the numbers greater than 7, and 5 is not greater than 7, then
〈λxι.P (xι)〉(xι1) is false at w2. And therefore 2〈λxι.P (xι)〉(xι1) is false at
w1. The evaluation at w2 is similar to the previous one and gives us also that
2〈λxι.P (xι)〉(xι1) is false at w2.
The evaluation of 2↓aP (@axι1) at w1 is as follows:
J2↓aP (@axι1)KM,g,w1 = T if J↓aP (@axι1)KM,g,w
′
= T
for all w′ ∈ W such that w1Rw′. In this case w′ can be w1 or w2. At
w2, J↓ aP (@axι1)KM,g,w2 = T if JP (@axι1)KM,g
′,w2 = T , where g′ is an a-
variant of g and g′(a) = w2; if (F(P )(w2))(J@axι1KM,g
′,w2) = T . Given that
J@axι1KM,g
′,w2 = g′(xι1)(g
′(a)) = g(xι1)(w2), we have that @axι1 designates
the number 5 at w2. The interpretation of the predicate P at w2, F(P )(w2),
is the set of the numbers greater than 7. But as it is false that 5 is greater
than 7, then ↓aP (@axι1) is false at w2. And therefore 2↓aP (@axι1) is false
at w1.
We evaluate now 〈λxι.2P (xι)〉(xι1) at w1:
J〈λxι.2P (xι)〉(xι1)KM,g,w1 = T if J2P (xι)KM,g
′,w1 = T
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where g′ is the xι-variant of g, such that g
′(xι) = g(xι1)(w1). We know that
the value of g′(xι) = g(xι1)(w1) and it is fixed to be 8. Then J2P (xι)KM,g
′,w1 =
T if JP (xι)KM,g
′,w′ = T , for all w′ ∈ W such that w1Rw′. w′ can be w1 or w2.
If it is w1, then JP (xι)KM,g
′,w1 = T , provided (F(P )(w1))(g
′(xι)) = T . The
interpretation of P at w1 is F(P )(w1) which denotes the set of the numbers
greater than 7. We know also the value of g′(xι): it is 8. As the property of
being greater than 7 applies to 8, then P (xι) is true at w1. If w
′ is w2, then
JP (xι)KM,g
′,w2 = T , and so (F(P )(w2))(g
′(xι)) = T . The interpretation of P
at w2 is F(P )(w2) which denotes the set of the numbers greater than 7. We
know also the value of g′(xι): it is 8. As the property of being greater than
7 applies to 8, then P (xι) is true at w2. Consequently, 〈λxι.2P (xι)〉(xι1) is
true at w1.
Finally, we evaluate ↓a2P (@axι1) at w1:
J↓a2P (@axι1)KM,g,w1 = T if J2P (@axι1)KM,g
′,w1 = T
where g′ is an a-variant of g and g′(a) = w1. And so the value of the nomi-
nal a is fixed to be the name of w1. Then, J2P (@axι1)KM,g
′,w1 = T provided
JP (@axι1)KM,g
′,w′ = T , for all w′ ∈ W such that w1Rw′. w′ can be w1 or w2. If
it is w1, then JP (@axι1)KM,g
′,w1 = T , provided (F(P )(w1))(J@axι1KM,g
′,w1) =
T . We have that J@axι1KM,g
′,w1 = g′(xι1)(g
′(a)) = g(xι1)(w1), which has
as value 8. As it is true at w1 that 8 is greater than 7, then the for-
mula P (@axι1) is true at w1. If w
′ is w2, then JP (@axι1)KM,g
′,w2 = T ,
provided (F(P )(w2))(J@axι1KM,g
′,w2) = T . We have that J@axι1KM,g
′,w2 =
g′(xι1)(g
′(a)) = g(xι1)(w1), which has as value 8. As it is true at w2 that
8—the denotation of the number of planets at w1—is greater than 7—the
extension of P at w2, then the formula P (@axι1) is true at w2. Consequently,
↓a2P (@axι1) is true at w1.
To sum up, in each one of the cases, either with predicate abstracts or with
hybrid operators, we have got the same result: the de dicto versions of the
formulas are false at w1 and the de re readings of the formulas are true at
w1.
In conclusion, as we have seen, predicate abstracts and hybrid operators
are both good mechanisms in order to differentiate between readings de dicto
and de re. Both are also powerful enough for offering intensional predication,
but we have only got a fully understanding of the difference in scope with






In the present chapter we present an Intensional Hybrid Type Theory.1 We
study the syntax and the semantics, and we offer also a selection of those
types which can be considered more interesting for formalizing the expres-
sions of natural language (section 3.2). Furthermore, our Intensional Hybrid
Type Theory, since it includes not only intensional types but also extensional
types, can be used as a common framework for the study of contexts where
intensional expressions are the essential ones (empirical contexts) and also
for the study of those contexts (non-empirical contexts) where extensional
expressions, such as mathematical statements, are the basics (section 3.3).
Our chapter also includes two miscellaneous discussions that we have not
been able to examine before: descriptions and identity of senses, both cru-
cial in any significant analysis about intensional logic. In section 3.4 we focus
on the two main theories of descriptions: Russell’s and Frege’s theory. We
present our rationale for choosing Frege’s theory and offer a solution to the
problem of non-denoting terms based on partial functions within a bivalent
logic. In our last section (section 3.5) we establish that, although identity of
intensions, intended as functions from worlds to objects, is a necessary con-
dition for the identity of senses, it is not a sufficient condition. In epistemic
contexts identity of intensions is too loose. We need a more fine-grained
condition which allow us to go beyond intensions and, so, we grasp a new
notion: hyperintensions. Synonymous isomorphism (Church), constructions
1See a previous formulation of a Hybrid Type Theory in (Areces, Blackburn, Huertas,
& Manzano, 2014).
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(Tichý) and algorithms (Moschovakis) are the possible candidates we present
for giving a successful account of these hyperintensions.
3.2 Intensional Hybrid Type Theory
3.2.1 Syntax
Types
In the previous chapter we have occasionally used for the types the symbols
ι, o and, σ. They remember respectively the symbols e (for entity), t (for
truth value) and s (for sense) of Montague’s type theory. In our intensional
hybrid type theory, we give preference to the notation defined in the previous
chapter where the symbols ι, o and, the subscript 1—instead of σ—were used.
Definition 3.2.1 (Type). The notion of a type, either extensional or inten-
sional, is defined inductively by the following rules:
1. Functional Types:
ι | ι1 | 〈(t1 . . . tn)t〉 | r1
t is either ι or ι1; t
1, . . . , tn, r are functional types. Intensional types
end in ι1 and extensional types end in ι.
2. Propositional types:
o | o1 | 〈p1p2〉
p1, p2, are propositional types. They are intensional if they end in o1,
and extensional if they end in o.
3. Predicative Types:
〈tp〉 | 〈πp〉
t is a functional type; p is a basic propositional type (o or o1); π is a
predicative type.
In order to avoid equivocal interpretations of how intensional types are
formed, mainly with respect to complex functional types, we follow the con-
vention explained in section 2.4 on page 95. As a result, the intension of a
functional type is internalized and remains with the symbol situated more to
the right.
Definition 3.2.2 (Abbreviation of Functional Intensional Types). If 〈(t1 . . . tn)t〉
is a functional type, then the intensional type r1 is 〈(t1 . . . tn)t〉1, which is ab-





In the previous chapters we have been creating tools, materialized as formal
languages, for dealing with a great amount of expressions of natural language.
In the present chapter we want to put into practice these tools for shedding
light on some philosophical problems. Of all the philosophical problems, we
have chosen one that has been linked to formal logic in a very special way. We
are referring to the ontological arguments. Much has been said in the field
of logic about classical ontological arguments across the twentieth century:1
there have been formal accounts mainly of the ontological argument(s) of St.
Anselm of Canterbury2 but also of those of Descartes and Spinoza.3 But in
the last quarter of the past century and in our current century one argument
has attracted increasing attention: the ontological argument of Kurt Gödel4
(section 4.3).
As every ontological argument, the purpose of Gödel’s proof is to arrive to
a demonstration of the existence of God starting only from a priori premises,
that is, from premises which do not suppose the existence of the world and
of the properties related to it. But just as in every argument, although the
rules are sound, it is possible to discuss the premises and the definitions to
see if they can be considered true or if they assume too much with respect
to the conclusion. Our aim for analyzing Gödel’s argument has not been
1See, for example, our exposition in (Manzano & Moreno, 2010).
2See, for example, (Hartshorne, 1965), (Malcolm, 1960), (Plantinga, 1967, 1974),
(Lewis, 1970), (Adams, 1971), (Oppenheimer & Zalta, 1991, 2011) and (Dombrowski,
2006).
3For both arguments see (Sobel, 2004, pp. 29–80).
4See, for example, (Anderson, 1990), (Hazen, 1998), (Oppy, 1996), (Sobel, 1987, 2004),
and (Fitting, 2002).
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to study the proof theory behind it, but to look into its philosophical no-
tions: positive property, Godlike property, essence and necessary existence.
Gödel’s axioms and definitions provide us with a rigorous approach to this
philosophical notions, and we have found this approach tremendously ap-
pealing. Apart from examining these notions in the argument of Gödel, we
have also reconstructed it from a novel point of view which considers god not
as an individual object but as an individual concept. As a result, we have
recomposed all the properties in the argument, giving to them the option
of offering intensional predication, i.e., to predicate of intensions, and not of
the objects designated by the intensions. The conclusion of the proof is not
so powerful, but it is more credible: we do not conclude that it is necessary
that exists a being which is Godlike. We humbly conclude that it is necessary
that god is the being which has all positive properties.
In order to achieve a balance between theists and atheists, we have also
presented a peculiar argument from a Bishop of the seventeenth century,
Juan Caramuel, who offered an argument against the existence of God (sec-
tion 4.4). As the premises are a priori, we have considered it as an ontological
argument, in spite of the fact that the expression “ontological argument” is
reserved, from Kant onwards, to the arguments for, and not against, the exis-
tence of God. Although the deduction rules of the proof are simple, we have
offered a more complicated formalization of the axioms of the argument as
a way of giving a philosophical use to our intensional hybrid language. The
conclusion is very strong, it says that it is impossible that god, an individual
concept, designates at any world. But there is some tricky axiom, denying
god’s contingency, that assumes too much.
In any case, our purpose by offering an analysis of the ontological argu-
ments, has not been to change the convictions of anybody. Unfortunately,
they are not going to change the life style and the way of thinking of the
reader. Our main objective has been to deal with philosophical problems
in a formal way. We claim that the intensional hybrid languages we have
presented give us enough machinery for making a novel approach to philos-
ophy. That is the main goal of this chapter. To build a bridge for dealing
with philosophical notions with a formal method. This can be considered a
contribution to a formal ontology, where rigorous definitions of concepts such
as denotation or existence are given. And that is just what we try to do at
the beginning of this chapter (section 4.2).
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4.3 Gödel’s Ontological Proof
The first traces of an interest of Gödel for the ontological proof date back
to 1944 (Adams, 1995, p. 388), although it was not until 1970 (Gödel, 1995,
pp. 403–404) that Gödel showed privately to Dana Scott his work on a
proof. Scott wrote a copy of it and this copy was around in private until it
was published by Sobel (1987). The proof, as can be seen in Gödel (1995,
403–404), is schematic and written in a formal notation, unlike the classical
ontological arguments that were written in an informal way. In its notation
Gödel makes use of quantification of properties, of predicate constants which
are properties of properties, and he also uses modal operators; therefore, the
formalization assumes a higher-order modal logic.
Now, we are going to put forward the proof of Gödel and present each
of the axioms, definitions and propositions in a three-level structure: firstly,
we begin giving an exposition in ordinary language; secondly, we present a
formalization which is close to the notes of Gödel (this is item (a), where an
actualist quantification is assumed); thirdly, we give a formal version in the
language of our Intensional Hybrid Type Theory (this is item (b)). We have
taken the first two levels from Fitting (2002, pp. 140–161).
4.3.1 Axioms
Gödel’s ontological proof is based on the following five axioms:
Axiom 4.3.1. Either a given property is positive or its contrary is, that is,
exactly one of a property or its complement is positive.
(a) ∀X(P(¬X)↔ ¬P(X))
(b) ∀X(P(〈λx.¬X(x)〉)↔ ¬P(〈λx.X(x)〉))
where x is an individual variable of type ι, X is a predicate variable
of type 〈ιo1〉, 〈λx.¬X(x)〉 and 〈λx.X(x)〉 are predicate abstracts of
type 〈ιo1〉, and P is a predicate of predicates of type 〈〈ιo1〉o1〉. P is
a primitive predicate representing positiveness and it is an intensional
predicate of intensional predicates.
Axiom 4.3.2. Any property entailed by a positive property is positive.
(a) ∀X∀Y [P(X) ∧2∀x[X(x)→ Y (x)]→ P(Y )]
(b) ∀X∀Y [P(X) ∧2∀Ex[X(x)→ Y (x)]→ P(Y )]
where Y is a predicate variable of type 〈ιo1〉 and ∀Ex[X(x) → Y (x)]
is an abbreviation for the formula ∀x[E(x) → (X(x) → Y (x))]. ∀Ex
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is a relativized quantifier which range over the objects located at the
world where the formula is evaluated. It has been introduced in order to
express actualist quantification, which is the quantification we presume
Gödel had, in a constant domain model as ours. Remenber that E(x)
is a primitive predicate of type 〈ιo1〉 which is true at a world w of the
objects actually located at w.
Axiom 4.3.3. The conjunction of any collection of positive properties is
positive.
(a) ∀X∀Y [P(X) ∧ P(Y )→ P(X ∧ Y )]
(b) ∀X∀Y [P(X) ∧ P(Y )→ P(〈λx.(X(x) ∧ Y (x))〉)]
where 〈λx.(X(x) ∧ Y (x))〉 is a predicate abstract of type 〈ιo1〉.
Axiom 4.3.4. Any positive property is necessarily positive.
(a) ∀X[P(X)→ 2P(X)]
(b) ∀X[P(X)→ 2P(X)]
in this case we have not done any modifications.
Axiom 4.3.5. Necessary existence is a positive property.
(a) P(N)
(b) P(N)
where N is a property of individuals of type 〈ιo1〉 which stands for
necessary existence.
4.3.2 Definitions
In mathematics, axioms and theorems are considered to be essential for the
advance of knowledge, but theorems sometimes appear as mechanical proce-
dures for arriving to a conclusion. Axioms are always considered the foun-
dations of a theory but: what about definitions? A lot of creativity is put in
definitions, they provide us with the basic elements that can be manipulated
in proofs, and you have to choose well your definitions in order to get proofs
which are informative enough to get an interesting result. Let us see what
are these creative elements of Gödel’s proof.
Definition 4.3.6 (Godlike). A Godlike being is any being that has every
positive property.
(a) ∀x[G(x)↔ ∀X[P(X)→ X(x)]]
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(b) G is the abbreviation of the following term:
G := 〈λx.∀X(P(X)→ X(x))〉
“Godlike” is considered to be a predicate of individuals and it has type
〈ιo1〉, and it is defined as a being which has every positive property. A
definition which is very similar to those definitions of Descartes and Leibniz
although they preferred perfections instead of positive properties.
Definition 4.3.7 (Essence). The essence of an object is a property that the
object possesses and that entails every property that the object has.
(a) ∀X∀x[X Ess x↔ ∀Y (Y (x)→ 2∀y[X(y)→ Y (y)])]
(b) Σ is the abbreviation of the following term:
Σ := 〈λX, x.(X(x) ∧ ∀Y [Y (x)→ 2∀Ey(X(y)→ Y (y))])〉
Σ is a binary predicate of type 〈(〈ιo1〉ι)o1〉 which takes two arguments:
the first argument is a predicate of type 〈ιo1〉 and the second is an individual
of type ι. Then, Σ(X, x) is read as X is the essence of x. Note that in (a)
does not appear the condition that an object has to possess its own essential
property, X(x), the reason is that in Gödel’s notes it does not appear either.
Scott thinks that it was an slip and adds in his notes the formula X(x) to the
definition of essence: ∀X∀x[X Ess x ↔ X(x) ∧ ∀Y (Y (x) → 2∀y[X(y) →
Y (y)])] (Sobel, 1987, pp. 256–257).
Definition 4.3.8 (Necessary Existence). An object has the property of nec-
essarily existing if its essence is necessarily instantiated.
(a) ∀x[N(x)↔ ∀X[X Ess x→ 2∃xX(x)]]
(b) N is the abbreviation of the following term:
N := 〈λx.∀X[Σ(X, x)→ 2∃ExX(x)]〉
N is a predicate of type 〈ιo1〉 and applies to individual objects. ∃ExX(x)




From the previous axioms and definitions we can get the following proposi-
tions:
Proposition 4.3.9. From axioms 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 it can be proved that any
positive property is possibly instantiated.
(a) ∀X[P(X)→ 3∃xX(x)]
(b) ∀X[P(X)→ 3∃ExX(x)]
Proposition 4.3.10. From axiom 4.3.3 and definition 4.3.6 we get that to
be a Godlike being is a positive property.
(a) P(G)
(b) P(G)
Proposition 4.3.11. From axioms 4.3.1, 4.3.2 and 4.3.3, and definition 4.3.6,
we obtain that it is possible that a Godlike being exists.
(a) 3∃xG(x)
(b) 3∃ExG(x)
Proposition 4.3.12. From axiom 4.3.1, axiom 4.3.4 and definition 4.3.7 it
can be proved that any being which is Godlike has as its essence the property
of being a Godlike being.
(a) ∀x[G(x)→ G Ess x]
(b) ∀Ex[G(x)→ Σ(G, x)]
Proposition 4.3.13. From axioms 4.3.1, 4.3.4 and 4.3.5 we get, assuming
the logic is K logic, that if there is at least one being which is Godlike, then
this being exists necessarily.
(a) ∃xG(x)→ 2∃xG(x)
(b) ∃xG(x)→ 2∃ExG(x)
Assume the previous axioms, and assume also the logic is S5, then it can be
proved that if it is possible that there is at least one being which is Godlike,




Note that the quantifiers in the antecedent is not relativized. The reason
is that the necessary actualist existence of a being which is Godlike follows
from his possibilist existence.
Proposition 4.3.14. Assume the logic is S5, then from propositions 4.3.11




Here finishes Gödel’s ontological proof.
4.3.4 Favorable Consequences of Gödel’s Proof
Assuming the previous axioms, definitions and propositions we can arrive to
other results:
Proposition 4.3.15. Any individual can only have one essence.
∀X∀Y ∀z[Σ(X, z) ∧ Σ(Y, z)→ 2∀Ew[X(w)↔ Y (w)]]
Proposition 4.3.16. An essence is a complete characterization of an indi-
vidual, that is, one individual can not have the essence of another individual
as property.
∀X∀y[Σ(X, y)→ 2∀Ez(X(z)→ y = z)]
Propositions 4.3.15 and 4.3.16 can be found on the notes of Dana Scott
about the proof (Sobel, 2004, p. 146). They can be proved assuming the
logic is K. From them we can also get that it is not possible that there are
two Godlike beings, that is, two distinct objects having the property of being
Godlike.
Proposition 4.3.17. There is exactly one Godlike being.
∃x∀y(G(y)↔ y = x)
Consequently, monotheism is guaranteed by Gödel’s proof.
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4.3.5 Inconvenient Consequences of Gödel’s Proof
Sobel presents some results which can be derived from Gödel’s proof which
turn out to be problematic for the concept of God (Sobel, 2004, pp. 128–135).
The objections raised by Sobel on Gödel’s proof are based on a generous in-
terpretation of properties. Given that our language has predicate abstract
terms, it is possible to build complex predicates through them. And the pos-
sibility of constructing these complex predicates is fundamental for arriving
to the objections.
Sobel shows that from proposition 4.3.14 we can get the following result:
Proposition 4.3.18. Any positive property is necessarily instantiated.
∀X[P(X)→ 2∃ExX(x)]
Sobel also shows that
Proposition 4.3.19. Any property which a Godlike being has is necessarily
instantiated by a Godlike being:
∀Ex[G(x)→ ∀X(X(x)→ 2∃Ex[G(x) ∧X(x)])]
And now, assuming also that any individual has an essence:
∀Ex∃XΣ(X, x)
we can arrive to this problematic conclusion:
Proposition 4.3.20. All what exists, exists necessarily.
∀ExN(x)
The informal idea of the proof is that for every existent different of a
Godlike being g, g would have the property that there is an object x different
of g which has an essence E. Given that this complex property, as every other
property of a Godlike being, is necessarily instantiated, then the essence E
is necessarily instantiated. And so, x exists necessarily.
Proposition 4.3.21. All what is the case, is necessarily the case.
φ→ 2φ
Informally, the demonstration of this theorem is based on that for any
truth φ, a Godlike being would have the property of being identical with
itself in presence of the truth of φ. This property, as any property of a
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Godlike being, would be necessarily instantiated. And, given that there
exists necessarily a Godlike being, then every truth is a necessary truth.
From proposition 4.3.21 we can conclude that in a system where the
axioms of Gödel are true, the modalities collapse, and so actual existence,
possibility and necessity are equivalent.
Proposition 4.3.22.
(φ↔ 3φ) ∧ (3φ↔ 2φ) ∧ (φ↔ 2φ)
Given that φ → 3φ, 2φ → 3φ, and 2φ → φ, are theorems of S5, and
φ→ 2φ is just proposition 4.3.21, we would only need to prove 3φ→ φ and
3φ→ 2φ.
4.3.6 Open Questions
Gödel’s proof is a correct proof and it has been developed by Fitting (2002)
in a tableaux calculus and by Sobel (2004) in a natural deduction calcu-
lus. Our main question then is not about the correctness of Gödel’s proof,
what we pretend to discuss below is how Gödel’s axioms and definitions can
be understood from our own point of view concerning intensions, positive
properties, existence and essences. Let us remember that to have a correct
demonstration is not a sufficient condition for accepting a conclusion, given
that the axioms should also be accepted.
In what follows we will analyze each basic notion of Gödel’s axioms and
definitions from a critical point of view. In particular the properties of pos-
itiveness, Godlike, essence and necessary existence. We conclude that the
meaning of the axioms and definitions is much more coherent when variables
are considered to be intensional and predicates offer an intensional predica-
tion (that is, a predication of intensions).
Positive Properties
In the language of the proof we had a predicate of predicates, P , which has
been used to represent the concept of “positive” or “positiveness”. Leibniz in
his work Quod ens perfectissimum existit of 1676 (Gerhardt, 1978, pp. 261–
262) used the concept of “perfection” in his proof, Gödel, however, prefers to
talk about positive property (1995, pp. 403–404). Gödel does not offer a de-
tailed analysis about what a positive property means, he only refers in a note
that positive has to be intended in “the moral aesthetic sense (independently
of the accidental structure of the world)”. He also indicates that it would be




The main result of the present dissertation has been the differentiation be-
tween two ways of predication based on a same intensional predicate. We
have claimed that an intensional predicate, which is supposed to change pos-
sibly its extension at any world of a given model, can be said of extensional
terms, but it also can be applied to intensional terms. Predication has been
centered, more often than not, in extensional terms and intensional predica-
tion has not received the attention it merits. With intensional predication
we do not refer to predication of intensional terms that are extensionalized
later, as when we use an intensional term with an intensional predicate in
a sentence like “the Pope is a nice man”. In this case, the intensional term
“the Pope” is not used in order to designate the individual concept of the
Pope—which is a function from worlds to individuals—, but it is used as a
way of determining an individual person at a concrete world. The property
of being a nice man is then attributed to a particular person at a given world,
and not to a concept. The predication, thus, is extensional even though there
is an intensional term in the sentence.
We have discovered that in order to have a proper intensional predication
it is not sufficient to have intensional terms and intensional predicates in a
sentence. It is also necessary to indicate when the intensional term denotes
an intension and not an extensionalized intension at a given world. In natural
language we sometimes recognize this kind of predication straightforwardly.
In the sentence “the Pope is a religious concept”, we can identify how the
property of being a religious concept is applied to the individual concept
the Pope. But suppose that a term of a formal language τ stands for “the
Pope”, the predicate symbol P stands for “is a religious concept” and the
predicate symbol Q for “is a nice man”. Then, if nothing more is indicated
symbolically, in the formulas Q(τ) and P (τ) we have no way of distinguishing
when the predication is extensional or intensional, and we have no means of




Notwithstanding, we can not allow any kind of ambiguity between the pre-
vious formulas Q(τ) and P (τ): neither in the use done of the intension nor
in the way that predication is executed. We have introduced a powerful type
notation, even in first-order intensional expressions, inspired by the work of
Church in the field of intensional logic (Church, 1951), which provides us
with the necessary means for removing any ambiguity with regard to the
interpretation of intensional terms and to the different readings which derive
from the two ways of predication. Predicates are then not only formalized
as predicate symbols. They are formalized as predicate symbols of a partic-
ular type. They can be either of type 〈to1〉, where t is an extensional type,
or of type 〈t1o1〉, where t1 is an intensional type. An intensional first-order
monary predicate, for example, can be of type 〈ιo1〉 or of type 〈ι1o1〉. In the
first case the predicate is applied to an extensional term, while in the second
case it is applied to an intensional term; and what is behind these two types
are extensional predication and intensional predication respectively. In the
case of terms, they are not allowed either to be formalized only by a symbol
τ , since it would result vague. An individual term τ can be of extensional
type ι or of intensional type ι1. As a result, extensional terms can combine
with (monary) predicates of type 〈ιo1〉 to give an atomic formula where ex-
tensional predication is exemplified; and intensional terms can combine with
predicates of type 〈ι1o1〉 for obtaining a formula with intensional predication.
Expressions denoting Intensions
Consequently, our intensional languages do not include formal expressions
which are only interpreted in an intensional way, where the object language
is the same as an extensional language even though the semantic rules are
not. This is usually done in first-order modal logic where the same symbols
of first-order classical logic are taken without any modification and are in-
terpreted in a different way. The same predicate symbol P which had only
one extension in first-order logic, suddenly has different extensions at the
different worlds of a first-order modal model. In this case, the semantics
changes but the formal language, although expanded with new operators,
does not. By contrast, we have constructed some intensional languages in-
cluding expressions which denote intensions, and whose expressions are not
only interpreted as intensions. Our First-Order Intensional Hybrid Logic
and our Intensional Hybrid Type Theory have expressions that denote in-
tensions as well as extensions. And so, both languages include expressions
having as their extension the intensions of other expressions. Therefore, our
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intensional logic has not only an intensional semantics but also an intensional
syntax. Our type notation enables the expressions of our languages to denote
extensions as well as intensions.
Double Use of Intensional Terms
Among these expressions denoting intensions we have the terms of our lan-
guage. Our terms can have as denotation an extension or an intension. A
first-order term, for example, can denote an individual object, in case its
type were ι, or it can denote an individual concept (an intension), in case
its type were ι1. But a formal language where intensional terms only denote
intensions has a limited application. In natural language intensional terms
are also used to pick up concrete individuals in different contexts. Therefore
we have been looking for a method for “extensionalizing” the intensions at
particular situations which were not only a semantic rule but an element of
the syntax too. As a result, we have been able to make a double use of the
intensional terms of our language with a precise modus operandi : as denoting
directly an intension or as denoting indirectly an extensional object. This
double use of intensional terms in our logic reflects the double use in natural
language of expressions such as “the president of the USA”, which can denote
either a concept or a concrete individual at a given instance of time.
Hybridization for Intensions
We have found in hybrid operators the solution to the problem of exten-
sionalizing the intensions of our language. As a consequence, we have cre-
ated a First-Order Intensional Hybrid Logic and an Intensional Hybrid Type
Theory where we have added hybrid machinery to the classical extensional
expressions and to the new intensional ones. Nominals: a, b, . . . , satisfaction
operators @a and the ↓ operator, make up our hybrid machinery. It has
allowed us not only to extensionalize the intensional expressions, but also to
increase the expressivity of the languages. The nominals have supplied us
with names for any world of the model, the satisfaction operators have given
us the context where a certain intensional expression has to be evaluated,
and the ↓ operator has allowed us to fix the nominals of a formula to the
world of evaluation. The intensional term, cι1 , for “the Pope”, which denotes
the concept of the Pope, if preceded by a satisfaction operator @acι1 gives us
a new term with a new type—it has been metamorphosed in an extensional
term (also called a rigidified term) with type ι—which denotes the person
who is the Pope at the world named by a.
If we want to evaluate the formula P〈ιo1〉(@acι1), “the Pope is a nice man”,
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at our present world w0, and we want also to refer to the actual Pope, we
can fix a to our present world by means of ↓, getting so the formula:
↓aP〈ιo1〉(@acι1)
De Re and De Dicto
The distinction between intensional and extensional predication mirrors the
traditional distinction between de dicto and de re readings. If we understand
a dictum as a concept and a rem as an object, in intensional predication,
when a property applies to a concept, we would have a de dicto reading and,
in extensional predication, when a property applies to an object, we would
have a de re reading.
The distinction de dicto and de re has been raised, however, in modal
contexts mainly with respect to how modal operators behave in connection
with intensional terms. If P〈ιo1〉 is a predicate symbol for “is Argentinian”,
and cι1 is an intensional individual constant for “the Pope”, how should
the sentence “necessarily the Pope is Argentinian” be interpreted? Does it
state that the actual person ruling the Catholic Church is Argentinian at all
possible worlds? Is it maybe saying that at any possible world the person
who is the Pope at each of them, has to come from Argentina? These two
possible interpretations in modal contexts have motivated our study of the
readings de dicto and de re, and we have shown how predicate abstracts, on
the one side, and hybrid operators, on the other side, are different formal
mechanisms to solve the problem.
Coherence with the Types
Even though predicate abstracts have success in solving the ambiguity be-
tween de dicto and de re interpretations, however, they have given rise to
some problems concerning our type notation in the construction of formu-
las. Formulas with predicate abstracts in (Fitting & Mendelsohn, 1998) and
(Fitting, 2004), when analyzed from the point of view of our type notation,
do not fulfill the coherence criteria for a well formed formula, since we have
predicate abstracts of type 〈ιo1〉 applied to intensional constants of type ι1.
It can be said that predicate abstracts are the interface between intensional
terms and their extensional counterparts but, in any case, they should build
well formed formulas. We have solved the issue with the addition of hybrid
machinery which allows to extensionalize the intensional term, devaluing its
type to ι, and so the predicate abstract of type 〈ιo1〉 can be applied to it
adequately.
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Other incoherences with respect to our type notation have been analyzed
too, mainly the one dealing with modal operators. It is common to say
that modalities qualify propositions. However, it is not rare to find modal
sentences constructed with a modal operator and a first-order formula of
extensional type. We maintain that first-order formulas of type o should
not be combined with modal operators which require propositions. And
propositions, being the intensions of first-order sentences, are not of type o
but of type o1. Consequently, we have observed the rule that, since modal
operators qualify propositions, a formula in which modal operators qualify
sentences of type o, should not be considered a well formed formula. (Unless
a formula of extensional type o is intended as a rigid formula of intensional
type o1.)
Extensional and Intensional Expressions
Anyway, in spite of the problem of having modal operators with extensional
expressions, we do not have renounced to having extensional expressions in
our formal language. And although in our First-Order Intensional Hybrid
Logic all the formulas are of intensional type, in our Intensional Hybrid
Type Theory we have intensional and extensional formulas. Both formal
languages include extensional and intensional terms, but only the second one
(our Intensional Hybrid Type Theory) include extensional predicates as well
as intensional predicates. The great variety of expressions in our Intensional
Hybrid Type Theory makes it a good candidate for unifying extensional log-
ics, which are proper of non-empirical contexts such as mathematics, and
intensional logics, which are more appropriate for the empirical statements
that natural language conveys. Our Intensional Hybrid Type Theory is not
a purely intensional logic where extensions have to be handled indirectly, it
is a kind of unifier between extensional and intensional logic where mathe-
matical statements and natural language statements can be formalized and
interpreted.
Extensional and Intensional Terms
We have said before that our First-Order Intensional Hybrid Logic and our
Intensional Hybrid Type Theory include extensional and intensional terms.
We have considered that extensional or rigid terms, whose interpretation do
not vary with the context, are a precise way for formalizing proper names,
and that intensional terms are the formal counterpart of definite descriptions.
We are aware that there are many problems which can not be solved with this
assumption, which, though justified, raises many problem when the possible
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worlds are interpreted within an epistemic framework and not in an alethic
context (Kripke, 1980).
Neither extensional terms nor intensional terms—when denoting intensions—
raise denotation problems (with respect to the object domain of the model) .
But when intensional terms are extensionalized at a given world through hy-
brid operators, the problem of non-denoting terms appears. A problem that
we have had to solve, since our position regarding definite descriptions has
been to take Frege’s side—descriptions are proper terms—against Russell’s
contextual account of descriptions. We have dealt with the interpretation of
non-denoting terms through partial functions. We have considered intensions
as partial functions which are defined possibly at some worlds and possibly
not defined at others. And all the atomic formulas containing a non-denoting
terms have been evaluated as false, since we have not allowed to predicate
anything true of non-denoting terms.
Furthermore, it turns out that some ambiguities, in connection with the
negation of formulas containing non-denoting terms, can appear. Following
(Russell & Whitehead, 1925), we have used predicate abstracts as a successful
way of differentiating between the range of the scope of the negation symbol
in those formulas.
Constant and Varying Domains
Moreover, we have dealt with a common problem in modal logic which has
to do with quantification. Although we have studied actualist quantification
at the beginning of our dissertation, we have mainly assumed in our formal
languages that the quantification is possibilist. The rationale has been that
it is easier to manage constants domains instead of varying domains, and
that actualist quantification can be defined in constant domain models by
means of a primitive predicate E which is true at a world w of the objects
that are actually at w.
Identity of Senses
We have also considered the problem of the identity of the senses of two dif-
ferent expressions. We have studied the rules that classically applied to the
relation of identity and analyzed the problems which raise when terms other
than variables are taken into account. Our conclusion has been that while
identity of intensions provide us with a successful account of synonymy in
alethic contexts, however it is not successful for dealing with the relation of
synonymy in epistemic contexts. We have called the latter contexts: hyper-
intensional. In these hyperintensional contexts a more fine-grained notion
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than intension is needed. It is not sufficient to reduce senses to functions
interpreted in a set theoretical way, where you only have a correspondence
between arguments and values. A deeper approach which unveils the proce-
dure of how a function gives a value to a particular argument is needed: the
constructions of Pavel Tichý or the algorithms of Yiannis Moschovakis, are
the theories we have put forward. Another theory, which does not reduce
senses to intensions, but claiming for an stronger relation for the identity of
two senses than the mere logical equivalence has also been presented: it is
Church’s Alternative (0) with its criterion of synonymous isomorphism.
Formal Ontology
In our last chapter our objective has been to “extensionalize” intensional
logic, i.e., to apply our abstract formal languages to concrete philosophical
problems. We have chosen ontological arguments as a good example to start
with. Ontological arguments have had a close relationship with logic in the
course of the twentieth century and in our current time. From all the onto-
logical arguments at our disposal we have chosen two: one for proving the
existence of God (Gödel’s ontological proof), and other against the existence
of God (Caramuel’s ontological proof). But we have not only presented the
arguments as a mere mechanical formalization, we have also reconstructed
them by means of two main assumptions: that god is an individual concept,
not an individual object, and that the predicate of existence applies signifi-
cantly to individual concepts and not to individual objects. Existence, when
applied to objects at a world in a model, is therefore reduced to be a predi-
cate of location, which gives only information about the world(s) where the
object is situated.
Denotation issues have also been clarified at different moments of the dis-
sertation, either by means of a monary predicate which applies to intensional
terms (section 2.2.4 and section 2.5.6) or by means of a binary relation which
relates at a given world an intensional term with its extension (section 4.2.2).
Moreover we have given a formal account of the notions of existence and
denotation in constant domain models and in varying domain models. In
varying domain models, we have formalized the denotation predicate as a
monary predicate and the existence predicate as a predicate which can be
defined with actualist quantifiers (section 2.2.4). In constant domain mod-
els, we have formalized the denotation predicate either as a monary predicate
(section 2.5.6) or as a binary relation (section 4.2.2), and the existence pred-
icate as a predicate applied to intensions which needs a primitive predicate
of location to be formalized (section 4.2.2).
Through the analysis of ontological arguments we have also arrived to the
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conclusion that there are many philosophical notions which deserve a precise
formal account in order to clarify them. We have shown that this can be
done with the help of our formal languages. They are powerful enough to
formalize a statement such as “there is nothing”.
The formal analysis of philosophical problems has opened our field of
study to a great amount of philosophical problems which have not been
studied with mathematical methods. The enterprise of building a formal
ontology is still opened and it would deserve much more attention. At the
time when Montague presented his work on a model theoretical semantics for
natural languages many logicians saw his attempt as an anathema. Maybe
the same can be said about the development of a formal ontology. Philosophy
and logic have been looking at each other with suspicion. By contrast, we
have offered the analysis of ontological arguments as a link for a mutual
approach.
Final Claim
In conclusion, if we had to answer briefly to the question: what are then the
conclusions of your dissertation? We would reply that in the present work
we claim that the concepts of functions are not only functions of concepts,
as Church (1951) supposed. The concepts of predicates of type 〈ιo〉 are not
only intensional predicates of type 〈ι1o1〉 but also intensional predicates of
type 〈ιo1〉. This simple, but fertile assumption, is at the root of many philo-
sophical problems. Predication has usually been reduced to be a predication
of objects and not of intensions, and we have not had at our disposal a type
notation for telling apart between them. Thanks to the distinction between
intensional and extensional predication some philosophical problems, such as
the definition of the predicate of existence or the analysis of the ontological
arguments, can be solved with success.
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Church, A. (1993). A Revised Formulation of the Logic of Sense and Deno-
tation. Alternative (1). Noûs , 27 (2), 141–157.
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& P. Aglianò (Eds.), Logic and Algebra (pp. 125–135). New York:
Marcel Dekker.
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